CROZER QUARTERLY

Volume XXIII JULY, 1946 No. 3

THE MINISTER OF MINISTERS

EDWIN EWART AUBREY
Crozer Theological Seminary

THE CHINESE SYMBOL for man is a line connecting heaven and earth. We are reminded of the saying in our own tongue that man has his feet in the dirt and his head in the clouds; and in the old Genesis account of man's creation he is formed of the dust of the ground and animated with a divine spirit.

All of these observations point to the same truth: that man must be reckoned with on two levels, and that his deepest problems arise from the attempt to keep contact between them. If heaven were reduced to earthiness, or earth removed to heaven, then the connecting line in the Chinese pictograph would vanish, and man would disappear. Every man remains a victim of this dual character of his life, and in the words of the French poet Baudelaire he is "gnawed by a truceless desire."[1]

Many have been the attempts to absorb the earthly into the heavenly. Hinduism declared that mundane life is an illusion, and it lost track of the significance of personality. Humanism has tried to absorb the heavenly into earthiness, and has issued in Lippmann's strange definition of "high religion" as "learning to want what you know you can have,"—a text for philistines. No progress ever came that way. Progress comes only as men come to know how they can have what they want.

When men try to escape either heaven or earth they lose their distinctive human quality. If we were trying to find the special activity in man that holds heaven and earth in an uneasy yoke to pull the load of life, we should best locate it in the imagination. This is the great servant, the "minister of ministers," of which John Davidson speaks in his poem "Imagination."

It is also in another sense "the minister of ministers," for the special task of the ministry is to keep alive and urgent for men this connection of earth with heaven, of what is with what ought to be, of the finite with the infinite. Only the man of imagination can discharge that duty.

It is not that other men lack imagination. All have it as a condition of their being human at all. For it is only as desire reaches out beyond

[1] *Tableaux parisiens,* quoted in J. D. Bennett, *Baudelaire,* p. 104.

its present satisfaction to something greater, or something higher, that man is really himself. Sensuous desire develops its own imagery, and where this is not allowed to be expressed, it will find some other outlet. In many of the European cathedrals are to be seen to this day, hidden under the seats in the choir stalls, fantastically playful carvings of animals and men, a surreptitious release from the rigorous dogmatic regulations that then governed the decoration of churches, in line with the demands of St. Bernard. And in philosophy the repression of desire truncates the growth of the mind. Writing of stoicism, John Cowper Powys says, "The cult of philosophic endurance can bring, and can be made to bring, steady, obstinate, stubborn content; but there are few stoics among us from whose personality ecstasy flows forth like a luminous flood."[2]

Yet it is not for the stoics that I am concerned so much as for the men to whom imagination is a stranger, perhaps even a driveling idiot. Such men are dolts. Memories they may have, literal accuracy they may exhibit, conscientious hard work they may do; but they cannot be thinkers or leaders. Sometimes the imagination of a man is shriveled up by so-called education. A former colleague of mine at the University of Chicago once said that he could always tell whether the classroom he was entering was filled with graduate or undergraduate students. He would say, "Good morning!" If the students replied, "Good morning, Professor!" he knew it was an undergraduate class; but if they whipped open their notebooks and wrote it down, he knew they were graduate students.

The accelerated program has done something like that to many students. They have not had time to assimilate ideas, to reflect upon their reading, to let the imagination play around new knowledge; and so, too often, they have not become intelligent though they might be learned. Being less mature, they lack the experience to understand much in their fellow men. All the more then will they need to cultivate the imagination, feeding on great literature where the deeps of human agony and joy are made available. Furthermore, it is possible to know things without being curious about them. We may take them at face value and not inquire within. Curiosity is the pregnancy of thought soon to give birth to new imaginings. Without curiosity life is sterile; and life without imagination is already moribund. "Genius," said Emerson,[3] "is intellect constructive." And there is no constructive thinking without imagination. Imagination is like a millstream: it turns the wheels of thought, but is not exhausted in turning them.

It has been said that "the intense dramatic consciousness of high issues at stake . . . is the essence of religion."[4] If religion has any special

[2] *The Meaning of Culture*, p. 91.
[3] Essay on *Intellect*.
[4] J. C. Powys, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

function in society, it is to give men an "intense dramatic consciousness of high issues."

This is one of the great achievements of imagination, and it is seen at its best in the prophets. In them the intensity is furnished from the concave mirror of their faith which takes the light from the universe and focuses it on one target, one problem, till it stands out starkly and vividly in our consciousness. Preachers must always be doing this. Only so can the full measure of a human problem be taken. Only so can the tragic depths or glorious summits of life be reached by the intellect or the heart of their hearers. For example, how can we understand the meaning of marriage apart from the great cosmic principle that creative power is achieved by bringing together the diverse into unity. Then the importance of the distinctness of the two personalities (the rights within marriage), the coöperation made possible because they differ (the obligations of marriage), and the enrichment of the world through mingling of their lives (the glory of marriage), are seen as a part of the great universal purpose of God, and then it is he who has joined them together.

The prophets saw through history to its deeper meanings, and these they often dramatized in vivid and terrible words. Sometimes they wrote with the archangel before their eyes, and their words were of doom or of marvelous rescue.

Such intellectual imagination is the stuff of the gospel; but the religious leader must also dramatize it in the imagery that is vivid today. Ancient colors fade, and ancient metaphors grow vague in meaning. The alert preacher must catch the images of current life and use them to clothe the insights of his deepest thought. Then every sermon becomes a drama —not a melodrama or a burlesque, mind you, but an epic of the human spirit.

Creative imagination forms images of the unseen, making them so vivid that men "live as seeing that which is invisible." It makes a future out of the stuff of memory but cut to a new pattern. It builds bridges over which we may pass from our deserts to the promised land. Sometimes those bridges are delicate suspension bridges, graceful but strong with well-tempered cables of logical thought. Sometimes they rise sturdily out of the ground of common experience, building up strength with solid blocks of familiar ideas, but giving them power to carry an incredibly heavy freight of hope. Sometimes the prophet says, "Behold!" and gives a vision; sometimes he says "Because" and gives an argument. But either way he glows with imaginative thought.

Of course it is quite possible for imagination to flee from reality into fantasy, and this may sap the vitals of a man. The leader must be a perennial peddler of hope to the despairing. Yet what is hope but imag-

ination married to experience and redeeming its partner from frustration?

Creative imagination, is, however, not only the great emancipator. It is also the grand inquisitor. It casts its searchlight into the dark places, and brings forth unsuspected wealth out of the opulence of common experience. The artist does not paint features but personality. Just so imagination sees in the unpromising man the hidden possibilities of greatness, as Jesus did in the demon-possessed Magdalene and in Matthew the publican. It can gain freedom by abdicating from the present; and it can also transform the hopeless present by finding in the garbage heap of failures some nourishment for future good. It can lift up the weary from the slough, and set them on the mountain road with new strength and courage.

Thus can the imaginative mind enter in and dwell companionably with the sorriest folk. This is sympathy. So much of our censorious pride is sheer lack of imagination. We cannot understand the souls of other men, because we cannot get beyond the circle of our own selfishness. We cannot often enough imagine the world without ourselves at the centre. Then, too, we cannot understand God, who is the true centre of the world's meaning; and knowing neither God nor man, we become as exiles in the market place. To enter in and sup, and know—this is the task of every helpful Christian. Not that one takes their lives for his. Jesus consorted with the publicans and sinners, but he never became one. His imagination probed their souls, but it also held fast to something far beyond them. The leader will want to know and love people; but he must keep free of them to guide them. None ever became a great preacher by becoming a mere henchman of a congregation. Let sympathy be a resource, and the vision the goal.

By the same token we must let the imagination play upon the past. Here the reconstructive imagination can bring from the Bible vital truth. From the bare words it can bring out the depth of the sorrow at the waters of Babylon, the sublimity of Paul's faith that nothing in the wide universe could separate him from God's love, the trenchancy of Amos' judgment on social corruption, the agonizing doubt of Jeremiah in his moment of defeat, the loneliness of Jesus when the Twelve misunderstood him. Only as a man feels the tug of such experiences upon his own soul can he really expound the Scriptures.

The task of religious leadership in our time can be done only by imaginative minds that draw from the past its inner riches, see the needs of our own day with clarity and sympathy, project great dreams into the future to guide men's hopes, and build roads from the present towards those future goals. Prosaic, overcautious, little minds will be inadequate

to that high responsibility. We need the ministry of imagination, that minister of ministers.

How is imagination to be cultivated? All of us have, as children, blown soap bubbles with a pipe. We dipped the pipe into the bowl of soapsuds and then blew gently while the bubble grew till finally it broke away, a perfect sphere, and drifted iridescent in the air. Just so we dip our minds into the reservoir of our experiences and develop them into ideas that form and float free of the concrete facts. New lights shimmer in them by free and—for the moment—irresponsible imagination. Later we shall want to use those new lights to enrich our experience itself; for the free association of ideas releases us from the fixed arrangement of our thought and makes new insights and appreciations possible. The fantastic may turn out to be the really true, as has so often happened in the history of science and philosophy. In the "House of Magic" in Schenectady scientists play with ideas in this way, and enough fresh discoveries emerge to justify the enterprise even to a commercial concern.

Men also build new insights by slower, less daring thought, making little forays from the citadel of knowledge to bring back new food for thought. A fact of history suggests a possible connection with its age. The stern moralism of Kant suggests a connection with his Pietist background, and the historian reaches out to explore the Pietists and gets a new clue to the understanding of Kant. Or Paul's idea of justification may suggest the Jewish theology or the Roman law of his day, and the New Testament scholar makes excursions in both directions to see what Paul might mean. So thought lives on, fed by the foraging of its imaginative heroes.

These are the jottings in the margin of our notes, and by them we escape the limits of our preconceived ideas. When one reads, he should make jottings such as these and try them out. Then he can escape the hardening of the arteries of thought.

"But how," one will ask, "are we to keep our imagination disciplined, so that we do not lose ourselves in fancy?" Let us first be careful not to discipline too rigidly, for imagination is a way to humility. Only the man who has reached out beyond his well-knit thought suspects with Ruskin that "all our thoughts are but degrees of darkness."[5] And this humility is itself a discipline, warning us against too great a confidence in our present intellectual achievements.

Imagination must come back again to find men where they are. The new idea must be related to what we already have if it is to help us forward. We may hitch our wagon to a star, but that also means that the star is hitched then to our wagon. We must explore the dream itself

[5] *Lectures on Art*, § 38.

and see how it can help us in the present. Thus bridled, the bucking bronco of imagination gives us strength and spirit to carry us fast and far. Without the bridle, it will throw us off and run wild, useless and dangerous.

This has often happened in religion. It happened when the Alexandrian fathers made allegories of the sober Bible facts, and wandered into fantasy. It happened in the Middle Ages when art was subjected to symbolic interpretation and engendered fantastic speculations on its own account divorced from what it once had symbolized.

Imagination needs close contact with reality if it is really to redeem life. When we fly a kite high in the wind, we need a string to hold it to the breeze, or it collapses and comes down to earth. So does the lofty flight of thought demand a firm hand on the string of logical continuity to keep it high. When this is done, the winds of God can fill the high-flown fancy with power enough to turn the world and change the hearts of men.

God is the ultimate reality, and the secret of all realism. Our imagination reaches up toward him, for our desire finds that its growing appetite can be satisfied only by communion with him.[6] To pray is to open the imagination towards God, and prayer is thought with growing pains. Thought is germane to prayer, but prayer runs on and reaches out in daring imagination and in hope. Then God touches the heart of man and lifts him up.

When this happens to a leader, he can lift his people up, touching them with his fire and kindling to flame the little fagots that they bring. The spiritual fire is lit, and in a darkening world new light and warmth are spread abroad against the winter chill. Then men can live.

[6] J. D. Bennett, *Baudelaire,* p. 149.

THE PLIGHT OF RELIGIOUS JOURNALISM

R. E. WOLSELEY
Northwestern University

TAILORS AND PRINTERS complain that depressions and wars have left them with too few apprentices for the future safety of their trades. But those industries are healthy compared with religious journalism in the United States, for that occupation not only is short of personnel but also is facing technological progress which it is even less well prepared to meet than is the general press.

Why is the religious press in this plight when once it was among the most powerful influences in American life? There are numerous answers, some much like those advanced to explain why the church is so distant from many working people or artists.

Religious journalism, to begin with, has several manifestations. Presentation of the news of religion and of the organized church in general publications is one. Publishing papers and magazines wholly devoted to religion and the church is another. Closely related to it are religious publicity and advertising. But there are no reliable figures on the number of religious journalists and publications or of the aggregate circulations of those publications. Associated as they are with a propagandistic institution—the church—religious journalists do less to advance their own interests and efficiency through organization than the teachers of high school journalism in many states, who support several magazines and meet to solve mutual problems.

The devoted and capable religious journalist of today, often a minister as well, is truly a man of God, for he has much to put up with. Only his loyalty to his beliefs can explain his willingness to work with so many handicaps.

Despite that devotion he sometimes is his own worst obstacle because he is untrained in journalism. Far too often a church board which would hesitate to employ him as an electrician lightly makes him editor of a magazine because he can prepare sermons or write letters to parishioners. Often he is a superannuated preacher or retired seminary teacher, undoubtedly competent in either field but as strange to the world of journalism as any other conventional reader of the press. And if the religious journalist is not to be described thus, the chances are that he is a young person filled with ambition and all the stupendous technique which one can learn editing a college weekly for one year.

An example of what happens when a board turns a publication over to a well-meaning but untrained editor occurred even on one of the fairly

well-edited religious monthlies serving a denomination. One of its subordinate editors did some special outside work with reader interest surveys. He went back to his office primed to suggest something similar for his magazine. But the editor, a nice old gentleman whose study of journalistic techniques stopped at Horace Greeley, refused to undertake such a survey because, he said, he already knew pretty well what his readers wanted.

All American church bodies, regardless of denomination, are run by people who are not young. Old age, here as elsewhere, means conservatism. The adventurous, progressive, and courageous editor has so often been interfered with that he must count on such interference.

Incidents can be quoted from various denominations. In one notorious case last year the editor of a whole group of church-school papers was dismissed after he had been one of the sponsors of a local meeting addressed by Norman Thomas. It was not that meeting, of course, which undid him, but a sympathy on this editor's part with mildly unorthodox political ideas in general.

In another instance a denominational headquarters requested the editors of one of its publications not to carry the advertisements of books by E. Stanley Jones because such advertising might be considered a recommendation of that famous missionary's views by the denomination. Another publication of the same denomination, however, printed a full page of patent-medicine advertising.

The conservative editors and the fearful brass hats, instead of looking for ways in which religious journals can lead the church people who read their publications to more progressive ideas, seem to spend their time expunging from the editorial schedules everything which might give undue offense. This reached its most ridiculous low not long ago when one brass hat, after taking a new editor's suggestion about shifting to the back some portion of a magazine's content (a special feature which for many years had been at the front) swiftly put the feature in the front again after one letter of complaint had been received.

The result is that many Southern religious journals are frightened to face the racial issue squarely, and many a Northern publication skids around the subject of labor unionism. The theological and doctrinal taboos can be imagined. They are deep-seated and rarely reconsidered.

By no means is this hush-hush policy on certain subjects directed only by conservative ecclesiastical officers. There is honest fear on the part of reasonable leaders that the rank and file of church members will not tolerate too many new ideas in publications emanating from the church. At some points this is a justified concern. But little attempt is made to find out just who the constituents are, how the older people's ideas differ

from the concepts of the younger readers, and if there is a minority which will support new views. Usually the group that writes the most letters of protest is feared the most.

But if religious journalism is to have any guts, it must bring religion's light to bear upon all the subjects that are important to readers. Religious journalists must do more than print stale sermons from overenthusiastic preachers or sentimental essays that cannot be ignored because they come from denominational bigwigs. It is not enough, for example, to print in issue after issue the story of the evil effects of liquor. It is necessary to publish articles, in popular educational form, that show the economic basis of the liquor traffic. This must not be avoided because it may lead to discussion of certain economic reforms.

After an analysis of nearly one hundred copies of twenty weekly and monthly newspapers and magazines published in 1945 by one large denomination, it was found that they presented news and views generously and consistently on only three or four social problems, one of them the relatively safe topic of the liquor traffic.

The religious point of view, however, was almost never presented to the readers on such topics as housing problems, racial intolerance, cartels, anti-Semitism, conscription for peacetime military training, religious education in public schools, juvenile delinquency, veterans' rehabilitation or education, Latin-American relations, rebuilding of war-torn countries and Christian social relations.

Religious journalism did not always thus shilly-shally, for church-published magazines and papers are among the oldest in the nation and at one time were among the most stimulating available to the public, being the real "idea" journals of their day.

A little more than a century ago there were more readers of religious publications in New York City than of all other types put together. It has been estimated that in 1840 three-fourths of all the reading by the American people was religious. This was true despite the fact that the *Christian Advocate,* the *Churchman,* and the *Watchman-Examiner* in those days had mechanical and manuscript problems even greater than those of the mid-1940's. By the turn of the century, however, much of this influence had been lost to the secular papers, with their national distribution improved by the expansion of transportation, which carried not only them but also the commodities they advertised.

A few religious publications still move in the traditions of the powerful papers and magazines of a century ago. Foremost among these is the *Christian Century,* which calls itself an undenominational journal of religion. It has on its staff three of the foremost religious journalists in the country: Charles Clayton Morrison, Paul Hutchinson, and Harold Fey.

Hutchinson and Fey are younger and less dogmatic than their editor, Morrison, and are looked upon by journalists from the "outside" world as well-informed, broadly traveled, and technically competent workmen. The *Century's* circulation, however, remains low, but it is influential among the preachers who comprise the bulk of its circulation list of about 38,000. Its views often find expression in the pulpit and it is read carefully by the nation's leading ministers. It takes a deep interest in politics, racial conflicts, and business trends as well as in theological disputes and new writings on religion.

Not unlike it in appearance but more doctrinaire in tone, and naturally less free in range, is the Catholic publication, *Commonweal,* with a modest 14,000 circulation. Except for its Catholic slant it is a traditional liberal weekly rather than a religiously motivated publication. This magazine, however, has vitality and courage, which set it apart from the often namby-pamby sheets of many another group. Also far above the average are *Advance,* of the Congregational-Christian church; *Zion's Herald,* an independent Methodist publication; *motive,* the Peck's bad boy among Methodist youth publications, which probably is the most outspoken, intelligently edited, and emancipated of all religious journals hooked to denominational purse strings and is barely tolerated by some Methodist brass hats; the *Christian Register,* Unitarian monthly whose humanism gives it broad scope; the *Churchman,* an ably edited Episcopal journal often far ahead of its denominational backers in viewpoint; the *Michigan Christian Advocate,* a Methodist regional weekly of considerable vigor; and a few others.

This handful stands out, however, in a welter of thin-blooded Sunday-school papers, educational quarterlies, and miscellaneous publications ranging from collections of conventional devotional literature to handsome scholarly journals carrying abstract articles in the jargon of the theologian. Here and there some particular small quarterly or special monthly, like *Social Action,* will take a boldly sociological attitude toward religion and earn the respect of those sickened by the Babbittry in so much religious journalism.

Business conditions on religious publications also hamstring the journalist. Although he is paid little, generally he reconciles himself to it because most religious workers are thus treated. Often he is a socially minded, altruistic being whose satisfactions come from more than money. But his publication sometimes must be subsidized, and being subsidized must follow the instructions of those who provide the cash. It must be thus supported, frequently, because there is not enough advertising or subscription money to keep it afloat. Consequently it is a cheaply printed, dull publication used as a propaganda organ. Little real loyalty is won

from its readers, who receive it, like as not, as part of the parish paper of the local church or in some group subscription plan. Not only is the religious journalist paid too little, but his equipment is likely to be old and worn; sometimes he cannot get the best workmanship because he must hire someone from his denomination or patronize some friend or member of the group or use the services only of the denominational publishing house.

If he is the kind of religious journalist who does not work within the framework of the church but covers church news for a general paper, he is thought to be a queer duck. Unless he disregards the opinions of the churchmen he must deal with, he dare not take part even in the office beer party. Except on the largest metropolitan papers the church beat is shoved off on some tyro, and on the metropolitan sheets is used largely as a teaser to catch advertising.

Church news and religious views are so badly handled by the American newspaper that an informed religious journalist cannot stand the job in the average city. Hence this responsibility falls to a lad or lass who might do well enough covering a church social but hasn't the faintest knowledge of the controversy over Karl Barth or the difference between the Mennonites and the Mohammedans. This indifference of the American press to religion and church as real news is an important factor in explaining the plight of religious journalism. If the public is not informed about these subjects through the daily papers, the movies, and the radio, religious journalism has a larger responsibility than ever in its history. And there is no denying that these three communication agencies regard religion as strictly an extracurricular activity. The secular and the religious editors alike are plagued by certain problems as a result. Chief among these is to decide whether to give the public what it wants.

Secular editors seem to have decided for all time to give the public what it wants, although they are troubled about how to discern those desires. They have few certainties, most of those which they have being in the realm of magazine material, like comics and pictures and columns. The fact that they do not give the public much material about religion has driven more and more churches to producing their own publications. Whenever the church journalist ponders what he shall do about giving the public what it wants, he worries about it from the angle of giving the public what he thinks it wants or what he wants it to want.

This is an ancient controversy among all journalists, and not just religious ones. In this country we have a reflection of it in the editing philosophies of such newspapers as the New York *Times,* on the one hand, and the Hearst papers, on the other. But when one examines the shelffuls of religious publications in any big seminary library, one realizes that

the religious journalist is making his principal appeal, not to the masses or to the classes but to the spirit of denominationalism and sectionalism.

And now a new spectre arises—technological advance affecting all printed journalism. It comes at a time when it is clear, to the careful reader of religious journalism, that the persons responsible for it are not even yet making the most of the simple technological processes and methods in production and distribution of modern journalism.

This does not mean that church papers and magazines must become in appearance, if not in content, copies of *Harper's Bazaar* and *Esquire*. Nor does it mean that good production methods are impossible under church journalism budgets, as some denominations have shown.

But if it has not been able or permitted to keep up with the general press in technique and scope, what will become of the religious press when the so-called mechanical threats to the general press arrive: television, facsimile, frequency modulation? Only one of these—facsimile—may affect the religious press drastically. Radio has not supplanted newspapers, although it has affected their counting rooms seriously. FM is another form of radio broadcast, with its main importance the possibility of getting still more of the advertiser's appropriation and thus affecting the church publications that depend upon heavy advertising schedules.

Television may have little more effect upon the newspaper, religious or otherwise, than radio, for like radio it disappears, even though it is before the viewer's eyes, and leaves no record. It undoubtedly will interfere with reading habits or will develop new ones; it may bring about the shift of emphasis from religious journalism to religious photography.

Facsimile newspaper reproduction, however, whether or not it is owned by the present newspaper publishers and operators, could force a whole new set of changes on the daily as well as weekly press and could make life unhappy for the nation's journalistic entrepreneurs, including the religious publishers. As we can learn from popular science magazines, facsimile newspapers may become fresh voices to shatter the silence on controversial issues in today's American papers. The indifference to religion of the general press has given the church press some opportunity of its own. If facsimile revitalizes the press, the religious journalist cannot promote his publication on the argument that general publications are oblivious to religion or to the social needs of the land.

If facsimile does not have this result after all, it will be necessary for religious journalists to meet the challenge as put by Wallace Greene, now an independent religious journalist: ". . . he [the Christian journalist] must survey the situation, show it for what it really is, and point up the fact . . . that the application of Christian principles to the situation is the only way to remedy it and to bring about a lasting and desirable alterna-

tive. For this is the Christian journalist's faith: that the application of Christian principles is the only practical and lasting solution to humanity's muddles, all the way up and down the scale from personal to global and back again."

Facsimile holds another threat or challenge to religious journalism. If it pours more reading matter into the market—literally into the home through the gadget that may be rented by the newspaper to the citizen—it can further distract the public from serious reading.

During Protestant Press Month several years ago, Dr. Bernard J. Mulder, then president of the Associated Church Press, pointed out that "estimated figures show that about 16,000,000 copies of the 'horror' magazines are sold each month" and that "15,000,000 copies of the sex magazines are also sold each 30 days, with young people buying the larger share." Although just what Dr. Mulder meant by "sex magazines" may not be clear, at least the sales of comic books, running to around 30,000,000, offers a strong contrast to the distribution of the religious publications of the nation, estimated by the present head of Associated Church Press, Dr. T. Otto Nall, as more than 2,000,000.

General journalism, whatever its mechanical form, will continue to give the public what it wants. The only way religious journalism can escape from its plight is to avoid being lukewarm about its social responsibility. It cannot, as Harper Leech and John Carroll said years ago about the newspaper in general, "be a jellyfish conforming in shape to every transient pressure."

THE ORIGINS AND PRINCIPLES OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY

GEORGE W. DAVIS
Crozer Theological Seminary

Few movements within the Christian church have vitalized Christianity and given it a resurgence of influence more than has evangelical Christianity. When one considers the millions whom it has saved from personal evil, plus the extensive good it has effected in the social order, one is indeed brought to spiritual attention, and his hat, so to speak, quietly removed. To mention only one achievement at this point, we note the effect of the Wesleyan revival upon England. Definitely evangelical in character, that movement went to the roots of eighteenth-century England's vice and spiritual misery, taking debased clergy by the hundreds and debauched laity by the tens of thousands to transform them into sober, serious, industrious, moral, and God-fearing men and women. So deep and wide was the reformation of English life that not a few believe it saved England from a débâcle comparable to the French Revolution. William E. H. Lecky, who certainly cannot be classified as a historian possessing any great bias in favor of religion, has this to say in his monumental work, *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century,* concerning the achievements of the Methodist preacher:

> The doctrines he taught, the theory of life he enforced, proved themselves capable of arousing in great masses of men an enthusiasm of piety which was hardly surpassed in the first days of Christianity, of eradicating inveterate vice, of fixing and directing impulsive and tempestuous natures that were rapidly hastening towards the abyss. . . . It [Methodism] planted a fervid and enduring religious sentiment in the midst of the most brutal and most neglected portions of the population, and whatever may have been its vices or its defects, it undoubtedly emancipated great numbers from the fear of death, and imparted a warmer tone to the devotion and a greater energy to the philanthropy of every denomination both in England and the Colonies.[1]

If evangelical Christianity had achieved no more than that, which is truly but a small part of its fruitage, it would still deserve the serious consideration of everyone who seeks to understand the power of religion.

Despite the good that it has done, evangelical Christianity has not always enjoyed clear sailing. Some have had only evil to say concerning it because at times its profound appeal to the feelings has spilled over into emotional excesses, such as shoutings, jumpings, seizures, or speaking in tongues, thus earning the reproach of the enemies of "enthusiasm" in

[1] Vol. II, p. 653.

religion. At other times, the failure of its adherents to live a life worthy of the clear, ethical demands of this type of piety has aroused the ire of its critics. And justly so! Yet it needs also to be stressed that such aberrations as we have mentioned have inspired contempt only in minds which fail to integrate the whole stage of evangelical religion, preferring instead to concentrate their attention upon the bad boy setting fire to the curtains at the end of the platform. While we should not condone evil anywhere, it is certainly a mistake to allow a little evil to becloud a great good. Many of the critics of evangelicalism have been guilty of such distinctly short-sighted judgment.

Just what is evangelical Christianity? The answer to that question will depend upon one's point of view. If one looks at evangelicalism from a theological standpoint, he will define it as that form of Christianity which holds that sinful man can be delivered from his misery only through the free grace of a holy God made available by faith in the sacrifice of Christ. If, on the other hand, he considers evangelical Christianity from a humanitarian angle, he will be compelled to speak of it as that form of Christianity which places an exceedingly great value upon the person, holding that religion is meant for the transformation of man and his empowerment for Christian usefulness. Yet again, approached from the psychological standpoint, evangelical Christianity would have to be defined as that form of Christianity which bases its authority upon insight, feeling, will, and heart-leadings, rather than upon strictly rational discoveries, however important these may be considered to be. The evangelical prefers to base his religion upon the inner certainties springing from genuinely Christian feelings. He refuses to approach religion with the head alone, fearful lest he degenerate from a religious man into a mere theologian. He knows the truth registered in an observation of Henry Drummond:

> It does not take a religious man to be a theologian; it simply takes a man with fair reasoning powers. This man happens to apply these powers to doctrinal subjects, but in no other sense than he might apply them to astronomy or physics. I knew a man, the author of a well-known orthodox theological work which has passed through a dozen editions, and lies on the shelves of all our libraries. I never knew that man to go to church, nor to give a farthing in charity, though he was a rich man, nor to give any sensible sign whatever that he had ever heard of Christianity.[2]

Fearful lest he fall into the lifelessness of a sterile rationalism or a formal Christianity, the evangelical has ever sought for authentic tidings of God's working within the innermost recesses of his soul. Such primary assurances are to him the root of religion without which he could know neither peace, nor joy, nor redemption.

[2] Henry Drummond, *The New Evangelism,* pp. 36 f.

The Origins of Evangelical Christianity

The evangelicals, of course, find their spiritual antecedents in the men who composed the writings which now constitute our New Testament. Undoubtedly, as will be apparent in our later discussion, they can and do find rootage for all their basic principles in that collection of books. The sinfulness of man, the power and holiness and wrath of God, the mercy and love of the heavenly Father, the need for cleansed affections, God's direct, saving activity in Jesus Christ, and the requirement for holy living are all there. So among many others the evangelicals would regard Peter and Paul, Barnabas and Luke, John and Silas, as having been filled with the evangelical spirit. Moreover, thinking in terms of the centurylong history of Christianity, not a few of the evangelicals would hold that whenever and wherever there has been a proclamation of the good tidings of that salvation made possible by God's grace revealed and pledged in Christ, there the evangelical mind has been at work. They would list among the leaders in this evangelical succession such men and women as the following: Augustine; St. Francis of Assisi; Peter Waldo; the Friends of God, among whom were Meister Eckhart, Henry of Nördlingen, John Tauler, Henry Suso, and Jan of Ruysbroeck; the Brethren of the Common Life, among whom were Gerard Groote and Thomas à Kempis; Catherine of Siena; John Wyclif; William Tyndale; Martin Luther; John Calvin. All of these held to a free and personal interpretation of God's grace, making it the indispensable condition of human redemption as it is mediated through Christ. Though many of them bowed to ecclesiastical authority and other externals in religion, their real philosophy of Christianity led them to place the inner before the outer, the personal before the institutional, the spiritual before the formal. Collectively considered, they represent a noble spiritual blossoming which finally came to full flower in the evangelicalism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

However true this larger picture of the history of evangelical Christianity may be, our concern with it in this paper dates from the time when it became a specific phenomenon, and later, a definite movement of religion, within the Protestant division of Christianity.

As a phenomenon in Protestantism evangelicalism emerged only when protesting groups arose requiring regeneration as the requisite condition for a close walk with God, combined with the insistence that regeneration is in no wise mediated or controlled by church, priest, sacrament, or any external principle. The Anabaptists were the first such Protestant group, strongly urging the indispensability of inward faith resulting from a personal experience of God's grace in Christ. They insisted that only spiritual persons should be counted as members of the church. Hence they eschewed

infant baptism, affirming that until men and women knew faith personally, there was no justification for their baptism into the church. What their horror would be if they read this statement from a living English churchman may easily be imagined: "Baptism has no efficacy apart from faith. Is infant baptism, then, the most blatant instance of *opus operatum?* The answer is that the faith is that of the Church, not of the child."[3] The Anabaptists repudiated all such secondary or mediated faith. Faith must be inward, personal, immediately and directly experienced. Thus in 1523 we find Balthasar Hübmaier, a highly educated (doctor of theology) Roman Catholic priest, studying Paul's epistles and through them being converted to the position that religion makes no true beginning save in a personal experience of redemption through Christ. Having attained to that position, he left the Roman church. Two years later he was rebaptized, became an Anabaptist leader, and persuaded his congregation at Waldshut on the Rhine to follow him into the freer faith. He died at Vienna in 1528, burned at the stake for his fidelity to the new way. Men of his stripe—and they were a goodly company—rooted religion in personal regeneration. Hübmaier's words in his *Dialogue with Œcolampadius* state their position: "Some of you tell me of the faith of another, of father or mother, some of the faith of godfathers, some of the faith of the Church, and all of this is spoken without foundation in the Scriptures. . . . for, the just will live by his own faith. . . . The Christian Church is built on the confession of one's own faith."[4]

The insistence upon personal, adult faith, registered in regeneration, as the criterion of Christian experience, was to be sustained by the Mennonites in Holland, the Pietists and Moravians in Germany, and the Baptists, along with other separatist groups, in seventeenth-century England. Once kindled by the Anabaptists, the light of evangelical Christianity has never gone out in Protestant history.

As a definite and effective religious movement within Protestantism, however, rather than as a phenomenon among scattered, protesting groups, evangelicalism may be dated from the days of the Great Awakening in eighteenth-century America and the Wesleyan revival which occurred contemporaneously in England. In Murray's, *A New English Dictionary,* we read under the term evangelical:

> As a distinct party designation, the term came into general use, in England, at the time of the Methodist revival; and it may be said, with substantial accuracy, to denote the school of theology which that movement represents, though its earlier associations were rather with the Calvistic than the Arminian branch of the movement. In the early part of the 19th c. the words "Methodist" and "Evangelical" were, by adversaries, often used indiscriminately, and associated with accusations of fanaticism and "puritanical" disapproval of social pleasures.

[3] J. S. Whale, *Christian Doctrine,* p. 166.
[4] Cited by Henry C. Vedder, *Balthasar Hübmaier, the Leader of the Anabaptists,* p. 121.

When Methodism finally separated from the Established Church of England, however, it did not destroy evangelicalism within that body. On the contrary, many evangelicals opposed to secession organized the evangelical party within the Church of England, making it a constructive and growing force therein which endures to the present largely as the Low Church party. Evangelicalism also found rootage in Scotland, creating the evangelical party within the church of that country.

From one country to another evangelicalism has spread until there is scarcely a Protestant group of any size that has not felt the impulse of its spirit. As a movement of religious faith and spiritual life, therefore, it has been well-nigh universal, refusing to confine itself to any particular theological school or division of the Christian church. Since the days of Whitefield and Wesley there has been a Calvinistic evangelical movement and an Arminian evangelical movement. Evangelicalism has flourished within state churches as well as among the separatists and dissenters in a score of lands. There have been evangelicals in Pietistic Germany and Presbyterian Scotland, in Mennonite Holland and revivalistic America. The evangelical principle has thus proven itself to be greater than any particular theology, more extensive than a national church, and larger than any sectarian division of Christianity. To understand why so many Christians in different groups and theologies are classified as evangelicals, we must turn to the principles which undergird this movement of Christian faith and life.

The Principles of Evangelical Christianity

At least *five* principles can be clearly discerned as belonging to evangelical Christianity. While some of these are dear to other groups of Christians, it is the combination of them which produces the evangelical type, making it a distinctive piety within the complex of Christian interpretations, worship, and action. These five principles are: 1. Persons are beings of worth; 2. The root of religion goes down into the affections; 3. There is no substitute for personal relationship with God; 4. Salvation is due to the direct and indispensable action of God upon the human heart; and 5. Salvation must eventuate in goodness. We consider these five principles in detail.

Persons are beings of worth. One cannot comprehend the truth, the power, and the appeal of evangelicalism apart from its contention that all men are of worth to God and hence should be of worth to one another. Feeling that way, the evangelical has ever been filled with a concern for the individual. He holds that in every man there is a sacred centre which cannot be violated without the offender bringing condemnation upon himself. You may call this central reality the soul, the spirit, the personality, or something else. By whatever name you designate it, the evangelical asserts

it to be the holy of holies within the barbarian, the Christian, or the man of no religion, which must not be transgressed. Hence there has ever been in the evangelical's mind a reverence for children, an opposition to all cruelty and misuse of men, and a desire to make life more abundant for others. He is filled, in other words, with a love of souls, without which the evangelical spirit cannot be said to exist in him. In his mind the worth of the person is supreme.

Perhaps there is no better way of suggesting the evangelical's sense of personal worth than by looking at the condition of the English church in the days when the evangelical revival occurred. In the villages, where five out of every six Englishmen lived in the eighteenth century, the church was plagued with two deadly evils: pluralities and nonresidence. These twin evils enabled one ecclesiastic to control *in absentia* as many as twenty or thirty churches, much as a district manager controls a chain of food stores, although the cleric undoubtedly did it with considerably less efficiency. The governing rector, moreover, might appear only at rare intervals or not at all if he so chose. His strategy was to send substitutes to conduct the Sunday services and collect the assessments levied upon the parishioners. In this way he gained the income from many parishes, regarding his churches as a good business proposition, seldom as an agency for the cure of souls. G. R. Balleine gives the following picture of the religious situation in the English villages at the outbreak of the evangelical revival:

> The Bishops did nothing to interfere [with these twin evils of pluralities and nonresidence], for they were the worst offenders. The Bishop of Llandaff . . . was Rector at one and the same time of two parishes in Shropshire, two in Leicestershire, two in the Isle of Ely, three in Huntingdonshire, and seven in Wales, while he himself lived in Westmoreland the life of a prosperous farmer. "Having no place of residence," he wrote, "in my diocese, I turned my attention to the improvement of land. I thought the improvement of a man's fortune by cultivating the earth was the most useful and honourable way of providing for a family."
>
> Squadrons of curates galloped from the towns early on Sunday mornings, each man meaning to visit six or seven villages. The sextons kept watch on the church towers for the coming of the parson, and when he was sighted rang the bell to summon the congregation. As soon as the prayers were gabbled through, the curate mounted his horse and rode on to the next village, and was not seen again for a week. Hundreds of parishes had only one service a week, and even that was dropped whenever the weather was bad.[5]

This basic unconcern for personal life was also reflected in the legal system of eighteenth-century England. Over two hundred offenses were punishable with death. A man could be hanged for breaking down the banks of a fish pond, picking a pocket, or stealing a sheep. There is a case on record of a woman who was hanged with her child at her breast for

[5] G. R. Balleine, *A History of the Evangelical Party in the Church of England,* pp. 17 f.

taking up a piece of linen which she quickly lay down when the shopkeeper detected her action.[6] Hangings were converted from tragic events into sources of popular amusement, many witnesses paying for front seats as though they were attending a prize fight.

The condition of the times made one thing clear—an upsurge of genuine religion was needed to reëstablish the worth of the individual. The evangelical revival provided just that, bringing with it the necessary reevaluation. A passage in Richard Baxter's *A Call to the Unconverted*, is typical of many in evangelical literature disclosing this concern for persons. (Parenthetically, Baxter was the man who so transformed the town of Kidderminster in Worcestershire in the late seventeenth century, that one could not walk down through its streets without hearing hymns being sung in a hundred homes.) The passage, typical of the spirit and emphasis of the entire evangelical movement, reads:

> It is life, not death, that is the first part of our message to you; our commission is to offer salvation, certain salvation; a speedy, glorious, everlasting salvation, to every one of you; to the poorest beggar as well as the greatest lord; to the worst of you, even to drunkards, swearers, worldlings, thieves, yea, to the despisers and reproachers of the holy way of salvation. We are commanded by the Lord our Master to offer you a pardon for all that is past, if you will but now at last return and live; we are commanded to beseech and entreat you to accept the offer, and return; to tell you what preparation is made by Christ; what mercy stays for you; what patience waiteth for you; what thoughts of kindness God hath toward you; and how happy, how certainly and unspeakably happy you may be if you will.[7]

Here was a type of Christianity which brimmed over with a contagious love for man, exalting the worth of every person.

The root of religion goes down into the affections. Evangelicalism has ever opposed the sufficiency of human reason. Revolting against the stubborn and barren rationalism of the eighteenth century, the evangelicals substituted the direct experience of God's love and grace for merely reasonable considerations. In another sense, their revolt went even deeper, for theirs was a rebellion against scholasticism's agelong emphasis that the intellect rather than the will is central in religion. The evangelicals dared to challenge that thesis, giving first place to the will. They declared that with his intellect alone man is unable to plumb the life of God and find the way to satisfying relationship with him. He must abandon any sense of personal adequacy in such matters, turning to the cross of Christ, there to find pardon and to feel the cleansing power of the Saviour who alone can do for him what God desires to be done; namely, to deliver him from the dominion of sin and acquaint him with the love of God. Yet this deliverance is never merely the acceptance of an intellectual proposition by means of which one

[6] See Arnold Lunn, *John Wesley*, p. 123.
[7] Richard Baxter, *A Call to the Unconverted*, Doctrine 2.

interprets the cross. It may be that, to be sure, but it also includes the feeling that here one has encountered personally God's mercy, which, when accepted in faith, leads to pardon for sin. It is the divine action of God granted in such firsthand encounter which saves, says the evangelical, rather than either good works or the added grace of the sacraments.

Jonathan Edwards was a strong Calvinist, teaching original sin, unconditional election, and the bondage of the will. Such positions would seem to make it superfluous to urge men and women to press into the kingdom, but the common sense of Edwards was stronger than his theology, and he pleaded with men so to do. Thus he introduced into his theology what has since been known as the Edwardean paradox: moral inability on the one hand and the responsibility to come to God on the other. Edwards never resolved those antithetical propositions. But in the sense that he believed men could enjoy an inner and personal sense of deliverance from sin and could press into the kingdom of redemption, he was an evangelical, nowhere more cogently revealing that fact than in his contention that "a great part of true religion lies in the affections."[8] Religion, in other words, is inner and personal. Edwards thinks of the affections as a part of the mind, since he is unwilling to divorce them from all semblance of rationality. But they are a specific phase of our mental life which he describes as "the more vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul."[9] As to the soul, he divides that into two faculties, the first of which is what we mean by understanding or reason; the second that which "inclines" a life one way or another. To this second faculty Edwards gives different names, writing: "It is sometimes called the *inclination:* and, as it has respect to the actions that are determined and governed by it, is called the *will:* and the mind, with regard to the exercises of this faculty, is often called the *heart.*"[10] It is in this area, variously called *inclination, will* or *heart,* and to which Edwards gives the over-all term of "the affections," that a great part of true religion lies. He writes:

> If we be not in good earnest in religion, and our wills and inclinations be not strongly exercised, we are nothing. The things of religion are so great, that there can be no suitableness in the exercises of our hearts, to their nature and importance, unless they be lively and powerful. In nothing is vigor in the actings of our inclinations so requisite, as in religion; and in nothing is lukewarmness so odious. True religion is evermore a powerful thing; and the power of it appears, in the first place in the inward exercises of it in the heart, where is the principal and original seat of it. Hence true religion is called the *power of godliness,* in distinction from the external appearances of it, that are the *form* of it.[11]

[8] Jonathan Edwards, *Religious Affections,* Part I (New York, 1868), p. 3.
[9] *Ibid.,* Part I, p. 3.
[10] *Ibid.,* Part I, p. 3.
[11] *Ibid.,* Part I, p. 5.

Only one conclusion can be derived from Edward's reasoning. Without strong turnings of the will (*i.e.*, of the affections) towards God, there can be no true religion. To be sure, God must establish in us those inclinations which empower the will to right belief and action, but yet, at the same time, we are under stern responsibility to press into the kingdom. The demand for individual response, disclosing Edwards' view of the primacy of the affections in religion, is revealed when he writes:

> Nothing is more manifest in fact, than that the things of religion take hold of men's souls, no further than they affect them. There are multitudes that often hear the word of God, and therein hear of those things that are infinitely great and important, and that most nearly concern them, and all that is heard seems to be wholly ineffectual upon them, and to make no alteration in their disposition or behavior; and the reason is, they are not affected with what they hear. . . . I am bold to assert, that there never was any considerable change wrought in the mind or conversation of any person, by any thing of a religious nature, that ever he read, heard or saw, that had not his affections moved. Never was a natural man engaged earnestly to seek his salvation; never were any such brought to cry after wisdom, and lift up their voice for understanding, and to wrestle with God in prayer for mercy; and never was one humbled, and brought to the foot of God, from any thing that ever he heard or imagined of his own unworthiness and deserving of God's displeasure; nor was ever one induced to fly for refuge unto Christ, while his heart remained unaffected. Nor was there ever a saint awakened out of a cold, lifeless frame, or recovered from a declining state in religion, and brought back from a lamentable departure from God, without having his heart affected. And in a word, there never was any thing considerable brought to pass in the heart or life of any man living, by the things of religion, that had not his heart deeply affected by those things.[12]

Edwards is here calling our attention to the central place which evangelical Christianity has ever given to emotional assurances. Especially does it find indispensable those assurances derived from the contemplation of the cross. It claims that until the life is drawn affectively to God through the Master's sacrifice, the Christian religion makes no effective beginning in a human life. The heart possesses reasons which the reason cannot plumb. Hence the believer is prized above the reasoner, though the need of reason is never denied. Among the historic representatives of this evangelical emphasis upon the primacy of the affections (the heart and will) in religion, are the Anabaptists of the Reformation period, the Pietists, the Moravians, the Wesleyans, the men who led the Great Awakening in eighteenth-century America, and numerous evangelical bodies of the nineteenth and present centuries.

There is no substitute for personal relationship with God. According to the evangelical, the function of the cross is to draw men and women into indubitable and saving relationship with God. Technically considered, this

[12] *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. 6 f.

state is known as regeneration and to a man the evangelicals regard it as indispensable. Unless one has participated in God's redemptive activity in Christ, which is in no way dependent upon external forms, and knows that his heart and mind have thereby been renewed, his religion is but a shadow and a delusion. Personal participation in the mercy and love of God as it is found in Christ Jesus is the *sine qua non* of redemption. Experience is the only valid criterion of the truth of religion. Thus, about the middle of the eighteenth century, when Samuel Walker, curate of Truro in Cornwall, was converted to the evangelical way of viewing Christianity, he rose in his pulpit in the Established Church to warn all those who, like him, had been basing their faith in salvation simply upon attending the church and communicating, that they were headed for perdition. In place of mere belief in the formalities of worship he preached repentance, faith, and the second birth. He held that regeneration alone could bring one into saving relationship with God. Unless one is born not of flesh and blood, but of the Spirit of God, there is no hope for him. Philipp Spener, one of the leaders of German Pietism, stated the evangelical's case, in 1665, when he set forth the aim of Christian preaching: "Since our entire Christianity consists in the inner or new man, and its soul is faith, and the effects of faith are the fruits of life, I regard it as of the greatest importance that sermons should be wholly directed to this end."[13] So the evangelical contended that without regeneration man is nothing.

The longing of the evangelical for personal relationship with God receives beautiful expression through the great poet of the movement. To William Cowper we owe the hymn which begins with the petition,

> Oh! for a closer walk with God,
> A calm and heavenly frame;
> A light to shine upon the road
> That leads me to the Lamb!

and ends with the assurance,

> So shall my walk be close with God,
> Calm and serene my frame;
> So purer light shall mark the road
> That leads me to the Lamb.[14]

Elsewhere, in the long poem which was destined to establish him as the leading English poet of his generation, Cowper urges his readers to enter into right relations with God:

[13] *Pia Desideria* (Leipzig edition of 1841), p. 101—cited by A. C. McGiffert, *Protestant Thought before Kant*, p. 157.

[14] *The Poetical Works of William Cowper* (Boston, Little, Brown, 1863), Vol. III, pp. 2 f.

Acquaint thyself with God, if thou wouldest taste
His works. Admitted once to his embrace,
Thou shalt perceive that thou wast blind before:
Thine eye shall be instructed; and thine heart
Made pure shall relish, with divine delight
'Till then unfelt, what hands divine have wrought.[15]

The evangelical's insistent demand that personal relationship be established with God sharpens his awareness that each individual stands alone with God, having no human support, but only the intercession of the divine Saviour. A man cannot call upon the church or the sacraments to save him. He is thrown back upon his own inner life and the quality of his relationship with God established through faith and the sure mercies of God in Christ. Feeling that on the day of judgment each man would find himself in precisely that situation, the evangelicals urged each person to approach the judgment seat of God now, with nothing of a worldly or tangible nature in his hands. As one of their favorite hymns puts the matter:

Nothing in my hand I bring,
Simply to Thy cross I cling;
Naked, come to Thee for dress,
Helpless, look to Thee for grace;
Vile, I to the fountain fly:
Wash me, Saviour, or I die.[16]

Salvation is due to the direct and indispensable action of God upon the human heart. Although the Arminian and Calvinistic evangelicals disagreed as to man's part in the process of salvation, they were unanimous about one thing—he could not save himself. The evangelical may talk as Richard Baxter does in his *A Call to the Unconverted.* Therein he bases his thoughts upon Ezekiel 33:11: "Say unto them, As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O house of Israel?" Baxter points out that man's damnation is not due to Satan, since "he doth not force men to sin, but tempts them to it, and leaves it to their own wills whether they will do it or not."[17] God certainly cannot be accused of responsibility for man's sin. The only party left to blame for sin is man himself. He is its cause. But if he had power to turn to sin and death, he also has power to turn and live, repenting and manifesting faith, thereupon to be ushered into the new birth.[18] I say that despite the fact that Baxter talks in such a bold way, he, no less than those evangelicals more Calvinistically minded, insisted upon the necessity of God's saving

[15] *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 153 ("The Task," Bk. v).
[16] Augustus M. Toplady, "Rock of Ages."
[17] Richard Baxter, *A Call to the Unconverted,* Doctrine 1.
[18] See *ibid.*, Doctrine 3.

action for the redemption of every man who would turn and live. He held that God alone gives grace and that in sufficient measure to save all who repent.

In all forms of evangelicalism, therefore, we find a distinct emphasis upon the centrality of grace. A strong supernaturalism characterizes every evangelical party, whether of the Calvinistic, Arminian, or other persuasion. To quote another verse from Toplady, who was definitely a Calvinistic evangelical:

> Not the labours of my hands
> Can fulfill Thy law's demand;
> Could my zeal no respite know,
> Could my tears for ever flow,
> All for sin could not atone;
> Thou must save, and Thou alone.[19]

Equally, we find John Wesley, as positively an Arminian evangelical as his contemporary Toplady was a Calvinistic evangelical, stressing the necessity of God's immediate action upon the human spirit. In his sermon, "Salvation by Faith," he declares:

> All the blessings which God hath bestowed upon man, are of his mere grace, bounty, or favour; his free, undeserved favour; favour altogether undeserved; man having no claim to the least of his mercies. It was free grace that "formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into him a living soul" . . . there is nothing we are, or have, or do, which can deserve the least thing at God's hand. . . .
>
> Wherewithal then shall a sinful man atone for any, the least of his sins? With his own works? No. Were they ever so many or holy, they are not his own, but God's. But indeed they are all unholy and sinful themselves, so that every one of them needs a fresh atonement. . . .
>
> If then sinful men find favour with God, it is "grace upon grace!" If God vouchsafe still to pour fresh blessings upon us, yea, the greatest of all blessings, salvation; what can we say to these things, but, "Thanks be unto God for his unspeakable gift!" And thus it is. . . . Grace is the source, faith the condition, of salvation.[20]

Wesley's conviction about the centrality of grace unquestionably goes back to his personal religious experience. Though a graduate of Oxford, learned, scholarly, and established as a priest in the Church of England, he still felt uncomfortable in his conscience. Something was lacking in his relationship with God. While searching for an explanation of the deficiency in his spiritual life, he attended a Moravian meeting in London on May 24, 1738. There he found assembled a group of warmhearted Christians from the Continent. While the Preface to Luther's *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* was being read, describing the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, he tells us, "I felt my heart strangely

[19] From his "Rock of Ages."
[20] *The Works of the Rev. John Wesley,* edited by John Emory, Vol. I, p. 13.

warmed. I felt I did trust in Christ, Christ alone for salvation; and an assurance was given me that he had taken away my sins, even mine, and saved me from the law of sin and death." What university, church, and sacrament had been unable to do, Wesley was convinced God did directly in his heart through the immediate action of his Spirit. When Wesley had faith, grace worked to produce the assurance of salvation.

The grace of God is, therefore, the fundamental requirement for spiritual life and the ultimate source of redemption. The evangelicals have never forgotten that. When man's heart is humbled and shamed by his sin, so that he turns in faith to God's mercy and love for him manifested in the cross of Christ, then he is granted a full and free salvation without the mediation of priests, church, works, or personal merit. It is a pure gift from God, establishing a new life when penitence and faith are exhibited. To sharpen our recognition of this characteristic attitude of the evangelical, let us consider a few more lines from Jonathan Edward's *Religious Affections*. He states that "affections that are truly spiritual and gracious, do arise from those influences and operations of the heart, which are spiritual, supernatural and divine."[21] Yet without "special and peculiar influences of the Spirit," producing sensations in the soul which could never arise from purely natural causes, such truly spiritual and gracious affections are utterly impossible. Divine action alone makes the difference between natural men and the saints. Edwards goes on to this conclusion:

> It is grace that is the seed of glory and dawning of glory in the heart, and therefore it is grace that is the earnest of the future inheritance. What is it that is the beginning or earnest of eternal life in the soul, but spiritual life; and what is that but grace? The inheritance that Christ has purchased for the elect, is the Spirit of God; not in any extraordinary gifts, but in his vital indwelling in the heart, exerting and communicating himself there, in his own proper, holy, or divine nature; and this is the sum total of the inheritance that Christ purchased for the elect. . . . It is through the vital communications and indwelling of the Spirit that the saints have all their light, life, holiness, beauty, and joy in heaven; and it is through the vital communications and indwelling of the same Spirit that the saints have all light, life, holiness, beauty and comfort on earth; but only communicated in less measure.[22]

Grace being the central requirement for redemption, the evangelicals have never doubted the inadequacy and insufficiency of man. These are inescapable corollaries whenever grace is elevated to an absolute position. The opposite pole of essential grace is the desperate sinfulness and spiritual helpfulness of man. The maintenance of tension between these two poles, with Christ as the mediating agent, constitutes the essence of evangelical theology. So the evangelical tended to put his faith in God rather than in

[21] Part III, I (New York, 1868), p. 65.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 89 f.

what man can do. Illustrative of this position is the letter which Lady Huntingdon of Clapham wrote to Henry Venn late in 1757. More than any other person she was responsible for spreading the fervor and message of evangelicalism to the cultured classes of England. As for Venn, destined to become the great evangelical rector of Huddersfield, in 1757 he was fighting to find his way into evangelical views. At that time he was serving as curate in the village of Clapham, a suburb of London, which was soon to become the home of many influential Englishmen, typical of whom were William Wilberforce; Henry Thornton, member of Parliament and destined to be one of the greatest philanthropists of his day; Charles Grant, chairman of the East India Company; James Stephen, famous lawyer; and Lord Teignmouth, for five years governor-general of India. All of these men were evangelicals. But let us return to Henry Venn. Invited by Lady Huntingdon to go on a preaching tour with George Whitefield to the western counties, she was dissatisfied with the doctrine he preached, and wrote him so in these words among others: "O friend, we can make no atonement to a violated law; we have no inward holiness of our own: the Lord Jesus Christ is the Lord our Righteousness. Cling not to such beggarly elements, mere cobwebs of Pharisaic pride, but look to Him who hath wrought out a perfect righteousness for His people."[23] The point is clear: man's inadequacy and sinfulness can only be met by the grace of God registered in Christ.

Since we have "no inward holiness of our own," the evangelicals made much of what Jonathan Edwards described as "evangelical humiliation." In this they included contriteness for sin, the aspersion of all pride, and the denial of every whit of self-righteousness. He whose life evidences these characteristics is at once humble and gives evidence that God's grace has been granted to him. Yet he will not boast about his spiritual achievements, but will consider himself to be undeserving and unworthy of the great mercies of God.

> A true saint [Edwards tell us] may know that he has some true grace: and the more grace there is, the more easily is it known . . . . But yet it does not follow, that an eminent saint is easily sensible that he is an eminent saint, when compared with others. I will not deny that it is possible, that he that has much grace, and is an eminent saint, may know it. But he will not be apt to know it; it will not be a thing obvious to him: that he is better than others, and has higher experiences and attainments, is not a foremost thought; nor is it that which, from time to time readily offers itself; it is a thing that is not in his way, but lies far out of sight; he must take pains to convince himself of it; there will be need of a great command of reason, and a high degree of strictness and care in arguing, to convince himself. . . . And this may be laid down as an infallible thing, *"that the person who is apt to think that he, as compared with others, is a very eminent saint, much distinguished*

[23] Cited by G. R. Balleine, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

in Christian experience, in whom this is a first thought, that rises of itself, and naturally offers itself; he is certainly mistaken; he is no eminent saint, but under the great prevailings of a proud and self-righteous spirit." And if this be habitual with the man, and is steadily the prevailing temper of his mind, he is no saint at all; he has not the least degree of any true Christian experience; so surely as the word of God is true.[24]

Stripped of all personal holiness and power to save himself, man is without spiritual health until God graciously visits him. Building their theology upon this cornerstone, the evangelicals could reach no other conclusion than that which we have now illuminated. They said that until a man truly humbles himself before God, confessing his impotence and sinfulness, God's grace will not function for his salvation. Yet without such direct divine action upon the human heart there can be no redemption. William Cowper gives us a vivid statement of this crucial evangelical position, and with his words we close this section:

> Grace makes the slave a freeman. 'Tis a change
> That turns to ridicule the turgid speech
> And stately tone of moralists, who boast,
> As if, like him of fabulous renown,
> They had indeed ability to smooth
> The shag of savage nature, and were each
> An Orpheus, and omnipotent in song:
> But transformation of apostate man
> From fool to wise, from earthly to divine,
> Is work for Him that made him. He alone,
> And he by means in philosophic eyes
> Trivial and worthy of disdain, achieves
> The wonder; humanizing what is brute
> In the lost kind, extracting from the lips
> Of asps their venom, overpowering strength
> By weakness, and hostility by love.[25]

Salvation must eventuate in goodness. Though the evangelicals hold that man's work can in no way save him, they are adamant in maintaining that salvation can only result in a life made beautiful by goodness. The goodness the evangelicals refer to, moreover, is not the mere "judicial righteousness" of original Calvinism, by which Christ's righteousness becomes our own. To be sure, they put faith in his righteousness rather than their own, but they make that no substitute for Christian character. They would be horrified, as every true Christian must be, at the judicial righteousness in one of Douglas Clyde Macintosh's onetime parishioners who said to him: "I know that I'm not living a good life; but then I'm not trusting in my own merits for salvation. I'm trusting in the merits of

[24] Jonathan Edwards, *op. cit.*, Part III, vi (New York, 1868), pp. 148 f., italics mine.
[25] *The Poetical Works of William Cowper*, Vol. II, pp. 150 f. ("The Task," Bk. v).

Christ, and in his death as my substitute on the Cross. And when I told this to the minister who was here before you, he said I was all right."[26]

In contrast to all such merely judicial righteousness, the evangelicals, fearing antinomianism as men do a plague, have demanded of their converts an actual righteousness manifest in personal attitude and deed. And let there be no doubt that there was desperate need for just that in the eighteenth century when evangelicalism at last became a definite religious movement under Edwards, Wesley, and Whitefield. Life had bogged down to pretty low levels among the orthodox Christians, and even among the clergy. William Grimshaw, who was to become a prominent evangelical leader at Haworth in the north of England, was earlier a typical parson of the times. "He read prayers and a sermon once every Sunday. 'He refrained as much as possible from gross swearing unless in suitable company, and, when he got drunk, would take care to sleep it out before he came home.' He was a huntsman, a fisherman, a first-rate card-player, anything but a herald of the Cross."[27] When, therefore, John Wesley preached his perfectionism (or perfect love) in this life, he did so as a necessary antidote to the antinomian philosophy and practice which was corrupting English Christianity. Earlier, Philipp Jakob Spener in Germany, one of the greatest of the Pietists, insisted that the demand for character and Christian conduct was upon the Christian. He should move toward perfection, by which Spener meant toward holiness of life, making steady and unslackened progress in that direction. If one was not constantly pressing on to that goal, it was clear evidence to Spener that one's claim to regeneration was false. So the evangelicals never put off the demand for personal righteousness to that time when men should depart this mortal body for higher realms. Let it be underlined: *the evangelicals required works in this life as the fruitage of faith.*

So if the early evangelicals held, as they did, that there was no Christianity without the personal reception of God's grace in Christ, they just as tenaciously contended that, having received the good news, one is under obligation to impart it and to share the good life with others. Their urgent requirements for specific Christian response to God's saving love in Christ produced a veritable flood of concern and deeds which has greatly blessed untold millions of lives through both personal and social channels. While they held that they were not saved thereby, their good works simply being evidence that God had implanted his divine love in their hearts, they nonetheless were impatient with all who accepted grace (or who claimed they had received it) without feeling the obligation of works.

We may suggest more clearly the fruits of evangelicalism by pointing

[26] D. C. Macintosh, *Social Religion*, p. 98.
[27] Balleine, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

out that 1. it required of those who accepted the gospel a passionate concern for the well-being of others, and 2. it led to a vast revival of religion and to a wide extension of its influence. Let us consider these briefly in turn.

The fruitage of evangelicalism in an enhanced concern for others is one of the glorious chapters in Christian faith and life. The evangelicals frequently spoke of this as a passion for souls. That they surely had. Typical of their desire to bring others to the new life is the interest of William Wilberforce in the spiritual well-being of his friends. A paper, bearing the date of January 12, 1794, has come down to us from his pen, carrying the instruction, "To be looked at every Sunday." Therein are listed thirty of his intimate friends with remarks about each. A part of that document reads:

S——— and Mrs. What books reading? To give them good ones—Walker's Sermons. Call on Mrs. S. and talk a little. Lend her Venn's last Sermon. Education of their children, to enquire about. Prayer, etc. Their coming some Sunday to Battersea Rise to hear Venn. Call often, and be kind.

Lady A——— and Sir R. Has he read Doddridge? Be open to her.

Mr. and Mrs. M———. Encourage to family prayers, etc.

Lord and Lady J———. See them. Get at them through G. Discover what books reading.

V———. Try what he believes and speak home truths.

The J———s. Call and sound them on religion. Give them money to give away, etc. Little presents.

Lady E———. Speak pretty openly, yet tenderly.[28]

This evangelical interest in others has been interpreted by some as purely a spiritual concern. We should not dodge the fact that it was precisely that whatever more it may have been. It caused William Cowper to cry out:

> . . . I cannot call the swift
> And perilous lightnings from the angry clouds,
> And bid them hide themselves in earth beneath;
> I cannot analyze the air, nor catch
> The parallax of yonder luminous point,
> That seems half quench'd in the immense abyss:
> Such powers I boast not—neither can I rest
> A silent witness of the headlong rage,
> Or heedless folly, by which thousands die,
> Bone of my bone, and kindred souls of mine.[29]

This interest in souls also led Richard Baxter to write: "We must labor to *do good to many;* and therefore we have greater work to do on earth than merely securing our own salvation. We are intrusted with our Mas-

[28] Cited by Leonard E. Binns, *The Evangelical Movement in the English Church,* p. 85.
[29] *Op. cit.,* Vol. II, p. 72 ("The Task," Bk. iii).

ter's talents for his service, to do our best in our places, to propagate his truth and grace, to edify his church, honor his cause, and promote the salvation of as many souls as we can. All this is to be done on earth, if we would secure the end of all in heaven."[30]

Yet it is a gross mistake to limit the evangelical's interest in others purely to spiritual matters. The truth is that his conception of "doing good" implied numerous efforts to better and enrich human lives in economic, political, social, and educational ways as well. It led to the abolition of the slave trade in the British Empire because of the efforts of William Wilberforce, to prison reforms under John Howard and others, to the founding of orphan asylums, to the establishment of schools for educating the young, to the starting of colleges, to the care of the poor, to the protection of child life, to the relief of the mentally diseased, to factory reform, and to many other philanthropic enterprises. The volume of good coming from evangelicals imbued with such broad regard for personality is indeed beyond computation. We can say with certainty, nonetheless, that the story of the western world would have been infinitely more tragic than it has been had there been no Wesley, no Henry Thornton, no William Wilberforce, no Hannah More, no Seventh Earl of Shaftesbury, no Elizabeth Fry, no Thomas Buxton. All of these, and others of equal calibre, owed their drive for righteousness to their evangelical faith. They did what they did for persons and for social reformation largely because of their sense of responsibility and their conviction of the danger and destiny of those in whose behalf they labored. But these qualities of personality are an inevitable distillation in any life which embraces the evangelical view of man's life in its relation to God.

Just as significant as the personal and social good created by evangelicalism has been the vast extension of Christianity's influence through the revitalized faith of millions of Christians. The great religious revivals under the Wesleys in England and under Edwards and Whitefield in America, leading not alone to moral transformation in numerous lives, but equally to the demonstration of the importance of religion for the cleansing and elevating of society, gave religion a larger place in much western life. The evidence of this has already been suggested at many places throughout this paper, and we need not spend more time on what might be called the internal phase of evangelicalism's revitalization of religion.

But evangelicalism did not only put new life into religion in Germany, the British Isles, America, and other parts of the western world; it also led to an amazing extension of Christianity to many parts of the earth in which Christian influence was until then largely unknown. It is the evangelical's concern for people which is basically responsible for the unpre-

[30] Richard Baxter, *Dying Thoughts*, chap. I.

cedented missionary activities of the nineteenth century. That movement of Christian expansion, begun by the Moravians and copied by the Methodists, inspired the establishment of the Church Missionary Society in the Church of England and lies back of most of the missionary zeal of our American churches. The marvelous success of these combined ventures has established the Christian faith on a dozen world frontiers. The result is that not only in theory, but in fact as well, Christianity is a world religion. Credit for that momentous fact should be given to those who earned it. They are largely the Christians who have toiled with the spirit of evangelical Christianity within them.

Our journey through the land of the evangelical draws to a close. Humanly speaking, evangelicalism represents a concentration upon the worth of the person. Psychologically, it stresses the primacy of the will as against the absoluteness of rationality. Religiously, it requires personal relationship with God. Theologically, it finds that apart from the direct action of God upon the human spirit man cannot be saved. Socially considered, it represents man's high privilege to be the love of his neighbors and the doing of good to them. Within this rich and significant complex the evangelical finds his spiritual orientation and the motivation for his daily life in personal character and human outreach.

THE FUNERAL

L. REINALD LUNDEEN
Frankford Congregational Church, Philadelphia

When I was a student in the Seminary one of my professors used to say, "Of all the things ministers do badly, the funeral service is the worst." I like to think that we are making some progress toward simplicity, sincerity, and helpfulness in the last rites of the dead. We ministers should take little credit for this, however, for it is the people themselves who want these last ceremonies short, simple, and unpretentious. More and more they prefer funeral chapels to churches or homes. They want less music or no music at all. In many cases they request that no flowers be sent, no obituary read, and no sermon preached. The modern funeral is becoming a quiet, meditative service without any show of any kind; just a sincere tribute of respect to the departed, and with simple submission to the inevitableness of death.

It is high time, for the fact is that the funeral service has been only slowly adapted to the requirements of an intelligent Christian faith. Many of our funeral practices are the survival of purely primitive and pagan ideas. Few people, for instance, actually believe in the literal resurrection of the body, but many people behave as though they did. They overemphasize the material, paying all honor to the corpse, placing it with proper ceremony in its "resting place," the scene of its glorious resurrection. They think of the dead as "sleeping," but is not this, too, the survival of the idea that the personality continues to be implicated with the body after death?

In primitive times, we are told, people were a great deal more solicitous for their dead than we are now. They saw to it that the deceased was provided with everything necessary for his comfort. Meat, drink, weapons, clothes—even slaves and wives—were interred with him.

One has but to recall these customs of ancient times to understand why we do many things we do in connection with the last rites of our dead. We continue many practices simply because no one has the frank courage to break with traditions. But gradually changes are being made, and we ministers have a chance to hasten them by making suggestions when the opportunity presents itself. A family stricken with grief is hardly able to think clearly about specific plans for the funeral. They are not sure what they want, but they seem apprehensive about what might happen if they just leave things up to the minister. Isn't this the reason they often say, "We want a brief service"; or "Mother always said she wanted no eulogy"? Such people may have had unfortunate experiences at

other funerals, and their suggestions to us are subtle hints which we ought to take seriously. We need such suggestions because often we have violated the principles of good taste in our funeral services; we have made them unnecessarily gloomy; or we have overdone the matter of speaking of the dead, especially in the case of some prominent citizen or churchman. Often the funeral has been a harrowing experience, bringing the family no comfort, but only adding another burden to aching hearts.

Why must funerals be so gloomy anyway? George Bernard Shaw once wrote to a friend: "You must try to educate people into a wholesome reaction against the present method of disposing of the remains of the dead, and the artificial gloom and horror of our funerals. . . . The instinct that makes people send flowers as a farewell is a right instinct and the inculcated notion that they must wear black and pull long faces is a monstrosity. If we cannot rejoice in the memory of the dead we had better let them alone." The artist Bourne-Jones at Robert Browning's funeral said: "Much would I have given for a banner or two, and much would I have given had a chorister come out of the triforium and rent the air with a trumpet." If we cannot have banners and trumpets at funerals, there is still much we can do by way of making them the source of comfort and hope that they ought to be.

Take music: Often some friend is asked to sing a favorite hymn of the deceased. Usually it had better been omitted. It has no place in the service; it is poorly sung; and it is dragged in simply because it is the custom to have music at a funeral. Why must our most doleful hymns or gospel songs be used at funerals? Unless the singer has a trained voice and the song in some way harmonizes with the ideals of the family, music had better be omitted. It should be triumphant and victorious, not doleful and depressing.

The sermon, too, is becoming taboo at funerals. Not in all sections of the country, to be sure; but more and more bereaved families request that there be no sermon. I suppose there are reasons for this. Preachers have been tempted to use the occasion of the funeral to preach on the theme of immortality. They use the old illustrations and the old arguments. People sense an overemphasis on the otherworldly and they have become indifferent to it. They simply do not care to hear survival after death discussed at funerals. All the texts and arguments are overworked. After all, our confidence in the goodness of God carries with it assurance of his fair and generous dealing with us in death. Always to be devising and delivering arguments on immortality suggests a subtle unconscious doubt about it.

Eulogies, too, are bad business. Where they are the most fitting and deserved, the family usually has the good sense to know their futility and

to request that nothing be said. At such times, silence is the voice of sincerity. After all, a life speaks for itself, and there is nothing a preacher's words can add or detract. Yet, despite all this, if often happens that a preacher will attempt an eulogy in the presence of a group of sorrowing friends, all of whom knew the deceased better than he did.

The passages of scripture which we often use at funerals are not the most inspiring or comforting. "Man that is born of a woman is of few days, and full of trouble . . . cometh forth as a flower . . . cut down. Earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust," etc., etc. Would it not be better to read, say, the Twenty-third Psalm, some selected passages from the fourteenth chapter of John and a few verses from the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians? The aim of the minister should be to inspire comfort and hope, and the scripture used should be selected with this in mind.

Again, the prayer at a funeral is often the hardest thing for a family to take. Many a minister seems to think that if he cannot preach a sermon at a funeral, he must incorporate a kind of sermon to the bereaved in his prayer. So it becomes long and rambling and utterly unpredictable. He keeps the family worried about what he may say next. To avoid all this and in order to be most helpful, the pastoral prayer should be written out with the utmost care and read sympathetically. It is in the funeral prayer that a minister can be most helpful in bringing assurance of God's gracious and continuing love toward men. And it is that assurance that is most needed by the bereaved family.

There are no infallible rules about the last rites for the dead. Death is a stark reality. The bereaved instinctively sense that there is not much to be said. It behooves us ministers to plan our funeral services so that they will be simple and helpful and comforting. Above all, the service must have the ring of sincerity.

Finally, the minister must realize that he has a supreme opportunity for friendship on these occasions. Words need be few, but they should be cheerful. The day after the funeral is a good time to call on a bereaved family or to write them a brief note. Someone once wrote to a bereaved friend, "My hand clasps yours in silence. Cordially yours." Such a brief sentence says all that needs to be said, and our attempts at wordiness usually do more harm than good. Soon or late, death comes to every home, bringing sadness and a sense of loss, and the minister by sympathetic understanding and common sense may help to cheer one of life's unforgettable experiences.

IS RELIGIOUS THOUGHT VALID?

A. C. REID
Wake Forest College

THE PROBLEM of knowledge tantalizes thoughtful people. A naïve person accepts as a matter of course the existence of mind, the competency of reason, the power of a free will, and the awareness of truth. This uncritical attitude is widespread in the field of religion and produces innumerable blunders. Many informed persons, however, are no longer credulous about glib claims concerning spiritual conditions. They seriously ask themselves and others what one can actually know about such matters as the soul, immortality, and God. Perhaps some theologian will make plain to us laymen the meaning of numerous fluent ecclesiastical utterances.

A critical examination of the nature of mind provokes searching questions. What is consciousness? What is mind? What is reason? Is knowledge reducible to mere opinion, or is there a mode of awareness which enables thought to transcend opinion? Is thought at its best superficial and illusory? Is there a foundation of fact upon which one's convictions about God, right, justice, freedom, soul, and immortality safely rest?

Since so many philosophical and religious problems are associated with mind, let us examine thought from three points of view: first, the fact of mind; second, mind as empirical achievement; and, third, mind and transcendental relationship.

THE EXISTENCE OF MIND

Various types of proponents of materialism deny, directly or indirectly, the existence of mind as such. From the fifth ecntury before Christ to the present time, numerous writers have claimed that thought is reducible to the status of materialistic atoms, to phenomena of force, or to the behavior of living organisms.

Materialism is the type of metaphysics which assumes that the whole of reality consists of materialistic existence. While materialism is a monism which is presented variously as atomism, naturalism, and behaviorism, it never transcends the essential substance and the basic properties of a physical substratum. Accordingly, whatever appears otherwise is illusory; there is nothing supernatural, spiritual, or otherworldly. Life and mind, for example, are only modes of naturalistic phenomena in peculiar spatio-temporal configurations.

The oldest type of materialism, originated by Leukippus and Democritus and reëmphasized in somewhat modified form by Epicurus and

Lucretius, restricts existence to the void and the plenum. The void one can neither comprehend nor describe; the plenum is the familiar theoretical atom falling through space. This system of materialism claims that all minute and gross objects, whether grains of sand or men, are composed of aggregations of atoms. The mind and the soul are no exception to the rule.

Naturalism is not so dogmatic about structure as it is about kind. It regards nature as the whole of reality, whether one claims that it is essentially phenomena, or mass and energy. There is no exception to this constant realm. Life and mind, again, are only parts of nature.

In science, the supposed indestructibility of physical substance, the intimate relation of galvanic phenomena to nervous and muscular activity, the facts of comparative anatomy, and the relation of cerebral complexity to mental capacity emphasize the supposed primacy of physical existence. The theory of total evolution also accentuates this position, for it implies that inorganic matter is the ultimate substratum from which all modes of physical objects, of living organisms, and of mind evolved.

The doctrine claims that life and mind are products of advanced complex physical conditions, and suggests that life and mind are not essentially different from their constituent elementary physical substances. Comparative anatomy, comparative psychology, pathology, embryology, botany, and geology are cited in support of that position. It is argued, for example, that when hydrogen, having certain properties, unites with oxygen, having other properties, a new compound is formed which has new properties which could not have been predicted. Sodium and chlorine examined separately do not resemble salt. But the new compound is still essentially chemical. Likewise, mind does not resemble physical substance, but sensations, perceptions, ideas, values, and will are essentially materialistic.

Behaviorism, unjustifiably called psychology, is the result of a strained effort to bring psychology to the status of a natural science, and it seeks by questionable logic to avoid perplexing problems. Its subject matter is primarily that of anatomy and physiology, such as can be found in Gray, Herrick, Pavlov, Rosaneau, Howell, Cannon, and Sherrington. This subject matter cannot be discredited, for one cannot disregard the findings of anatomy, physiology, neurology, pathology, endocrinology, and abnormal psychology. The complexity of the human body, the vast intricacy of the nervous system, the powerful influence of the endocrines, and the number, distribution, and almost incredible sensitivity of the sense organs are plain facts which any informed person accepts. Moreover, the acuteness of sense organs makes it possible for one's environment to affect him much more than he suspects. For illustration, the retina is so responsive that one trillionth of a watt of energy easily arouses visual sensation, and a mere twenty-two ten trillionths of a gram of a smell substance gives a

sensation of smell. The retina is said to be thirty thousand times as sensitive as the most sensitive radiometer devised by physicists. Moreover, galvanic changes are associated with feeling and emotion. An affectometer, having electrodes attached to the palm of the hand, shows responses in the sweat glands to even relatively weak stimuli. The body is, in many respects, like a delicate receiving set or a sounding board which is highly selective and responsive.

Materialism errs, however, in the claim that it embraces a full explanation of man, if not of all reality. Even though we accept whatever facts it offers in its various forms, its inadequacy is patent. Let us grant that it aids science, presents a unified world system, posits universal natural law or its equivalent, marshals facts of descriptive science in its support, presents an observable "psychology," and offers modes of escape from persistent philosophical problems. Many conditions are still not met.

For example, no descriptive science now claims to explain the whole of reality. The subject matter of a descriptive science is observable phenomena, and its inferences are based upon observation. Descriptive science, moreover, does not explain causation, but offers the "law of sufficient reason." It is fully aware that, in the realm of natural phenomena, it cannot posit either "the cause" or the "first cause." Physical "facts," furthermore, are not universal to existence. Memory, recognition, imagination, and values exist as states of mind. They do not occur except in terms of consciousness. Psychic processes are not reducible to the status of physical sequence. Self-consciousness is a simple illustration of psychic experience, a condition not found in inorganic or mere organic substance. Values and volitions are not epiphenomena of the brain or of any other structure of the body. Behaviorism cannot explain *one*, it cannot establish how one and one make two, and it has nothing to say about beauty, goodness, and honor. In fact, if materialism were true, the attainment of any form of knowledge as such would be an impossibility.

Mind as Empirical

Recognition of the existence of mind does not, however, remove all difficulties. Proof that man possesses mind and is capable of reason removes only one type of difficulty. Numerous grave problems persist. What are the limitations of thought? Are thought processes valid and do they offer dependable evidence of reality, or, are they at best superficial? Is all thought reducible to sensationalism? Are ideals only opinion and therefore transitory and as variable as time and place?

Empiricism is here arbitrarily defined as the assumption that all of one's knowledge is a product of experience. Psychological experience is regarded as sensation, image, and affection, or their equivalent in psychic

processes. Complex conditions of consciousness, as meaning and reasoning, are mosaics or combinations of sensation, image, and affection. The combinations are effected through the active nature of states of consciousness themselves, or through a substratum which, as it were, carries the acquired data.

The Sophists, of the fifth century before Christ, adopted empiricism as a means of solving the problem of knowledge. They and their doctrine are both early and somewhat representative of the empiricists. The Sophists made the individual the last court of appeal in the matter of the validity of experience. They assumed that knowledge depends upon the individual's store of acquired mental experience. Thus they built up a naïve, sensationalistic psychology. Protagoras, for example, declared that "man is the measure of all things." Each person's experience furnishes him his mental data, and, insofar as he thinks, he must think in terms of these acquired data. It is utterly impossible for him to think except in terms of these data. The congenitally blind, for illustration, have no conception of visual qualities, for they possess no visual data. The congenitally deaf cannot remember sounds or otherwise use sounds in their thought, because they have never heard sounds. It follows, then, that if one experienced no sensation, he would possess no mental data and thus know nothing whatever about the world in which he exists.

The experience of the race is, after all, only the experience of individuals, for there is no group mind or racial mind. And, since human beings are so different and because sensory experiences are so diverse, it would appear, therefore, that the subjectivity and relativity of experiences are valid only in a restricted and practical way, and that they offer no valid evidence of ultimate truth, such as the basic tenets of theology.

It may be argued that there is some associationalistic medium or influence which is superior to the data of thought and which carries sensations, images, and other data. Perhaps there is an innate or congenital mental dynamic which binds together one's earliest sensory experiences, then subsequently associates the new with the old, forms memory bonds, and aids in establishing mental habits. This does not, however, admit of innate ideas, for ideas, as has been shown, are acquired. But how are ideas acquired? The data of ideas originate directly and indirectly, as has been stated, through sensory experience.

This condition, moreover, points to the problem of the diversity in the sense organs and in sensory experience. No two sense organs are identical. The five sense fields give five different types of sensory qualities. For illustration, what, in terms of sensation, is a cherry? Vision answers, red; touch says, light pressure; smell reports, fruity; taste insists, sour; audition perhaps says, noise. Which, if not all, is correct? And the

same sense organ may vary its report as time and circumstances demand. Moreover, it must be remembered here that no two adults have precisely the same psychological reactions. Differences are as numerous as individuals, and as time and place permit.

Descriptive science has recently offered technical information about mind. In 1879, Wundt founded the first psychological laboratory. He proposed to describe mental processes. Soon his disciples had established many laboratories in Europe and America. In these laboratories consciousness was defined as the sum total of the states of consciousness as experienced by an individual during his lifetime.

The emphasis thus became placed upon the description of mental processes and their sequences. What are some results? Three elementary states of consciousness, possessing indispensable attributes such as quality, time, and space, are proposed. Sensation arises from sensory stimulation. Image, originating ultimately in sensation, arises out of mind, where in some way it has been retained. Affection appears as an accompaniment of sensation, image, or some complex mental state, and closely resembles sensation.

Thought is also found to occur in numerous complex or compound states. Perception, or meaning, is a compound formed of sensation and images, and, frequently, of affection. Ideas and concepts are compounds retained as psychological units. Reasoning is a series of perceptions and ideas. Memory is the tendency of processes to reappear in the order in which they previously appeared, through the agency of a peculiar linkage trait intrinsic to mental processes, and having the characteristic of recognition. Attention is a pattern of consciousness shaped by the effect of environment upon the contents of mind. Will is not an observable directive faculty, but the "flow" of mental data in this or that direction. Such activity or concentration of mental processes is apparently an inherent trait of mental states.

It should be remembered here that descriptive psychology, by definition, restricts itself to observable facts. It does not offer a metaphysic of mind. It does not deny or claim the existence of intangible, transcendental characteristics of mind or of man. It simply probes, observes, and finds states of consciousness which function lawfully.

It would seem, then, that, from a purely psychological point of view, knowledge is restricted to acquired sensory data and various combinations of mental processes. One is thus forced to doubt that consciousness, as such, can transcend the acquired data which constitute complex states of consciousness, or go beyond series of processes. Sensation, image, and affection are limited. Complex conditions of mind, if composed of such

"elements," would likewise be restricted by the very nature of their components.

If this is all, one therefore passes over the circle back to the sophistic premise that knowledge is limited, that one cannot know things as they are, that insight is restricted to perception, and that each individual is the measure of knowledge. For, from this point of view, not only concepts and ideas but also hopes, feelings, emotions, and urges are of an empirical nature. They are valid and adequate only within their sphere. Like sensation, image, affection, perception, and imagination, they cannot reveal such facts as soul, immortality, goodness, and God, which are the true objects of real knowledge.

Mind as Transcendental

If materialism is correct in denying the existence of mind or reducing mind to the status of epiphenomena, then knowledge cannot be attained. If, according to empiricism, thought is restricted to the level of sensationalism, one must admit that knowledge is only opinion. It appears, then, that one must turn from materialism and empiricism to some supernatural or extraëmpirical modes of thought or causes of mental processes, if one is to discover experience which reveals objectives of the spiritual realm.

Idealism is a realm which offers us hope. The long and diverse history of idealism will not here be traced. Only two types, as related especially to mind, will be mentioned.

The first listed here is subjectivism. It is sometimes called mentalism. It reduces idealism to idea-ism, and, in fact, limits knowledge to mental phenomena, including such refined psychological processes as concepts, ideas, and abstractions. The agent, or mind, doing the thinking and the ideas are both realities indispensable to thought. Ideas made up of the stuff of sensory data are formed, or effected, by the mind itself acting upon or in the data. Mind, as such, and consciousness, which seems to be a manifestation of mind, are, therefore, essential to knowledge and to reality as we know it. In fact, an extreme subjectivist would claim that, since all one is aware of exists in terms of mind, then not only is mind prerequisite to knowledge but also reality, certainly insofar as one can know of it, resolves itself into concepts and other such mental states.

The subjectivist therefore places much emphasis on concepts, ideas, and feeling. He also stresses modes, laws, or categories of mind, which are common to normal man. For him the existence of consciousness and of the lawful modes of thought establish the validity of thought. Thus, concepts, ideas, reason, and the like are fact. The concepts horse, house, man, temperance, justice, and right are valid. Such concepts are abstractions which transcend the components used in their formation. From the

point of view of the subjectivist, these abstractions are perhaps the highest types of knowledge; for him, they appear to constitute the closest approximation of thought as such to reality. Yet, one here thinks of Santa Claus and fairies.

Another type of idealist claims the existence of innate knowledge. He does not claim that one innately possesses particular information, as information about mathematics, history, or science. He rather refers to an indescribable mental something capable of transcending sensation, which makes immediate judgments possible and which is also concerned with the major objectives of knowledge. Sensation and images alone, it is argued, are incapable of perceiving space, time, relations, or values. Sensations and images are fitted into relations of space and time and values.

As an evidence of innate knowledge, it is said, there are self-evident truths. The mind, it is asserted, immediately and necessarily forms a judgment when experiences occur in immediate sequence. It is prepared and ready to make *a priori* judgments; a stimulus only is necessary to provoke judgment. For illustration, it is self-evident that $1 + 1 = 2$, that 2 is greater than 1, that a circle and a square are unlike, that right is preferable to wrong.

Claims in support of self-evident truths are, however, not sufficiently inclusive, nor are they clearly convincing. The vast majority of so-called self-evident truths are merely products of swift reasoning. The infant learns that $1 + 1 = 2$ and that the square is unlike the circle, just as he later learns that $6 \times 9 = 54$, and the meaning of "larger than," "better than," and "farther than."

Furthermore, sensation and other states of consciousness are intrinsically spatial and temporal; thus it seems unnecessary to put space as such or time as such in the mind as a special mode of reference. It may also be noted that judgment or reasoning is so swift and feeling so elusive and yet so powerful that one may not, except with the greatest difficulty, detect their rise or even their appearance as processes. If someone says, "It is all right to lie," you instantly say "No." Your judgment may have been formed within a few thousandths of a second, and perhaps it was attended by feeling or by a minor condition of emotion; but the judgment was something formed, not given. Sensation, image, affection, perceptions are experiences existing, as truly as anything else, in their own right. The individual and his thought are facts. Abstractions are valid within their proper sphere.

But are such modes of knowledge generally adequate? At best they are probably reducible to a refined type of empiricism. Thought is so complex and yet so refined, and it moves with such lightninglike swiftness, that one may easily misinterpret its nature. Abstractions can there-

fore be regarded as superior, but as criteria of truth they are valid only within empirical limits.

But what of intuitive knowledge? In discussing this highly controversial matter, the type of intuition one presents must be understood. There are perhaps two legitimate types of intuition, empirical intuition and transcendent intuition.

Some psychologists define empirical intuition as self-awareness. A thought process is aware of its own existence. A thought, of course, does not have to stand off from itself, or be twins, to observe itself. For example, one experiences pain and at the same moment is aware that he experiences pain. This condition approaches pure awareness; it is of the nature of unlearned data.

Withal, these active, creative, Januslike processes, by virtue of their essential nature, do permit of valid intuition. But we must remember that it is only empirical intuition. If one accepts such mental states, however excellent and valuable they may be, one falls into the logical and factual abyss of a modified form of sensationalism. Trapped in this way, one would be forced to confess agnosticism concerning the existence of the soul, immortality, and God. With respect to these fundamentals of religious belief, one would feel like agreeing with Omar when he says:

> Myself when young did eagerly frequent
> Doctor and Saint, and heard great Argument
> About it and about: but evermore
> Came out by the same door wherein I went.

The problem of knowledge should not be left thus unsolved. A Christian should know. Many of us believe that he can know, that he can become aware of the Eternal. We feel that he can discover that prayer is a means of divine communion. In our opinion, one can justifiably assert that knowledge exceeds opinion. Moreover, one's stability largely depends upon the possession of such keystones of knowledge. Then let us turn to another type of intuition.

The second type of intuition, since it is of a transcedent or mystical nature, will not submit itself to scientific description or to logical examination. We must arbitrarily eliminate from this type of intuition any such experiences as dreams, illusions, hallucinations, emotions, the communion of one person with another, or communion with nature, for these can be explained in terms of empiricism. Moreover, we must refuse to condone or to flatter the laziness, ignorance, and vanity from which come so many claims of "immediate revelation, of illumination without search, and of certainty without proof and without examination." These need no explanation. Furthermore, we must not here include logical certainty

derived from observed physical events and human relations. When intuition of a transcendental nature occurs, it occurs mystically between a finite ego, man, and an infinite ego, deity.

The awareness of this communion must occur through the medium of consciousness. The psychological state in question must assume such forms as the recipient's mental development permits. Perhaps it is of the nature of a noble urge, a profound feeling, a magnificent idea, or a great conviction which affects mind in such a way as to evoke concepts, reverence, and will. Acceptance of this type of intuition implies the adoption of a metaphysic of the individual human being and of reality essentially spiritual. It is in and through such communion of the spiritually finite with the spiritually infinite that true knowledge is gained and that faith—the keystone of wisdom—is achieved.

SOME COMMENTS ON PERSPECTIVE

FREDERICK B. IGLER
University of Pennsylvania

On a very hot day this past summer 15,000 fans were booing the umpire, and how they booed! The Athletics were trailing by two runs, it was the eighth inning, and three minions of Connie Mack were on the bases. Two men were out when the batter laid the wood on the ball. It sailed out over the head of the third baseman, and landed, so I thought, just inside the left field foul line. Two runners had already crossed the plate when the umpire back of third base called it a foul. I was sitting in the upper stands back of third base. The Athletics lost the game. I thought the ball landed safely within the foul line, but the umpire said it landed outside, and held up his hands to indicate how close it was. But then who am I to say that the umpire, who was only ten yards from where the ball hit, was not correct in his judgment? Anyway, ninety per cent of that crowd thought the decision was unfair. Umpires are human. You baseball fans have a good picture of where the 15,000 were sitting in Shibe Park.

In 1923 I was traveling on the Bernese *Oberland* from Montreux, Switzerland, to Interlaken. Sitting across the aisle from me was an elderly lady giving frequent expressions of wonder and amazement. Every now and then she would look at me, and perhaps noting the expression on my face, she finally asked me to change seats with her. I refused, but she insisted and I succumbed. When I sat where she had been sitting, and looked out of the window which had been her focus, then I understood her expressions of wonder and amazement, for as far as the human eye could see was a panorama of ice and snow covering valley and mountain. The sun playing on it made it a picture of beauty never to be forgotten. Yes, when I sat where she had been sitting, then I understood . . . .

John Chamberlain, the foreign correspondent, said about four years ago that Adolph Hitler fifty years hence might be only a speck on the pages of history. Strutting as Hitler then was, as the big colossus in hobnailed boots, spitting fire and spewing everything which was antisocial and inhuman, the evaluation of Chamberlain must have seemed to millions as the vaporings of a man grown prematurely senile, or the subtle expression of a fifth columnist. And yet I take it that Chamberlain was simply trying to say that when history puts Hitler in his place, as history has a way of dealing both with men and events, only a small niche will be needed.

A year ago one of our magazines carried the story of a father who had written to his marine son in the Pacific asking the boy what he wanted most for Christmas. To the inquiry the lad replied that he wanted nothing so much as to have his father continue sending his letters and enclosures so that he might get a picture of the total effort of the allied forces into which the mud, blood, terror, heartaches, and death of his company of marines fitted. The lad said he was on a small island in the Pacific, jumping from foxhole to foxhole, winning more ground by killing more Japanese, and that what he craved was not candy, peanut butter, or razor blades so much as the buttressing knowledge of the worth-whileness of their sacrifice, toil, and death. There are those who have said that the efforts of our commanders in this area of acquainting the men with the conflict of ideologies, the backgrounds of the same, and the importance of the part they played in the total plan of attack were quite inferior to that of the British Army. The by-products of such a shortsighted policy will be with us in the coming years. You are saying, perhaps, that a member of the armed forces in wartime cannot expect to see things in their true relationship, and that "his is not to reason why; his is but to do and die" as volley after volley thunders.

About fourteen years ago I was called into a family situation by a student friend. His mother had telephoned, telling him that his father had been away from home for seven days, during which the family had had no word from him. Their pride had kept the fact from the community. Upon investigation I discovered that the father had lost his position in the early days of the depression, had walked ceaselessly from place to place day after day hunting work without success, and was then hiding away in a North Jersey Y.M.C.A. I found out too that it was not the first protracted stay away from home. His wife, his children, and even the pastor of his church were severe in their condemnation of his actions. It did not take much subtle detective work to discover that the father was seeking the calm and peace of seclusion from the arrows of misdirected love which his wife shot deep into his soul each day as he returned from his fruitless search for work. The children did not know and could not understand why their father acted so cruelly, the mate of the long years was stunned when she realized what her barbs—given in love, so she thought—had done, and the pastor was shocked to realize that a deacon's home could get so fouled up. What a complex picture the average situation is. And how many of us succumb to the temptation of making judgments afar off without knowing all the factors. Ordination to the ministry does not of itself declare for competence in the art of perspective. I do not think that one needs to become a trained psychiatrist to correct this fault.

At the time of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia the Holy Synod of the Eastern Orthodox Church met in convocation in Moscow to consider a petition sent in by small outlying poor parishes. These parishes had been in the habit of borrowing the chalice for Communion service from neighboring wealthier parishes. Their petition was to the intent that, since they were so poor, would not the Holy Synod authorize the use of silver or silver-gilt metal with which to make the chalice. Their hope was that thus they might own one for their own use. While men died in the streets for an ideal of freedom, the Holy Synod declared that anything but pure gold would defile the sacrament, and hence denied the petition. (I wonder what the cup which Jesus used at that last meal was made of.) How difficult it is to break with patterns which have their roots down deep in tradition. When the church gets caught mixing up the priorities of life, then the charge that religion is the opiate of the people may have some basis in fact.

Some years ago an industrial concern in the Middle West sensed a type of restlessness among its employees, most of whom stood at the same place in the belt line day after day, doing the same thing. An investigator soon discovered that the restlessness was focused in the monotony and drudgery of doing what seemed to the men insignificant and useless toil. The investigator suggested that the work be staggered over a period so that groups of employees with their families might be guests of the corporation as they followed the product from its beginning to its completion. The ample dinner which was eaten at the end of the trip with the management did not detract from the experiment, but its success stemmed very largely from the fact that the men for the first time saw their individual labor in terms of relationship to the finished product. The industrialization of our society has produced many more factors than labor unions and racketeer labor union leaders of which we ought to be cognizant as we find ourselves in the midst of growing tension between capital and labor. We are supposed to be leaders, moulders of public opinion, those who have the capacity to see things in their true relation and relative importance.

You have heard the story of the lady standing before one of Turner's beautiful sunsets in an art gallery. She looked at it from several different angles, but finding nothing in it, she turned to the man standing near by, not knowing that he was the painter, and inquired of him whether he saw any beauty in it. As the story goes, he simply replied: "Don't you wish you could, madam?" How true it is that we do not get much more out of a situation than we carry to it. It is as true in the area of human relations as in the field of art. Who of us would claim that we do not have blind spots? Perhaps because we are subject to the frailties of

human nature we get all fouled up, our vision becomes blurred, and our mental waters become muddied.

Recently I have been talking with a medical student of more than average intelligence about his membership in the Christian Medical Society. He carries in his wallet a card of membership signed by the national president and the national secretary. On the back of the card are the five points of their creed, that to which they apparently give their assent when they join the group. One cannot read that statement without feeling that there has been little if any attention paid to the findings of the consecrated scholars of the church. This student is a researcher of the first water. He believes in the scientific method in the field of medicine. He has aspirations to excel in his profession, not for personal glory but for service to mankind. His motives are the highest. But as he sat in my office conversing with me, he was two personalities, one you wanted to praise and the other you wanted to curse. He is cultivating growth vocationwise, and yet is satisfied with his stunted stature faithwise. He is dynamic in his medical science, and static in his faith. He has resilience and the humility of a child studywise, while at the same time he holds with a bulldog tenacity to the religious concepts of his childhood. Who fouled up this youngster? Was it the church through the pastor's sermons, the Sunday school, his home environment, a system of education from which the study of religion had been divorced? Perspective . . . the capacity for seeing things in their true relation! What will he carry as a doctor, introduced as he will be to the intimacies of a home or an individual like no other person, to the total problem of which the apparent illness may be but a symptom? And there he sat in my office the focus of a congeries of factors. Something within me wanted to condemn him for his inconsistency and for his lopsided development, to drop an atomic bomb so-called on his stubbornness and his narrowness. But as the many factors in his life began to emerge, I saw him redeemed, saved personally and socially, made whole only by a long process of patient friendship, the end of which might be a proper approach to God's truth.

While I was greeting folks following a recent preaching appointment, a lady said: "Thank you very much. The service helped me to see life in a new perspective." Granted her sincerity, would her comment be a good evaluation of the worth of any service of worship? I wonder what she meant. Might it have been the sense of unity for which I had striven in scripture, prayer, responsive readings, hymns, and sermon? It could have been the period of directed prayer, for prayer for some focuses the eternal verities. Might it have been some new insight gained from the sermon which overcame a mental twist of long years? There is a possibility that it might have been those hymns of security and adventure which

touched her deep places. Then, there are those for whom just being in the house of God and in the presence of kindred spirits provides both the setting and the stimulus to see life whole. Granted the need for integrated lives, what is the best guarantee in a service of worship for the end we seek?

It would seem to me that unfertile soil for the growth of true perspective is to be found, among many others, in the following: the minister who telephones me that he wants to drop in my office at a certain time to get my advice on a problem. He arrives on schedule, takes off his coat, states the problem, gives his reaction to the problem, thanks me for the time given him, takes his coat and leaves. I have said nothing .... the friend of long years standing who always jumps the gun and gives you "the answer" even before the question has been fully stated .... the patient who insists on telling the doctor what the ailment is, and what the treatment ought to be, and then happily pays the doctor's secretary the $10 charge for the visit .... the student who has B plus or B minus capacities, and yet is satisfied in getting through on a passing grade .... the holy crusader for causes who still thinks and talks of God in childhood concepts .... the military commander in the American zone in Germany who says that the fight between the Nazis and the anti-Nazis is on a parallel with the bickerings of the Democratic and Republican parties back in the States .... the professor in the law school who opens his class each fall with the statement: "Good morning, gentlemen. I am happy to see you all here. This time next year there will be only a third of you left. Now on with the first lecture." .... the individual with the absolutist or perfectionist philosophy of life .... those citizens who vote for a party man regardless of merit, and then buy Pure Rock water by the bottle for home consumption because they cannot drink the chlorinated water Philadelphia offers .... the church which preaches the saving power of the gospel of Christ, and yet disregards the factors of social change operative in the community .... the State which elects a senator by the votes of those who have paid the poll tax and reëlects him in spite of his antisocial and inhuman mouthings .... the minister who preaches with vigor on Christian ethics for the other fellow, but generally feels he is entitled because of his profession to special treatment .... the university dean who is firmly convinced, and on all occasions, that "the Jews cannot stand up to the sufferings of life and take it on the chin," as he says .... the home where parents in disciplining their children forget that they too were once upon a time children themselves .... the members of the armed forces who thousands of miles from the homeland, without sufficient data, and forgetting that we are still trying to be a democracy, shout loudly against strikes .... the teacher in our public schools who looks upon the

daily task as a chore, a source of bread and butter only .... the stimulating college teacher who thinks that attainment to a college faculty, or the fact that he writes Ph.D. behind his name makes him an authority in all fields, especially of religion .... the individual whose first comment on any discussion of international questions when the United Kingdom is mentioned is "Must we always pull their chestnuts out of the fire?" or when Russia is mentioned almost dies of a stroke.

Webster's *Dictionary,* to which confused people with a modicum of intelligence turn for answers, says that perspective is the capacity to view things in their true relations or relative importance. Life gives us multiplying factors in a constantly changing situation. It is our happy privilege to try to make out of these factors a beautiful picture, a true story, an integrated personality, a whole man, a beloved society; yes, even the kingdom of God. What a task for poor mortals, but how challenging and rewarding!

JUDAISM AND IMAGES

J. SPENCER KENNARD, JR.
West China Union University

INCONSISTENCIES in the Jewish attitude toward images at the dawn of our era can be explained by an economic determinism which regarded heathen emblems as innocent or obnoxious in proportion as they symbolized earthly rulers. Whatever gave religious sanction to Herod and the Cæsars was sacrilege; yet even idols could be tolerated when they raised no issues affecting political interests.

Professor C. H. Kraeling's significant article in the *Harvard Theological Review* of October, 1942, has rendered a great service to students of Christian origins in showing how Pilate's intruding of Cæsar's image on the temple mount in the autumn of A.D. 26 may have initiated the Baptist's career as a prophet of judgment. It was a kindred insult to the sanctuary in 167 B.C. that produced Daniel, and that of Caligula in A.D. 40 "the Little Apocalypse." Coming as a climax to Herod's efforts to introduce the *Augustalia*, it would not have been surprising if Pilate's affront should have had repercussions second only to the Maccabean struggles and leading, on the one hand, to an upsurge of revolution that led to national destruction and, on the other, to the escapism of the Christian church.

But the article of Dr. Kraeling, like others on the subject, fails to note that back of the insult to Israel's religion was the gesture of foreign sovereignty. Moreover, that same economic determinism unravels many another knot in the skein of Jewish symbolism.

The "shekel of the sanctuary," with its pagan emblems, is an example of ignoring of the Decalogue's injunction against images when they had no bearing on current political issues. The coin in question, a tetradrachm minted at Tyre, was the standard for the temple, and persons making contributions had to convert whatever else they had into this medium. Exceptions were made in the case of those with conscientious scruples who could substitute other coins and announce, "Lo, these are for my Shekel";[1] the same was true for persons at a great distance who could use the Persian daric[2] or some other equivalent.[3] Contract parchments from Dura and coin hoards show it was standard for this whole area.

On its obverse this shekel bore the figure of Melqarth, the Tyrian Heracles, and on its reverse the Ptolemaic eagle. Other types are linked with the maritime activity of the city; some had an image of Astarte, goddess of the city and patron of its commerce.

[1] *Shekalim* 2, 3. [2] *Ibid.*, 2, 1. [3] *Cf. Bekhoroth* 8, 7.

The tetradrachm minted elsewhere usually had the head of a sovereign. For example, out of twenty-two tetradrachms in the Fifth Dura Hoard, sixteen dating from 49-20 B.C. have the head of Philip Philadelphus on the obverse, and on the reverse Zeus enthroned and holding a wingless Nike. A comparison of the coins of Tyre shows that the other mints favored symbolism connected with royalty, whereas Tyre's preferred mythology. Had Tyre been trying to impose either its ruler or its cult, the Jewish people would have banished its coins as they did Cæsar's. Secure from that menace, they felt its gods a lesser evil than earthly kingship.

That the Greek god of valiant deeds should have penetrated unchallenged into the temple precincts points to the practical sense of the priesthood in selecting this "stater" which, as its derivation from ἵστημι implies, was something well established; it points equally to current political tensions. The issue of the day was God's lordship against that of Cæsar.

This exception is the more noticeable for the early first century, when a strictness seems to have prevailed toward images unknown in either earlier or later ages. No ornamentation with figures is mentioned in the *Middoth's* description of the sanctuary, aside from crowns over certain windows and a golden vine at the entrance (3, 8); there is no suggestion that Jesus' age tolerated the cherubim and other figures of the first temple. A few centuries later that use of figures adapted from heathen temples was ascribed to Solomon's rare wisdom;[4] but to Josephus that had been a sin.[5] Moreover even Palestinian synagogues employed ornamentation with forbidden things. The figures of animals from that at Capernaum, dating from about A.D. 200, cannot be dismissed as instance of that community's heretical trends, for similar indifference to the Decalogue's letter abounds elsewhere. Chorazin's synagogue had representations of human beings and that at Bet Alfa even a head of Phœbus.[6]

How a contemporary of Jesus felt about such desecration can be seen from several passages in Philo, such as *De Decalogo* 14 and 29, and *De Monarchia* 1, 3. Josephus is yet more emphatic in his efforts to justify his fellow countrymen in their overt acts against images.[7] Language like theirs does not spring from fanaticism. Philo's position is philosophical,

[4] For several of these points I am indebted to Louis Ginzberg. See his *Legends of the Jews* (7 vols, 1909-1938), III, pp. 158 f.; IV, p. 154.

[5] Josephus, *Antt.* viii, 7, 5.

[6] H. Kohl and C. Watzinger, *Antike Synagogen in Galilaea,* (Leipzig, 1916); R. H. Pfeiffer, *J.B.L.,* XLV (1926), pp. 211-222; G. Dalman in *Palästinajahrbuch,* II (1906), pp. 44 ff. Martin Rist ignores all such complications in the problem of the imagery: "Cæsar or God", *Journ. Relig.,* XVI (1936), pp. 317-331.

[7] *E.g., Antt.* xv, 8, 1 f; *Bel. Jud.* i, 33, 2; *Antt.* xvii, 6, 2; *Bel. Jud.* ii, 9, 2; *Antt.* xviii, 3, 2; *Bel. Jud.* ii, 10, 4; *Antt.* xviii, 8, 2.

and conduct which he denounces with heat in the case of Jerusalem[8] he passes over without rebuke when it has to do with Alexandria.[9] The "ten degrees of holiness"[10] recognizes that the strictures against images are relative, and idolatry outside Palestine is taken for granted.[11] Even Gamaliel II can frequent a public bath adorned with a statue of Aphrodite without compunctions because the location was at Acre and the goddess herself the offender. He justified his conduct with, "What is not treated as a god is permitted."[12]

The real point at issue, and one missed by modern writers on this theme, as it is missed by Josephus also, seems to be the theocracy. Palestine was sacred to God himself. Foreign rulership denied that divine sovereignty. Thus objects quite innocent in themselves became blasphemous in proportion as they were associated with human kingship. What the Baalim had been to the eighth-century prophets, earthly rulers were to Jesus' religious contemporaries; the Pharisees, as Josephus puts it, were "in a capacity of greatly opposing kings."[13]

And so it was that in defining what should be regarded as idolatrous, the Mishnah focuses on the emblems of kingship:

> All images are forbidden because they are worshipped once a year. So R. Meir. But the Sages say: Only that is forbidden which bears in its hand a staff or a bird or a sphere. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel says: That which bears aught in its hand.[14]

The Babylonian commentary clarifies the political focus: the staff is evil "in that it is master of all"; the bird, "in that it holds all mankind like a bird in its hand"; the sphere, "in that it holds the whole world in its hand." And to make no mistake that it is kingship that is referred to, further symbols are added of sword, crown, and signet ring.[15] It is noteworthy that only two great scholars dissented from "the Sages" in wishing to extend the injunction against idols to objects not associated with sovereignty.

The eagle deserves more study than it has received, as it throws much light on this problem of images. The natural starting point is the eagle which Herod the Great placed on "the great gate of the temple"—presumably the "Nicanor" gate, reached by fifteen steps from the women's court and connected by an underground passage with the garrison in the Antonia. Josephus would have us believe that the leaders of the Pharisees, Matthias and Judas, and forty of their disciples, were willing to jettison their lives in its destruction for the mere reason that it was contrary

[8] Philo, *Leg. ad Caium* 38.
[9] *Ibid.*, 20.
[10] *Kelim* 1, 6-9.
[11] *Oholoth* 18, 6; *Mikwaoth* 8, 1.
[12] *Abodah Zarah* 3, 4; *cf.* 4, 3 f.
[13] *Antt.* xvii, 2, 4.
[14] *Abodah Zarah* 3, 1.
[15] *B. Abodah Zarah* 41a.

to "the law of their fathers."[16] And when the late B. W. Bacon tells us that we have to do merely with the emblem of that resurrection, which was so distinctive an article of belief for the Pharisees, we are yet more perplexed.[17]

The problem is simplified when we note that it was kings who were accorded apotheosis. The eagles mentioned by Bacon on the temples at Palmyra and Baalbek, like those on the royal tombs, were a reminder to the people of Syria of the immortality of their rulers. They shared eternity with the gods because they themselves were gods. Suggestive pictures of rulers carried to heaven on the backs of eagles or other birds have been collected by Cumont;[18] some Roman coins depict members of favored families on the back of the peacock.

The eagle is especially associated with Zeus. Usually it is sitting on the ground beside him; sometimes it is perched on his arm or sceptre. It bears his weapons and lets loose his lightnings. Linked with kings, it conveyed to them something of his authority. Long before it was introduced into Europe by Alexander it was regarded in the East, especially in Persia, as an emblem of sovereignty. Crowned heads of Europe, and even our own United States, have fallen heir to that tradition.

A copper coin attributed to Herod has an eagle on the reverse. This is the only instance of a living creature on a purely Jewish coin. Herod got the idea from the coins of other monarchs.[19] The Cæsars were notably fond of this emblem. They chose the king of the birds because they felt themselves supreme among the potentates of earth. A Parthian king who desired terms of peace was ordered first to worship the Roman eagle and the imperial images.[20] Jewish literature repeatedly connects it with Rome, as in IV Ezra 11:45 f., where the eagle with its "horrible wings," "thy harm-dealing heads, thy hurtful talons, and all thy worthless body," is consigned to judgment; and in the Assumption of Moses 10:8, where Israel is told,

> "And thou shalt go up against the eagle,
> And its neck and wings shall be destroyed."[21]

Because of the censor allusions in the Talmud are sometimes in the form of riddles, like the one about the descendants of the eagle who wished to

[16] *Antt.* xvii, 6, 2 f.

[17] B. W. Bacon, "Eagle and Basket on the Antioch Chalice" in *Ann. Amer. Schools of Oriental Research,* V, (1925).

[18] F. Cumont, *Études Syriennes,* pp. 35 ff.

[19] Some assign the issue to Herod of Chalchis, brother of Herod Agrippa I (A.D. 41-48). Yet, as these coins are always found in or near the city of Jerusalem, that possibility should be dismissed. See F. W. Madden, *Coins of the Jews* (1911), p. 114.

[20] See article "Imago" in Daremberg and Saglio, *Dict. Antiq.,* III, i, p. 413.

[21] *Cf.* IV Ezra 10:60—12:48; 14:17; II Baruch 39:5. In Enoch 90:2-16 the eagles are leaders from Greece or Macedonia.

establish a ruler, apparently a thrust at Rome; another tells of "a pair of scholars" who "came from Rakkat, and having been caught by an eagle," owed their escape to giving "the eagle" a tribute of royal purple.[22]

And so it is that in the case of the eagle erected by Herod in the temple, we are to think of an image connected with Herod himself. That association was intensified for the people who saw it hung upon the place selected by Herod to spy upon them. Accordingly, the fanatical zeal which hacked it down was not simply due to its being, as Josephus and his modern followers would have us believe, an "idolatrous religious practice";[23] they were hacking at Herod's pretensions to a divine support for his misrule.

The episode of Pilate's standards must be viewed in this same light; that is, as the repudiation of a usurper to a rule intended by God for his Messiah. In spite of being lodged in the Antonia, rather than in the temple itself, the anger against these *imago* emblems seems to have been greater than against Herod's eagle. Had they been of the alternative type, the *aquila* or golden eagle, even so the uproar would have been considerable, for the eagles, too, were emblems of Cæsar's rule and objects of worship. But the *imago,* with its portrayal of the emperor himself, drove the people to a frenzy of revolt. Once more they were faced with the "abomination of desolation" which had precipitated the Maccabean struggle.

No wonder then that the incident was recorded not only in Josephus,[24] but also in a lost work of Philo, in Eusebius,[25] and used to kindle zeal for liberty.[26]. Here was the chief religion of the Roman army[27] pitted against that of Israel. The offense of the *semaia* became so acute to Christians that in no small measure they are responsible for the alternative symbolism of the cross.[28]

One other factor is needed to explain the heightened frenzy, that of time. Since Herod's efforts to impose the *Augustalia* and reverence for himself thirty years had elapsed of increasing pressure for emperor worship. Augustus had now been enrolled among the gods, no longer an incarnation of one or more gods but a god in his own right, with numerous shrines and an extensive priesthood administered by an Asiarch in Pergamum. The magnitude of the conflict between Cæsar and the God of

[22] For this explanation I am indebted to Professor Samuel Cohon of Hebrew Union College.

[23] Kraeling, *op. cit.,* p. 275.

[24] *Bel. Jud.* ii, 9, 2; *Antt.* xviii, 3, 1.

[25] *Demonstratio Evan.* viii, 2, 123.

[26] "On the third of Kislev the ensigns were removed from the court"—*Megillat Ta'anith* 9a (cited by S. Zeitlin, *Megillat Taanit* [1922] 69; *cf.* pp. 87 ff).

[27] Cf. Tertullian, *Apol.* 16.

[28] *Cf.* Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 29.

Israel explains some of the hysteria with which Jesus had to cope and the drift toward national extinction.

The suicidal challenge to Rome was issued, at any rate, fourteen years later when Caligula ordered his image to be placed in the temple. Some Jews had overthrown an altar erected in his honor at Jamnia, a seaport inherited from Salome which was part of his *patrimonium principis*. Philo has vividly portrayed the consternation with which the emperor's retaliatory order was received:

> A man arrived with blood-shot eyes, and looking very much troubled, out of breath and palpitating.... And he with difficulty, sobbing aloud, and in a broken voice, spoke as follows: "Our temple is destroyed! Caius has ordered a colossal statue of himself to be erected in the holy of holies, having his own name inscribed upon it with the title of Jupiter."[29]

He also gives what purports to be King Agrippa's impassioned letter to the emperor, telling how deeply the Jewish nation had been shocked.[30] Petronius, legate of Syria, seeing that attempt to enforce the edict would lead to disastrous war, risked his life in an appeal for reconsideration.[31] Fortunately the ship bringing news of Caligula's death arrived before the one ordering him to kill himself. A few years earlier, when the legate Vitellius wished to lead his army across Palestine to attack Arabia, he was dissuaded because of the offense that would be given by standards.[32] Here the economic factor protrudes itself, the chief dread being the devastation caused by armies in transit.

Simeon's maxim, "what is not worshiped is permitted," breaks down for Herod's trophies. Even though the populace erroneously believed the wooden supports for this armor had been carved,[33] they could in no sense have imagined them as objects of worship. Yet they sought to avenge Herod's insult to their religion by his assassination, and tore to pieces the traitor who disclosed the plot. Though the unnamed "Sages" in the *Abodah Zarah* passage[34] may have been more tolerant than Herod's age, they agreed that the essence of sacrilege was endorsement of heathen kingship.

That conviction is borne out by Pilate's votive shields which, if Philo's description may be trusted, had no human representation whatever. And the inscription contained only "the name of the person who had placed them there, and the name of the person in whose honor they were placed there."[35] These words of Philo seem to preclude the possibility of the offense turning on the frequent practice of embedding in the

[29] Philo, *Leg. ad Caium* 29.
[30] *Ibid.*, 36.
[31] Josephus, *Bel. Jud.* ii, 10, 4.
[32] *Antt.* xviii, 5, 3.
[33] *Antt.* xv, 8, 1 f.
[34] *Abodah Zarah* 3, 1 and 4.
[35] *Leg. ad Caium* 38.

votive objects denarii or other coins bearing "the image and superscription" of Cæsar. But to Jews of the time of Jesus it was enough that they were dedicated in his honor. And even though the place where they were deposited was not the temple but Herod's palace, the indignation was so serious as to require a delegation of leading Jerusalemites journeying all the way to Rome to enforce their removal.

Facts like these throw into a new perspective the question put to Jesus about "tribute to Cæsar." The denarius violated Jewish sensibilities as much as these other images. The image of Cæsar on the denarius and the superscribed titles reminded his contemporaries that their religion again was threatened with extinction as in the days of Antiochus IV. Both the imperial coinage policy and the coin hoards show the foreignness of the denarius: the latest denarii minted in the East seem to have been an issue of Octavian in 29-27 B.C. Throughout the Syrian province at the time of Jesus, tetradrachms, especially those minted at Antioch, were the medium for savings and ordinary silver transactions. Hence it was natural that Jesus should have had to ask his Quisling foes for a denarius with which to expose their hypocrisy.

The proper use for a denarius was debated. The extra pious would have nothing to do with it. Such was a sect of the Essenes mentioned by Hippolytus.[36] Some Jews still refused to pollute their eyes with one in the age of the Amoraim.[37] The logical thing was to remint the coins, and this is what was attempted from the outbreak of the revolt of A.D. 66. This attitude reached fanatical proportions during the revolt of A.D. 132-135. Many of the restruck pieces still show traces of the imperial effigy. Worried over the problem of what to do with a denarius received as a birthday present, Patriarch Jehuda was advised by Resch Laquisch that he should throw it into a hole in the ground, but to do so with a ceremonial gesture to mitigate the offense to the giver.

The problem seems to have been much like that of what to do with "the wages of the prostitute." According to a Jewish tradition Jesus himself is said to have recommended use of the money to build a latrine for the high priest.

[36] *Refut.* ix, 21.
[37] *B. Abodah Zarah* 50a; *B. Pesahim* 104a.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

To READ the word *parable* is to see a lonely road, sweeping down through rocky defiles from Jerusalem to Jericho, and on the road a friendly stranger bending over a sorely wounded man; or an aged father with opened arms and shining face hastening from the doorway of an Oriental house to greet a repentant and footsore son. And as we read the stories or catch a memory of them, we glimpse a man speaking by a quiet lake or in a busy street. Parables and Palestine seem indissolubly linked together.

Nor is this mere romantic illusion. Parables are, and always have been, peculiarly the property of that land. Well could the sage admonish his readers:

> Drink waters out of thine own cistern,
> And running waters out of thine own well.

These cisterns, unlike many others in a land often dry and parched, were always full. Not alone the older sages and prophets but the later rabbis were skilled in drawing from these wells. It is no exaggeration when a Jewish scholar writes: "In the Talmud and Midrash almost every religious idea, moral maxim, or especial requirement is accompanied by a parable which illustrates it." Yet it is no unwarranted Christian pride to add: When viewed against this worthy background, the parables of our gospels stand revealed as the supremely beautiful examples of an ancient and established art.

To appreciate them to the full we would have to hear them as they were first spoken. Unfortunately, that we can never do. It was not until many years had passed that they were collected, perhaps even written down. They had not been forgotten. It is safe to say that many a preacher as he strove, not alone in Palestine but in the wider gentile world, to win followers for his crucified Lord had used them time and again to point and illustrate his words of exhortation. How frequently must he have urged upon careless hearers their obligation to lose their indifference, to sell their other treasures and to purchase with the proceeds the one pearl above valuation; how often must these captious folk have seemed to him, as to his Master, like querulous children in the market place of the Oriental village, refusing to join their comrades, be the game "weddings" or "funerals." Surely, many a time in discouragement, as he and his fellow missioners sought to save a world which had no especial desire to be saved, he had remembered the mustard seed and what it speedily had become. Then as now, when earlier illustrative stories were told to point new truths, they must again and again have suffered modification to make them fit neatly and exactly the new occasion, to make them really illustrate some all-important point. It would be scarcely possible, despite the oft-asserted amazingly retentive Oriental memory, that alterations and changes —sometimes small, sometimes large—should not creep in. Nor is this surmise alone. The parable of the Talents, as told by Matthew, of the

Pounds, as told by Luke, with their all too clear differences of detail when read side by side, reveal that this was actually the case. And it is with interest that we read that in another ancient gospel, now known to us only from occasional fragments tucked away in the writings of early fathers, the same story of entrusted wealth occurs in yet a different form. Not the man who hid his talent and later returned it safe received the dreadful condemnation: *he* was roundly scolded; the worse fate was reserved for another who had spent his money on harlots and flute girls and so could not return even what he had received. Thus not infrequently the very fact that these stories were so apt, so pointed, so unforgettable, made them liable to change as men fondly repeated and used them.

And then when finally, in the last decades of that first century, they were gathered together, were assembled with other traditions of what many years before had been done and said, were fashioned into connected narratives, what problems must have confronted the evangelists as they sought to string together on their golden chains these jewels long since separate. For years the interest had been in *what* was said, *what* was done, not in *where* or *when*. But now these matters suddenly loomed large, and each evangelist sought to supply those long-forgotten links. Small wonder that when seeming clues failed, ingenuity must be employed. Right here we need be on our guard. The setting may well be beautiful, an admirable one to point the story as the later Christian wished to apply it; nonetheless it may equally well lead us to miss the original point which the prophet of Nazareth had intended to stress.

At times we find ourselves perplexed, not only as to *when* and *where*, but also as to the *why*. "Except ye become as little children . . . ." But little children have many ways all their own. Is it easy to be sure which characteristic was originally singled out? "And the lord commended the unrighteous steward because he had done wisely." Who can be quite certain as to these words? Are they a part of the parable, the praise of a master who has been barefacedly swindled by a nimble trickster? Are they a later comment that *the* Lord, that is, Jesus, had commended at least one quality in the clever scamp? Sometimes even greater perplexities arise, as we view with real concern that which seems to approve what we deplore. Can we read with our minds that simple story of the man who found a treasure hidden in his neighbor's field, and who quietly lined his own pockets with the result of his trespass? Are we ready to be content with "a penny" after long hours in a sun-burned field while our neighbor who started but an hour before the job was through receives an equal wage?

Those who heard the stories knew their meaning. They were not left to flounder and to guess. A later writer, bound by his own theories, might assume that Jesus spoke his parables to hide his secret from all save his chosen twelve—else why had the others failed to see?—"Unto you is given the mystery of the kingdom of God, but unto them that are without, all things are done in parables; that seeing they may see, and not perceive;

and hearing they may hear, and not understand; lest haply they should turn again, and it should be forgiven them." We cannot accept that easy answer. Ablaze with his message, convinced that he was proclaiming God's greatest gift to men, theirs for the taking if they would but open their ears and hearts, he spoke his words not to conceal but to reveal; not to repel, but to call the prodigals home. The point of this story of the steward may be obscure to us; we may be sure that it was clear to them.

Much of our difficulty would be lessened could we but realize that in its purest form a parable sought to make but one point clear. Not infrequently there are many details in the story, but they are there simply to make the story live; themselves, they are freighted with no esoteric message. If we seek to try to identify them, to guess who each figure is, what each detail means, we go hopelessly astray. A widow tries in vain to get a favorable verdict from an indifferent judge. Finally, due to her persistent clamor, he gives her her decision to save his tender eardrums. Precisely. That sort of thing happens. People did and do act that way. Persistence wins. Surely, to try to identify the widow, to guess who is meant by her "adversary," to cast God in the rôle of the graceless judge, is not only to import difficulties but to make a crystal-clear story muddy and obscure, and to teach a vicious untruth. God does not wish such an attitude in prayer, nor does he hearken because of our much speaking. When the woman sweeps her house to find a coin, we are not to ask: "Who is the woman? What is the dust? What is the significance of the broom? What does the lost coin represent?" The room is a room in a Palestinian house, and the dust the dust which is as common on the floors there today as it was when the story was first told. We allow ourselves to be confused because we try to read parables as if they were allegories.

In his matchless allegory, *Pilgrim's Progress,* Bunyan also tells a story of one who swept a dust-filled room. But the point to be observed is that that room was not a room at all but "the heart of a man that was never sanctified by the sweet grace of the gospel," and the dust was not dust but "his original sin and inward corruptions, that have defiled the whole man." The parable sets one thing *beside* another; the allegory substitutes one thing *for* another. The parable must be true to life, must picture people acting as people really act. Men do fall prey to bandits, are neglected by those who should give them help, are aided by men of kindly heart but hated race. For the allegory no such requirement exists. Justice may be depicted with veiled eyes though she holds in her hand scales which she must read. Each detail is added, not because it is needed for the story, but to mean something, to represent something else which the teller wishes to represent. Both are legitimate forms of illustration; but to turn what was intended as a parable into an allegory, to pry out secrets which are not there, is to rob one of the most precious and lovely of our possessions of almost all its value.

From Off the Campus and On

Dr. Aubrey needs no introduction to readers of the Crozer Quarterly. His inaugural address as fourth president of Crozer Theological Seminary, which was printed in our issue for January, 1945, indicated his broad and sound academic outlook. The present brief essay reveals another quality of this gifted theologian, the ability to focus his attention upon some important emphasis and make it seem so obvious that one wonders why he had not thought of it himself. Dr. Aubrey came to Crozer in September, 1944, after fifteen years on the faculty of the University of Chicago. He is a native of Scotland, a citizen of the United States. He holds degrees, in course and honorary, from Bucknell and the University of Chicago.

Mr. Wolseley is assistant professor of journalism at Northwestern University and editorial consultant for several publishing houses. In September he is to join the faculty of Syracuse University as associate professor of journalism. In addition to a constant stream of articles to religious and literary journals he is the author of five books, the most recent of which is *Exploring Journalism.* For several years he has been an annual lecturer on religious journalism before editorial conferences in the South. There will be few readers who deny that his subject is a timely one and that his criticism is warranted.

Dr. Davis is professor of theology at Crozer. He is a graduate of the University of Pittsburgh and of Colgate-Rochester and a doctor of philosophy from Yale. He came to Crozer from a pastorate at Columbus, Ohio. Dr. Davis is well known to the churches of the East, being in constant demand as a preacher. He has been granted sabbatical leave for 1946-1947 for study in the field of missions.

It is always a pleasure to welcome Dr. Reid to our pages. For many years head of the department of philosophy at Wake Forest, it is no exaggeration to style him one of the most influential educators of the South. His many friends will be gratified to know that he has been invited again to be chapel preacher this summer at Harvard University.

Mr. Lundeen is a graduate of Cotner College and the Yale Divinity School. Following a pastorate in Fairfield, Connecticut, he came to Philadelphia in 1939 to be minister of the Frankford Congregational Church. The importance of his essay in the present issue is in inverse proportion to its length.

The influence of a student pastor in a university can be very large. Few men in that position can rival Frederick B. Igler. For nearly thirty years Dr. Igler has been Baptist pastor on the campus of the University of Pennsylvania. He is a graduate of Bucknell and Colgate-Rochester.

In 1937 Bucknell made him a doctor of divinity. Occasional book reviews from him have appeared in our pages. At last the editor has succeeded in extracting an essay.

Dr. Kennard is a professor of history at West China Union University, under the American Baptist Foreign Mission Society. He is a graduate of Harvard, a Ph.D. from Yale, and holds a doctorate of theology from Strasbourg and a doctorate of literature from Paris. At present he is engaged in literary research at Union Theological Seminary, New York.

Once again twenty-two reviewers appraise a good grist of current books. Those interested in sacred statistics (see the issues for January and April of this year) will discover that once again the old proverb is fulfilled: "Aller guten Dinge sind drei." Were it not too deadly a pun, it might be hoped that our readers will continue to find them "good" but not "dry." Once again a bare identification of the reviewers must suffice. President Aubrey has already been introduced in a previous paragraph. Mr. Ayres is in charge of chemical research for the Gulf Oil Corporation and a scientist of distinction. Mr. Batten is dean of Crozer Theological Seminary. Dr. Battenhouse is professor of church history at Vanderbilt. Professor Cranston is Phillips professor of religion at Dartmouth. Dr. Dabney is dean of Andover Newton and a professor of homiletics. Dr. Diller is dean of the chapel of Mills College, California. Professor Enslin has the chair of New Testament at Crozer and is editor of the Crozer Quarterly. Dr. Ferm, a frequent contributor to these pages, is professor of philosophy at the College of Wooster. Professor Grant is professor of New Testament at Union Theological Seminary and one of the translators of the new *Revised Standard Version* of the New Testament. Dr. Gray-Smith is minister of the New North Church, Hingham, Mass. Professor Hartt is assistant professor of theology at Yale. Professor Helfer is chairman of the department of music at Hunter College. Professor Keighton has the chair of homiletics at Crozer. Dr. Knudson is dean *emeritus* of Boston University School of Theology and an eminent theologian. Dr. Mackie, a Presbyterian minister, is president of the Presbyterian Minister's Fund. Dr. Mays is president of Morehouse College. Dr. Minear is professor of New Testament at Andover Newton. Professor Montgomery is professor *emeritus* of Semitics at the University of Pennsylvania. Professor Outler is a member of the department of theology at Yale. Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Professor Spinka has the chair of church history at the Hartford Seminary Foundation.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Revised Standard Version of the New Testament, New York, Nelson, ©1946, pp. vi, 553, $2.

Let it be said unqualifiedly: This is a magnificent piece of work. The publishers are well within the facts in printing on the jacket, "The most important publication of 1946."

It would hardly seem necessary in these columns to discuss the reason for the translation. There have been many translations into English: all of them have their points of strength. The renditions into so-called "modern English," as Goodspeed's and Moffatt's, to mention but two, have been, and will continue to be, widely used. Yet the very freedom which both gifted paraphrasers exercised, while making their version admirable and frequently crystal-clear interpretations, limits correspondingly their value for many purposes. No one questions the majesty of the King James, although that string has been distinctly overplucked; nonetheless, in many ways it is not a good translation. The text it renders is far from that of the original writers. (Readers who are still not convinced of this fact would do well to read and ponder Professor Grant's admirable essay, "The Greek Text of the New Testament," in the *Introduction,* which is published separately and should be in the hands of every reader.) At times the rendition by the King James of the available text is far from accurate. But, worst of all, the very quality for which it has been so widely praised is its greatest weakness. The New Testament is not written in sonorous and literary Greek. It is written in a plain and frequently most informal style. Thus the literary artistry of the King James is at times utterly misleading. And folk who persist in talking about the King James giving the original language of Zion are thus doubly mistaken. On the other hand, the American Revision (ASV), while in many ways far superior, and one which I personally greatly like, has seemed to many readers to be lacking in beauty and force, and at times so literal as to be wooden.

The present revision sought to escape all these pitfalls. It has attempted to provide a strictly accurate translation of a Greek text as nearly identical with that of the original writers as modern knowledge permits, and, at the same time, utilizing the results of modern philology, to do it in dignified English which will reveal the real meaning and will not sound like holy jargon. If the test of a pudding is in the eating—and the subsequent state of the eater's stomach—the test of this, or any other translation, will be the way it stands up year after year to the most merciless examination. Thus, from one angle, all the appraisals of reviewers are distinctly premature and of limited value. Constant use alone will assign to it its proper place. My own feeling, based on a reasonably careful study of it, is that that place will be high.

The text employed, insofar as I have been able to check it, is eminently sound, and great sanity has been shown by the translators in their appraisal of variant readings and in their relegation to footnotes of textually unsound readings, even when the latter are widely popular. Again and again their crisp, but never flip or flippant, renderings add pungency and aid understanding; as, for example, Herodias "had a grudge against him" (Mark 6:19). The sanity in the use of *shall* and *will* and the avoidance of the heavy overuse of the former in the third person—a trick so beloved by many preachers—were to me very welcome. The modern punctuation,

the use of quotation marks—though unfortunately not to the third generation—and the common sense in printing a single-column page—all these qualities are admirable.

Sound scholarship is evidenced on every page, but it is never reckless. Thus "delight in riches" (Mark 4:19) is known today to be philologically sound and no paraphrase. Of course the "father and his virgin daughter" have disappeared from I Cor. 7:36 ff. My relief at their *exeunt* nearly (but not quite) reconciles me to the use of "betrothed" for the lady in question. But perhaps the translators are skeptical about virgins. At any rate, the bevy of ten in Matt. 25 are "maidens." So far as the four gifted daughters of Philip the evangelist are concerned, the translators are discreetly noncommittal, styling them "unmarried." Most scholars, I suspect, would agree with the translators that it is illegitimate to try to find a distinction between the two verbs for "love" in John 21. Personally, I am still unconvinced. While the translators are not so wooden as always to translate the same Greek word by the same English—new occasions teach new meanings—they do avoid meaningless and misleading changes. Thus regularly when the same word or phrase occurs in two or more of the Synoptic accounts, it is rendered by the same English equivalent. Because this is so habitually the case, I was surprised to discover "who had had a flow of blood" (Mark 5:25) but "who had suffered from a flow of blood" (Luke 8:43).

Talents and *pounds* are kept in the famous parables, with footnotes suggesting their approximate values. Occasionally *coin* appears for *denarius, penny* for *kodrantes; shekel* stands without comment. *Thou* and *thee,* and their family, have disappeared save in address to God. Probably this is wise; it may very well be that it is due to hardening of my own arteries that I feel a wee bit of regret at this point, though I view the absence of the *begats* without fear and without reproach.

Surely "the curtain of the temple was torn in two" is less likely to be misunderstood than was the classic "veil." On the other hand, I miss "abomination of desolation," even though I concede that "desolating sacrilege" may be more exact. Usually the English employed is crisp, but exceptions occur: "began to invoke a curse upon himself" seems a needlessly long-winded way of saying that Peter cursed. (Probably this is to warn the unwary reader that the apostle did not cuss.) Again, "you may go your way" for "depart," or some even crisper and less decorous rendering of the little Greek imperative seems to me a bit slow. Frankly, I think the translators were distinctly unwise in rendering *doulos* "servant." The word meant *slave* to the authors and it should have been so translated throughout. It is especially misleading in Paul's letters, but it is, to my mind at least, unwise elsewhere. It seems to me also a pity that people in torment still "gnash" their teeth. Why not let them "grind" them, as folks in those sorry straits surely would? Is "bread of the Presence" much better than "showbread"? (It is safe to say that not one reader out of a hundred has the slightest idea of what either means, and "showbread" has such a comfortably familiar sound.) Occasional hints for the pronunciation of proper names—or rather, the indication as to which syllable should get the stress—are given; but many are left unadorned to embarrass the modern preacher, who ought (but generally) doesn't know the classical rule. "Zeb'edee" and "Timae'us" are pointed, as is "Caesare'a"—it would be of interest to know what determined the choices between *e* and *ae*—but "Alphaeus" and "Thaddaeus," not to mention the tricky "Philippi," are left naked and to shame. I suppose "Ja'irus" is correct—at least *Webster* says so—but I decidedly dislike it.

"Bruising himself with stones" (Mark 5:5) evidences a philological judgment and is defensible, though I still think it uncertain; surely, however, we deserve

something better than "ordered" and "sternly charged" for *epitimeson* (Matt. 12:16) and *embrimesamenos* (Mark 1:43). Here surely the translators are softening the text rather than translating; admittedly both words are tough for a translator, especially if he be pious.

To save space—for like Tennyson's brook this review could go on for ever—a few other queries may be raised without further comment: Why no indication of the very important textual variant at Matt. 1:16? Why the seemingly sloppy use of *leave* in "leave the dead to bury their own dead" (Matt. 8:22)? Why "town of the Samaritans" in Matt. 10:5 but "cities" in 11:1? Why the obscure and archaic "vessels" in Matt. 13:48 where, because of the context, it can be doubly confusing? Is "powers of death" so much better than "gates of Hades" or "of hell" (Matt. 16:18)? Why "Counselor" in John but "advocate" in I John? Why, oh why, "battalion" in Mark 15:16 and Matt. 27:27? When I read that, I turned in dread to John 18:12, fearing to find a *colonel* demoted to the command of a mere battalion; but no, it was there "a band of soldiers" and the *chiliarch* had been busted to a "captain." Why must we go back to the King James with a lamp "under a bushel"? Is "and the guards received him with blows" the best that can be done with Mark 14:65?

But enough of these queries. No one, of course—the translators probably least of all—will be completely satisfied. But so far as I have been able to tell by reasonably wide reading and constant checking and sampling, this is far and away the best translation into English of the New Testament for the general reader that has yet been made. It deserves, and it will undoubtedly receive, a hearty welcome. If it should deter any more translations of the New Testament into English, say for at least ten years, that achievement would be by no means the least of its merits.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Idea of Christ in the Gospels, by George Santayana, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. 266, $2.75.

This is the kind of book we have been wishing that Santayana would write. Not that we agree with his conclusions but because we wanted his word on this subject. We know that in spite of his tough mind heralding the cruel gospel of animal faith, cold materialism, nonpersonal immortality, and the like, he has courted Platonism, essences, beauty, morals, and even played favor with his mother religion, Roman Catholicism. What does he really think of Christ? And the gospels? And the historic traditional doctrines of ecclesiastical theology?

Santayana somewhere said that he disliked system makers. We remember how restless he has been down through the years because he could not find, he said, some friendly philosophical way to which he could subscribe and follow. Well, you read him far enough and you will see that he has found his way, that he has a system. It is in the light of his other books that this one is to be understood. They all form one pattern of thought. Here he rounds out his thought by squarely facing the mighty Christian tradition—a kind of capstone to his whole philosophizing.

His thesis in the first part is undercover. The casual reader is sure to miss the point in the reverent phrases and the beautiful rhetoric. This is true of all his writings. But here and there the basic view shines forth in unmistakable revelation. The thesis is this: we study the gospel narratives, the record of Christ's life as given by inspired writers, the whole pattern of it; but we disregard the historical truth (we are not historians or conventional higher critics) and seek rather the moral and

dramatic inspiration of the whole. The gospel writers were not historians but men inspired with a religion, a passion. Not one was an eyewitness; but all were missionaries of a cause. Thus, like them, our interest is not in historic details but in the religious image of Christ which they formed for themselves when they played upon the theme of God-in-man.

The book is, accordingly, more of a psychological approach than metaphysical. His knowledge of modern biblical criticism is surprisingly adequate for one who is a layman in the field. We must understand the writers to be men inspired. Now, inspiration is neither false nor true unless it is acted upon by thought or deed. And then, it requires a complex of practical experiences to make such judgments. When a man is inspired, he is moved by a kind of primitive passion. He feels a miracle. The evangelists felt this. To divorce this miracle-feeling from them is to misunderstand them altogether. Their stories—whether true or not—present dramatic portrayals of the person of Christ. And these reflect not the minds of calm reporters but of converts. The gospels did not determine the faith of the developing early church but the church itself gave to them authority. The idea of Christ is an image highly complex, a personified symbol of moral and metaphysical interpretations of life, the context almost frozen in Jewish framework. Succeeding ages grappled with their own images, drawing upon the written texts for materials and proofs. It was an impetuous assumption that this idea of Christ possessed an ontological power creating the only true religion and the only pure morality. What made for the success of such ontological assumptions? The traditional answer, of course, is their truth. But not so. The real answer is psychological first and metaphysical afterwards: there is some inborn predicament of the human spirit!

Thus, in panorama, the idea of Christ as it caught the imagination of believers is sketched. Familiar terms thus become explained: Son of God, Son of Man, atonement, prophecies, prayers, second coming, resurrection, etc. And through it all, the Santayanan voice is heard in approval and disapproval. "The Christian love of mankind is not natural love at all, but something else, charity." "Miracles are so called because they excite wonder." (It is sheer unreason to deny their possibility.) "Facts, real physical persons or events, are of no religious importance except as the imagination may be stimulated by them and may clothe them with a spiritual meaning." Aristotle was potentially a better Christian than Plato since he did "not undermine the needful contrast and interplay between the natural and the supernatural" as did Plato. Why? Because "for orthodox Christianity it is indispensable that both should exist realistically, with empirical transitions and deviations between them." "*I thirst* may be taken symbolically as well as literally; and God may have abandoned us because perhaps he does not exist." "The idea of Christ is much older than Christianity." It belongs with prophecy.

In the second part of the book entitled "Ulterior Considerations" he reflects critically upon a variety of themes associated with Christian philosophies, such as creation, the fatherhood of God, the soul, theism, etc. Literary criticism, he insists, requires a warmth of imagination to perceive human nature which underlies all religious ideas, particularly to weed out the assumptions of the culture and ideology into which a religion is born in contrast to the gropings of the human mind itself. "Facts matter little for the spirit except for what they mean to the heart." Man dramatizes about God because he is a spirit given to poetry and fancy. God as a personal monarch, a creator and father—these are mythical symbols of inspiration. The human spirit is a derivative of nature, generated in the very depths of the real and to which it returns after its articulation. "The supernatural is the ideal hyposta-

sised. But if you hypostasise the ideal you kill it. To quicken it again you must revert to the plane of nature, reincarnate the spirit there, and let circumstances awaken in that spirit once more some eternal image of the real become an ideal." The whole world reveals a transcendent quality, and inspiration is only a phase of that phenomenon. But it is tragic to end with transcendence, for then you put existence itself to a stop. You can call on a God as Father as the name for that power that flows in spirit, the human spirit, working through it when it truly expresses itself, namely, when it is spontaneous and heroic. The idea of Christ as model is the true guide to the spirit's vocation, a spirit which triumphs over impeding elements of human nature, coördinating and purifying them but not canceling out that nature.

If this review meets the eye of some minister who has come to feel stale in his weekly sermonizing, I recommend it warmly to him. The book is packed with germinal ideas for sermons. It is of the kind that disturbs habits of thought and poses the kind of questions which must seek for fresh and live answers. For professional theological students it is an intellectual catharsis full of explosive material to relieve any feeling of ideological sluggishness.

VERGILIUS FERM

The New Modernism, by Cornelius Van Til, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1946, pp. xx, 384, $3.75.

The interesting thing about this book is that it is a scholarly, comprehensive, and systematic attempt to prove that the common view with respect to the theology of Barth and Brunner is mistaken, that instead of being antimodernistic it is in fact fundamentally modernistic and may properly be designated "The New Modernism." Its polemic, we are told, is directed primarily, not against the earlier forms of modernism, but against what Professor Van Til refers to by such terms as the Reformed faith, Protestant orthodoxy, and historic Christianity. Fundamentalists were at first inclined to welcome Barthianism, though with some reservations, as an ally, but now it would seem that their more scholarly leaders, or at least some of them, have come to a quite different conclusion. They look upon the dialectical theology as their "mortal enemy." It comes, it is true, in the guise of a friend, but it is on that account all the more dangerous. It is "a fifth column in orthodox circles."

The book before us divides itself into two main parts. The first (pp. 1-130) deals with the philosophical background of both Barth and Brunner, and the second (pp. 131-379) with their theological views and their personal relation to each other during the past twenty-five years.

The chief philosophical sources of Barthianism, according to Van Til, are to be found in the critical philosophy of Kant, in the two types of dialecticism represented by Hegel and Kierkegaard, in the idea of *Urgeschichte* or "primal history" as expounded by Overbeck, and in the "existential" philosophy of Heidegger. These philosophical movements are taken to be representative, if not constitutive, of modernism. They are said to be phenomenalistic and positivistic. They assume the autonomy of man, and leave no place for the self-contained and triune God of historic Christianity. Modernists, to be sure, speak of "God," but they think of him as virtually identified with nature and history. Only in this sense is he immanent in the world. Hence modernism is declared to be "a purely naturalistic theology" (p. 371). And such also is the dialectical theology in its root principles. "The only foe against whom Barth really militates is orthodox historic theology. For him Christian theism is really the 'Satan of religion'" (p. 106).

The obvious reply to this line of argumentation is that Barth does not use modern phenomenalism or pantheism as a foundation for his own theology but simply as a means of discrediting philosophical theology in general. He is himself a philosophical skeptic and employs this type of skepticism as a basis for his own biblical authoritarianism. In this respect he is in my opinion radically mistaken. A theology that feeds on philosophical skepticism will eventually perish thereby. But so far as modern philosophy is concerned, Dr. Van Til has at this point no particular advantage over Barth.

The second and main part of *The New Modernism* gives a critical account of the "Crisis" theology since it first took on a distinctive character in Barth's commentary on *Romans,* published in 1919. The history of the movement, insofar as it is represented by Barth and Brunner, is divided into three periods. The first extended to 1927 and was marked by essential agreement between the two leaders. The second (1927-1932) was a period of civil war between them. And during the third period (since 1932) each has gone his own way.

The chief difference that has developed between the two men is that, while Barth has maintained what seems to be an increasingly sharp antithesis between "revealed" and "natural" theology, Brunner has moved in the opposite direction. But according to Van Til this difference is much less significant than is commonly supposed. Brunner's new position represents no real theological advance. Both men are still tarred with the same modernistic stick. "There is no more Christianity and no more theism in Brunner than there is in Barth" (p. 376).

In distinguishing the theology of crisis from that of orthodox Protestantism Van Til refers now and then to the fact that the former accepts, while the latter rejects, the main results of modern biblical criticism, but he does not lay special emphasis on it. He is interested in something more basic. He maintains that Barth and Brunner differ radically from the Reformed faith in their conceptions of God, man, sin, Christ, election, and other essential Christian doctrines. In support of this conclusion he quotes extensively from their books. And it will have to be admitted that there is an immense amount of muddleheadedness and a mass of bewildering and exasperating paradoxes in their writings, which lend themselves to diverse interpretations. But the main trend of their theology is nevertheless fairly clear. It moves in a conservative, not a progressive, direction.

One of the most misleading features of Van Til's book is the way in which it applies such terms as phenomenalistic, positivistic, activistic, antimetaphysical, and naturalistic to theological modernism. The fact, of course, is that the overwhelming majority of so-called modernists believe in the metaphysical reality of God. The same is also true of Barth and Brunner. They are both theological, though not philosophical, personalists. The author refers occasionally to personalism, but apparently has little understanding and less appreciation of its theological and apologetic significance.

Another misleading feature of the book is its attack on the doctrine of the autonomous self. This doctrine, commonly known as the doctrine of the creative activity of thought, was Kant's great and enduring contribution to epistemology. There is in it, rightly understood, nothing that encroaches upon or is inconsistent with the divine creative activity. Rather does it imply the divine creation of the human spirit.

In its general standpoint the book represents what the author regards as simon-pure Calvinism, and insofar as this is the case it belongs to an outmoded past. But in spite of this it is an interesting and informing book in two respects. It directs

attention to certain elements in the theology of Barth and Brunner that are often overlooked; and at the same time it presents the outline of a somewhat novel philosophical apologetic for a belated orthodoxy.

ALBERT C. KNUDSON

The Meaning of Human Experience, by Lynn Harold Hough, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1945, pp. 367, $3.

The editor of the CROZER QUARTERLY has made a difficult assignment. An adequate review of Dean Hough's encyclopædic treatment of human experience in the face of the current paper shortage must appear as the work of a magician. One is tempted to generalize briefly in terms of encomia, which this volume richly deserves, thereby offering little that is new to the many readers who already appreciate the quality of Dean Hough's mind.

Perhaps this review might better take the form of a request to the author for a series of volumes, which would consider much more thoroughly many of the major implications raised—and far too hurriedly dismissed—in the course of the quite intricate development of his thought, which here approaches the kaleidoscopic. Some difficulties concerning the organization of the multifarious materials included in the book probably stem from the fact that the volume grew out of a series of Southwestern University lectures. A happy combination of topical arrangement and chronological analysis is always very difficult to achieve, even when the scope of concern is limited to certain relatively well-defined areas of human experience. When a presentation of the entire panorama is attempted, as in the present instance, even a lengthy book is confronted with an almost impossible task. The mood of our day, as clearly evinced in this writing, is synoptic; and both the virtues and the evils of the current literary fashion are typified in the work before us. Scope is gained, but it is gained at the expense of leisure and exhaustive examination.

The author states his thesis in clear terms in the opening chapter: "Men's ways with nature, men's ways with other men, men's ways with their own minds, and men's ways with the great world of the unseen make up the very warp and woof of that experience which we would confront and seek to understand" (p. 11). This is a large order in one volume, even for Dean Hough.

Difficulties involved in the attempt to blend topical treatment and chronology confront the reader, as he "confronts the human," from the very outset. An example of these occurs in the initial sketching of the growth of man's sense of power. Primitive man gradually learns to control nature and to turn its processes to his own ends. The pyramids of Egypt are presented in a sentence by way of illustration. Their building is a "fascinating mystery," the focus of which is placed in the development of man's engineering and mathematical abilities. Now no one would deny this aspect of ancient Egyptian culture, but the pyramids mean much more than this. We would like to pause here and investigate. But we leap the centuries to Ikhnaton, and then through the vehicle of a sentence find ourselves—somewhat breathless—with Hammurabi. Mythology then flashes into the picture, seen as a device made by the masters to maintain authority over inferiors. It disappears in the next sentence. Of course, the author cannot mean that this is all there is to a mythology. But someone might think so. For the scholarly reader epitomes of this sort are superfluous. For the reader who is untrained in such matters further qualification is surely indicated in order to avoid distortion of the several topics in point and the concealment of the central issue, which concerns the growth of concrete individuality in history.

This characteristic of the opening chapter, which may best be described as kaleidoscopic, in varying ways colors all of the subsequent presentation. It is a case of "now you see it, now you don't." From this tracing of man's urge to mastery over physical and social environments, which has been given to us with an historical emphasis as a kind of springboard, we now turn rather abruptly to essentially philosophical questions. These carry through the remaining four chapters of Part One. Even for one who has cut his teeth on F. H. Bradley the chewing is hard. In this area of reflection impressionistic writing becomes actually dangerous. This critic, for one, is in hearty agreement with the general outlines of the personal idealism towards which this section of the book moves. The author's discussion of "Human Personality" and its grounding in the nature of the Divine is developed in splendid fashion. The chapter on "The Ultimate Person" should be read with careful and sympathetic attention. But the philosophical steps to arrive at this point, which move through the tortuous avenues of "Knowing and Thinking" and "The Nature of the Real," are difficult to follow. I do not think the fault is entirely that of the reader. This philosophical section should be either greatly expanded to resolve a variety of technical questions, or streamlined to remove the hazardous grade crossings. There is enough material in this section alone for a large volume. The effort to compress it forces the author into certain difficult situations. For instance, we find a definite statement made on p. 24 that "we must always have an epistemology before we have a metaphysic." We must analyze man as a knower and a thinker before going on to questions concerning what he knows and what he thinks. Maybe . . . . Now this may or may not be so. It is a very important matter for philosophy. If it is so, I submit that the position may be maintained only after exhaustive scrutiny. I remember a personal chat with Alfred North Whitehead in which he condemned this order as one of the evils of the twentieth century. But the author goes on to say that "actually he [man] is not aware first of himself, then of an organ of awareness, and then of things of which he is aware. He is just aware of himself perceiving and of himself considering. He uses—when at last he does come to use—the word 'mind' to describe himself knowing and himself thinking." Here I assume, although perhaps in error, that "perceiving," "knowing," and "thinking" all involve objective reference in Dean Hough's usage. Therefore, I have difficulty in seeing why, on the premises stated in the book, epistemology must precede metaphysics rather than keep it company in a relation of mutual relevance and necessity. The author is emphatic that a thinker is not a true thinker when passively contemplating his thoughts. True thinking involves the activity of control. Civilization is a product of such control. The thinker, as self, is more than his thought. This position is clearly asserted as a defense against the claims of materialism and panpsychism. Its general Kantian orientation is well known.

It might be wished that the author had carried the positive current of examination to much greater length in his journey towards "The Ultimate Person" and "The Speech of the Great Person." As it is, we are turned again, and rather abruptly, to a consideration of the various errors of materialism, realism, and idealism. Here the topical arrangement becomes especially difficult and artificial. Materialism is disposed of in a solid section of two pages. This is not much, but perhaps it is all materialism warrants. But the treatments of realism and idealism alternate—sections two, four, and six going to the former; and three, five, and seven to the latter. Only the seventh, which deals with personal idealism, contributes positively to the thesis of the book. This makes for hard reading, even for one who knows in advance what the line of argument ought to be. That much greater attention should

have been devoted to the "negative" philosophical positions is clear—or they should have been omitted entirely in favor of emphasis upon positive construction. As it is, they appear as straw men. The author himself appears to recognize this, for in the following chapter—which is a very fine one—"The Ultimate Person," the third section is devoted to the fallacy of attempting to explain the personal by means of the impersonal. This should have been disposed of, once and for all, in the preceding critical chapter, "The Nature of the Real." These examples merely serve to illustrate the difficulties involved in the use of an impressionistic approach to technical problems of philosophy.

We come into a different atmosphere with the competent development of "The Hebrew-Christian Witness," which carries through the ten chapters of Part Two. Here detailed comment is unnecessary. The author is so clearly master of his subject that one wishes that the volume had begun at this point. It must be read to be appreciated. The chapter, "The Queen of Sciences," is especially rewarding. But it is interesting to wonder what the literary effect might have been had the author reversed the order of Parts Two and Three, placing the latter, "The Humanistic Tradition," before "The Hebrew-Christian Witness." Of course, this would have involved the shifting of many separate topical sections, but the total effect of passing from "The Hebrew-Christian Witness" to the fourth—and last—entitled "The Evangelical Synthesis," might have been superior to the present arrangement. In fact, the first chapter of Part Four, "All the Streams Flow Together," is the real climax of the book. The concluding section seventeen of this chapter, "Christus Imperator," states: "So in every way Christ becomes the center of all human thought and of all human experience." This high note should end the author's comprehensive quest. We would come away from our reading with a feeling of satisfaction and fulfillment. It is something of a letdown to descend again into the realm of controversy and be confronted, as a kind of afterthought, with the fallacies of "Hindu inclusiveness," and problems of ethics, both of which might easily have been dealt with under appropriate headings (following the topical arrangement) in earlier chapters of the book.

And now, as the situation concerning paper is one of the hardest brute facts of present human experience, this critic is happy to turn Dean Hough's challenging work over to the reader with the hope that he will give it the careful attention it deserves, and attempt to find this reviewer wrong on all negative points. As already emphasized, these points involve, in the main, factors of literary organization. Perhaps they are inevitable in view of the evolution of the volume from a series of university lectures. They limit, although they by no means void, the significant value of Dean Hough's contribution to modern religious literature.

ELLIOT VAN N. DILLER

Light from the Ancient Past, by Jack Finegan, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1946, pp. xxxiv, 500, $5.

Few manuals of archæology have attempted to span such a long period of history or to touch upon such diverse fields of knowledge as does this volume bearing the subtitle "The Archeological Background of the Hebrew-Christian Religion." The background of the Hebrew-Christian religion is traced from the earliest evidences of civilization in Mesopotamia (from about 5000 B.C.), through the many phases of the history of that area, down to the time of Abraham. There follows a panorama of Egyptian history, literature, culture from about 5000 B.C. down to the Greek

period. From Egypt the reader is led to Palestine for a general summary of its past from the Stone Age to the fall of Jerusalem in 587 B.C. Surveyed are the empires of western Asia: the Kassite dynasty, the Hittite empire, Assyria, Chaldea, and Persia. Rome and the Roman empire from *ca.* 753 B.C. to A.D. 476 are described with considerable detail given to the catacombs and to the ancient churches of Palestine, Syria, Egypt, Constantinople, and Rome. An interest in Paul and his journeys has called for frequent excursions into the large field of Greek archæology. Besides these surveys of at least seven different archæological areas there is a lengthy section, "Manuscripts Found in the Sand," which deals with papyrology, textual criticism, ancient manuscripts, and other matters relating to the writing and transmission of ancient documents. Where can one find so much in the compass of one volume?

It is this broad sweep of interest which is both the strength and the weakness of this book. It evidences an amazing curiosity on the part of its author. With a working knowledge—and in some places the knowledge of a specialist—of the literature in the highly esoteric fields of archæology Professor Finegan has produced an excellent outline of our present knowledge of the ancient world from the point of view of one whose interest is in the Hebrew-Christian tradition. The book is something more than an outline. The bones of the historical structure have been made to live by means of good illustrations, not the threadbare ones which have served over and over again in some of the older manuals, but fresh and well-chosen ones. A concise, but interesting, style, a feeling for the detail which will interest the general reader, good arrangement of illustrations, excellent format—these are some of the features which contribute to the pleasure of reading the book.

The inevitable weakness of such an ambitious attempt to cover so much ground is the lack of authority. Obviously, Professor Finegan is at home in the material with which he deals in certain sections of the book; in others he has relied upon newspaper reports, popular articles, and upon other manuals of archæology. One would expect in a discussion of Tepe Gawra reference to be made to the volume describing this excavation; while there are a number of references to provisional and popular reports, the official publication is not mentioned. Material for the discussion of Taanach seems to be taken from the popular manuals of Burrows, Duncan, and Barton, rather than from the original publication of the excavation. This is but one example of the way in which the author leans, in his discussion of Palestinian archæology, upon secondary rather than upon primary sources. Only occasionally does this reliance upon the secondary sources make for serious difficulty. In the discussion of Rome in the time of Paul is the statement: "In 1941, however, the discovery of an inscription at Ostia was announced with statistics indicating that in A.D. 14, the year of the death of Tiberius, the city of Rome had a population of 4,100,000 inhabitants." A footnote indicates that the *American Journal of Archæology* is the authority for this information. Since Professor Finegan had correctly said some pages before that Tiberius had died in A.D. 37, and that it was Augustus who had died in A.D. 14, the reader would naturally conclude that the author had merely miswritten the date here. Yet a glance at the *American Journal of Archæology* shows that the item appeared in the New York *Herald-Tribune* for July 4, 1941, without the mention of any authority for the information. The newspaper had given the incorrect date for Tiberius' death; the *Journal* had copied it without correction; and now it has appeared in the more permanent form of an archæological handbook. It would not be surprising to see the item quoted again, this time supported by such good authorities as the *Herald-Tribune,* the *American Journal of*

Archæology, and *Light from the Ancient Past.* Then one might begin to wonder if there were not some evidence that Tiberius did die in A.D. 14.

For the most part, *Light from the Ancient Past* is purely descriptive; conclusions are cautiously and guardedly made. In light of the generally conservative tenor of the deductions, it is surprising to find at the end of the discussion of the Roman churches of St. Peter and of St. Paul-Outside-the-Walls that ". . . the chain of archeological evidence is such that the last resting places of the two great apostles may confidently be sought beneath the extensive hall of the three emperors and the soaring dome of Bramante and Michelangelo." The Church of the Holy Sepulcher in Jerusalem is also seen as the structure in which ". . . we may with confidence seek . . . the true place of Golgotha and the sepulcher of Christ." It is needless to say that these are not opinions which are widely held in non-Catholic circles.

Despite these criticisms of details, this book serves a useful purpose. It is a Baedeker of Near Eastern archæology, packed with interesting detail, as well as with a wealth of bibliographical material on many subjects. No one will read it without learning from it. The two hundred well-chosen illustrations and the ten maps and plans are worth the modest price of the book. On the whole this is an admirable introduction to the archæological wealth of the ancient past for the minister, the student, and the interested layman. Professor Finegan is to be congratulated that he has had the courage to undertake such a large task and that he has been able to maintain such balanced proportions when confronted with such a wealth of material. Lacking yet, however, is a synthesis of the history and culture of the ancient past comparable to the work of Eduard Meyer in German.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

A Layman Looks at the Bible, by C. A. Ben Mordecai, New York, Bloch, 1946, pp. 141, $2.

This is a book coming not from a priest or rabbi, but from "one of the people," which Hebrew phrase is the basis of the Christian term *layman,* as distinguished from the cleric. The work has been posthumously and excellently edited, with an introduction by Professor A. I. Katsh and a very attractive memoir of the author's life by S. E. Starrels. The given name of the author was his pen name; he was actually Hyman Starr, a Ukrainian by birth, who fled with his father's family to America, and settled in New York, where he died in 1942 after an arduous business life. In his later years he returned to "his first love—the study of the Hebrew Bible."

The book consists of thirty-three chapters, each with fresh interpretations of the text of the biblical passage discussed, or suggested rearrangement of the materials. It is free of hereditary rabbinism on the one hand, of higher criticism on the other. Its independence well exhibits the many problems that still remain in the Hebrew text, as is evident, for instance, in the excellent Jewish version, which has often to make sense out of textual nonsense. The author does not hesitate to make textual corrections. And so the work is a useful introduction for both the student and the scholar.

In the first place notice may be taken of fresh interpretations of words and phrases. Chapter 9 cites Numb. 18:1 (the citation is incorrectly given in the print): "Thou and thy sons . . . shall bear the iniquity of the sanctuary; and . . . the iniquity of your priesthood." The author properly attempts to amend the unfortunate translation, "iniquity," with "hazard," or the like. The same word occurs at Gen.

4:13, where the English versions in the citation of Cain's word to the Deity make him say, "my punishment," with variant, "iniquity," for which "danger" is proposed as a substitute. The author continues the study of the term in II Kings 7:9, and in several Psalms. However, the reviewer would suggest the legal term "liability" as the best translation. In general the usual English translation of the Hebrew legal phraseology requires considerable revision. Chapter 12 has an interesting fresh interpretation of Deut. 18:8 with the change of root in a difficult word from *mkr* to *nkr*. Chapter 14 discusses the place names in Gen. 38:5: "And she yet again bore a son, and called his name Shelah, and he was at Chezib when she bore him." The writer explains the geographical word anatomically, the babe was "in a caul," supporting this by the connection of the name *Shelah* with the word meaning *placenta*, both terms of childbirth. But Professor Albright's additional note is to be considered.

Chapter 15 cites Exod. 21:22: "(and he shall pay) as the judges determine"; these words represent a prepositional phrase of dubious meaning. The writer, following a different root, translates by "with apologies." But it is questionable whether such good manners mattered in ancient law. The reviewer, following the root proposed, suggests "with pleas," *i.e.*, in defense of the case. Chapter 19 discusses the story of the infancy of Samuel, I Sam. 1-2, suggesting *inter al.* that the comment in 1:18b should be rendered as follows: "So the woman regained her composure, and she ate, and wore no more the same expression"; that is, psychological terms are expressed. The difficulty of interpretation appears in the English versions, which eke out the last sentence by introducing the word "sad." Chapter 22 considers Isa. 48:19: "thy seed also had been as the sand, and the offspring of thy bowels like the grains thereof." It is proposed that the final phrase means "like the roe thereof," *i.e.*, of the sea, which antecedent appears in the preceding verse. This is supported by a Ugaritic phrase published by Albright and cited in a note. Chapters 27-30, bearing on Prov. 17:17; 23:31 f., Job 14:6; Song 1:4, offer notable fresh interpretations.

A large number of the chapters are devoted to rearrangement of the texts. It would take too much space to review and criticize the several attempts. Chapter 13 treats the conclusion of the Song of Miriam, Exod. 15. The original "folk story recited by all the women" is presented in the following arrangement of verses, namely, 21, 19a, 19b, each with the choric refrain, "in the sea." Professor T. H. Gaster presents an interesting parallel from Ugaritic poetry. Pp. 133-137 offer many new arrangements of the Psalms, which should be considered by the student.

These studies face the problem in all literary criticism of ancient documents, which were also paralleled by oral tradition. The scribes did not have before them a quantity of variant manuscripts, but largely wrote from memory, especially in the case of poetry and story, using their own arbitrary ordering of the materials, which again might be censured, interpolated, and rearranged by later scribes.

JAMES A. MONTGOMERY

Justice and the Social Order, by Emil Brunner, New York, Harper, ©1945, pp. vii, 304, $3.

What is justice? This question arises repeatedly and acutely in the contemporary scene. The Nuremberg trials, the efforts of the United Nations to resolve rival claims to land or reparations, the struggles between capital and labor on the home front, the dissolving marriages of returning veterans—all these areas exemplify the

basic issue. What is the court of appeal in such discussions? Are there any principles beyond the formal rules of legal procedure or the fallible human judgment of lawmakers to which appeal can be made? Or is justice that which conforms to some legal code? If the latter be true, how are we to escape legalism and achieve progress? Does not justice grow by advances beyond existing laws? And if so, by what criterion shall we judge advance?

To such questioning two answers have, in the main, been given. One group declares that there are eternal principles inscribed in the very stuff of nature, according to which right and wrong are to be judged. The other group asserts that man, as he evolves, defines with increasing precision and intelligence the conditions on which social equilibrium is achieved. The first group are the exponents of a divine natural law, the second are the positivists; and the controversy between them has come alive again since the turn of this century.

The present volume is a contribution to this discussion by the well-known Swiss theologian. Dr. Brunner recognizes here a weak spot in Protestantism: it did not give to the whole idea of justice the place it deserves, and has received from Roman Catholic theology, in Christian ethics. He is also aware that here ethics runs into theology, and that the larger problem of relating faith to reason is focused at this point too. The author, while not the antirationalist that Barth is, nevertheless holds reason to be subordinate to revelation. Consequently his position on natural law and justice is readily anticipated.

He stands for an eternal law, rooted in divine revelation, from which justice in human relations can be derived. At the same time, he recognizes that "the question of justice in the systems of this world is clearly one which lies on the borderline" between theology and the philosophy of law.

With great erudition he examines the underlying principles, and then offers some practical implications for justice in family life, economics, and politics. The book is very clear, even in translation (thanks to the fine work of Miss Mary Hottinger), and should interest all who care about a deep-rooted Christian social message, or about the present status of law.

The main thesis of the book is familiar to any student of the history of either Christian ethics or juristic theory. It runs as follows: the world was created by a just God, and therefore nature is rooted in primal justice. Where men flout this justice (or what the Old Testament calls "the righteousness of God"), they become unnatural, divorced from the basis of their very existence. Where men seek to live justly, they will find in this eternal law of God their criteria for testing social relations. In the Bible these criteria are explicitly stated in the declarations 1. that God created humans to be different (male and female), 2. that he created them to be individually responsible to himself, 3. that equality consists in each being able to make his special contribution under God to the common life, and 4. that justice is inextricable from a religious view of the world.

Clearly this line of argument depends for its validity on its theological presuppositions. The issue can be more clearly seen by stating the alternative theory of democracy: 1. that human nature with its rational faculties emerged from a biological setting into social life, 2. that individuality developed by differentiations within the group on the physical basis of spatial separateness and of inherited physiological pecularities, 3. that the value of such distinctiveness in the enrichment of common life became obvious through the interchange of experience, since it made possible judgments based on a wider range of experience, and 4. that the aim of

justice is to conserve the rights of each and all to find free expression of their lives for mutual enrichment and common advance.

In his eagerness to sharpen the opposition of Christianity to totalitarianism Brunner has really by-passed this alternative, though many of his critical comments are relevant for this democratic form of secularism. First, in a comment on Aristotle he points out that the Stagirite arrived at his conception of human inequality not by observation but by faith, a lingering confidence in the superiority of Greeks over barbarians and of men over women. As if anticipating the reply of the modern philosopher, he adds that "it is not matter which is the principle of individuality . . . but the personal will of God." But this is not argued, only asserted as *a priori.* Here the author displays his methodological viewpoint: that all philosophizing must start from the premise of a personal God calling men into responsible relation to himself.

But this is precisely the bone of contention in modern debate, and we can take one of two attitudes in discussion. Either we can declare an absolute difference in starting point between Christian theology and secular philosophy, or we can discuss whether there is a personal Creator. Brunner takes the former attitude. The only road open to the philosopher is then to be converted to this faith as a precondition of sound thinking, of what the Calvinist calls "regenerate reason." This position Brunner had already expounded in his *Philosophie und Offenbarung* in 1925.

The practical ethical conclusions at which he arrives coincide with secular democratic theory as we find it in such writers as T. V. Smith and Max Ascoli; so that we are brought back to the question: Do the democratic views require his theological grounding? His answer is "Yes." But what happens then to the fortunate "inequalities" (*i.e.,* the individual differences) of which he speaks as the condition of dynamic justice? This remains his unresolved dilemma.

This review has concentrated on the initial premise of the book. The careful discussions of the nature of inequality, the relation of justice to love, the meaning of law will reward the reader who is willing to tackle a profound and extremely stimulating, as well as timely, book.

EDWIN E. AUBREY

Christ the Lord, by John Knox, Chicago, Willett, Clark, 1945, pp. xi, 146, $1.75.

In this volume, Professor Knox vigorously attacks many recalcitrant problems in New Testament criticism. In capsules small enough to fit the requirements of the Ayer Lectureship, the reader is given a taste of the following topics: the character of the gospels and the major facts of Jesus' career that survive criticism (lecture 1); Jesus' view of the kingdom of God and the son of man (lecture 2); the character and content of his ethic (lecture 3); the earliest experience of the resurrection as an event constitutive of the church and its faith in the Lord (lecture 4); the developing formulations of Christology and soteriology (lectures 5, 6). The style is everywhere clear and forceful; the method faithfully follows the canons of current scholarship; the conclusions are judicious and convincing.

My chief disappointment lies in the failure of the volume to fulfill the promise of the subtitle, and to maintain the perspective adopted in the introduction. The subtitle reads, "the meaning of Jesus in the early church." According to Dr. Knox, this involves "the whole meaning of the whole New Testament," and the word *meaning* is defined not as "truth understood" but as "reality experienced." And to apprehend that reality, the historian must "stand imaginatively within the event." Right. But this is what the author fails to do. Hobbled by academic questions of a modern classroom, he does not free himself (except in oblique comments) to view

the Lord as Peter or Paul saw him. In each successive chapter his first concern is to pay his respects to contemporary scholarship, and this leaves little time to delineate the reality which early Christians experienced. Like many of us, Dr. Knox finds it easier to deplore a false historiography (p. 4) than to escape it.

This dilemma appears in the division of the lectures into three sections corresponding to the memory (He was remembered), the faith (He was known still), and the theological reflection (He was interpreted). This strikes me as a dubious literary device, for, as the author admits, these three are "fused indissolubly" in the original situation. It would never have occurred to an apostle to split his relationship to Jesus Christ along these lines. Furthermore, the actual contents of the lectures are as awkwardly related to these captions as the usual sermon is to its text. Only in the last chapter, in the discussion of sin and salvation, does Professor Knox move into the genuine milieu of apostolic experience. And here he writes with penetration and warmth. Elsewhere academic analysis displaces the existential concern that alone can make the event (*i.e.*, Jesus Christ) an intelligible and redemptive reality for us.

PAUL S. MINEAR

Guilt and Redemption, by Lewis J. Sherrill, Richmond, John Knox, 1945, pp. 254, $2.50.

This very interesting book centres on the conviction that "Christianity has the most penetrating and the most constructive solution ever offered for the tremendous problems arising out of human guilt" (p. 7). Dr. Sherrill finds, however, that the full redemptive resources of Christianity are not now being employed because contemporary conceptions of guilt are superficial. The traditional terminology of Christian teaching is now used as a screen to conceal the "deeper meanings of sin." Guilt and redemption have been separated from each other. "Redemption" has no meaning for ordinary people because they have no sense of guilt. And those who do experience guilt find no help in modern Christianity, where they are given "a remarkable metaphysical theory of redemption which in practice . . . cannot reach down into the recesses of the human soul and set that soul free from guilt" (p. 14). Dr. Sherrill aims at the overcoming of this discontinuity between guilt and redemption. Drawing upon clinical psychology and upon Christian teaching, he undertakes to exhibit in depth the problem of guilt, and to show how the Christian gospel may be more effectively focused upon the resolution of this problem.

The author tells us that we must not begin with theological or psychological dogmas about human nature, but with the actual experience of guilt, as exhibited in clinical records. I suppose it might be argued that at least some theological dogmas have also sprung from the actual experience of guilt, and that they tell us something as striking and suggestive in their own way, as clinical records—but I shall suppress further suppositions of this sort for the time being. Then it is shown that conflict is the root of guilt. Men have not always known this, or, many times when they have suspected it, they have fostered responsibility for their plight upon the gods or upon the natural environment. Even when they have correctly perceived that the root of their most oppressive problems was within, the way to effective resolution of conflict and guilt was blocked by ascetic escapism or pessimism.

But what is this "guilt" and what is the conflict that produces it? Guilt, Dr. Sherrill says, is both "fact" and "feeling." The "fact" is responsibility for violating an accepted code of conduct—a code first externally related to the individual and then internalized. Violation of the internalized code produces the *feeling* of guilt.

Now below all rational, conscious processes, such as the making of moral judgments, there is a substratum of "primitive emotions," ready to erupt into blind resistance to any threat to the self (p. 77). These emotions are aroused in the earliest "dynamic relationships"—*i.e.*, the family—in which the individual is involved. Their expression meets in that context such powerful opposition that they are repressed. Thus the very painful feeling of guilt is generated. Since it is too painful to be endured in full consciousness, the self conceals and disguises its guilt from itself; and these disguises are symptoms of submerged but dreadfully potent conflict.

Thus guilt, anxiety, and hostility are bred in the early, formative years of life, by the headlong collision of the egocentred drives and the repressive power of society. Redemption is the process by which these "destroyers" are overcome. Redemption is *agape* overcoming and transmuting *eros* (cf. p. 159). This is psychotherapy at its best, and it is the very marrow of Christian doctrine. According to Christianity man is fully responsible before God for his sin, and his sin disrupts the right dynamic relationship between the self and God and between the self and other human selves. In Jesus Christ God comes as *agape* (love) to restore man to right relationships (cf. p. 164). And the individual and personal appropriation of this power unto new life is faith (p. 182).

Dr. Sherrill believes that the true meaning of faith has been corrupted in Christian history, for theology has supplanted Christ as the object of faith (p. 184); the dead hand of authority has born down the living spirit. Yet it is alone the spirit of Christ that saves, for it alone is able to plumb the depths of the human soul and work its healing at the root of man's being (pp. 208 ff.).

The central aim of this book—to bring theological dogmas concerning guilt and redemption into a more productive relationship with the concrete problems of human life—is an undeniably important one. I find some difficulties presented in this particular program, however.

1. I wonder how much of this program consists in the substitution of the terminology of clinical psychology for that of traditional Christian thought. It is by no means self-evident that the substitution of psychiatric jargon for this older terminology is itself a profound illumination of the depths of the human spirit. And it is certainly not simply to be assumed that clinical psychology and Christian theology are talking about the same things, even when they use the same terms.

2. Dr. Sherrill appears to assume that his readers will take for granted that the traditional "metaphysical" doctrine of redemption cannot work a radical cure for guilt, because he does not submit any kind of evidence whatever for this remarkable claim. I do not know whether or not he supposes that anything metaphysical *could* not produce satisfying practical results; but if he does suppose this, he would do well to say so and produce the argument and evidence for it.

3. The author never clearly states what he takes to be the right relationship of theology to concrete experience. In the main, he operates with an inadequate conception of what a dogma is (cf. p. 15) and of what the function is of theological and philosophical abstractions (cf. pp. 217 f.). He finds that the church drove out the living Christ and put a creed about him in his place (cf. p. 184). He does not know just when this happened, but he claims that it was well established by the time of Athanasius (p. 183). Dr. Sherrill's eloquence here is fine: it would be even better if it were accompanied by a cogent theory of the rôle of creeds and of abstractions in general in the Christian life, or in life in general. Without that, it looks very much like the old, old story of "living" experience contra "dead" thought, than which there is nothing any staler or less illuminating.

4. Dr. Sherrill discovers his primary meanings for guilt and redemption in clinical psychology and then sees whether Christian doctrine will fit into the picture. True, he very briefly mentions the possibility that guilt is responsibility before God; but he does not seem to find anything oppressively serious in this transcendental reference of sin and guilt. Since God is all love—here a very loosely knit dogma indeed—the sinner has no grounds for anxiety before God, if he is able to have faith in Christ who is the incarnation of God's love (cf. pp. 226 f.). I do not know the sources of Dr. Sherrill's own dogmatic formulations here, but as an interpretation of Christian teaching, they are very dubious.

5. Certain of his rhetorical generalizations are confusing and others are mistaken: (a) His discussion of Plato is very seriously handicapped by failure to distinguish mythological from nonmythological aspects of Plato's thought. (b) The conclusion on Kant (p. 41) is clearly wrong. (c) Very little attention is given to the Pauline notion of faith as God-wrought. (d) The conventional interpretation of Hebrew sacrifice (p. 112) is today widely discredited.

6. There is considerable interest today in the cross correlation of theological and psychological concepts and interpretations. Fresh and productive synthesis of these areas requires rigorous scrutiny of the respective functions, methods, and presuppositions of both. I cannot find this in *Guilt and Redemption.* Dr. Sherrill appears to feel that theology is going at fundamental problems in the wrong way, and that it has pretty consistently done so. I have suggested that on this point he has given us very little evidence and very little argument. And I am not able to see a clearly defined suggestion, in this book, as to what theology, or the church in general, must do as the corrective measure.

JULIAN N. HARTT

Theological Education in the Northern Baptist Convention, by Hugh Hartshorne and Milton C. Froyd, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1945, pp. 242, no price.

This volume was prepared for the Commission on a Survey of Theological Education of the Board of Education of the Northern Baptist Convention. It is a survey in that it seeks to analyze and describe the status of pastoral leadership in the churches and the educational program of the seminaries but does not attempt to evaluate the work of the schools nor to offer solutions to many of the problems which it raises.

The first part of the study deals with the question: What is the job of the minister? It begins with an excellent statement of the concept of the ministry in Baptist tradition, and in the light of historical development discusses the problem of vocation and profession, of calling and competence. There follows a report of what the ministers, seminary faculties, and students view as the task of the minister and what the churches want in their leadership. This, in turn, leads to a discussion of the activities, professional status, and supply and demand of ministers. The other three sections deal with the men who are now in the seminaries, present facilities for professional training, and possible developments in theological education.

This is a much-needed study, and all who are concerned with the preparation of leadership for the Baptist churches should be grateful for it. Some things are said bluntly, as they should be. For instance, among Baptist ministers only 36 per cent have a full seven-year college-seminary training; 22 per cent are trained in Bible schools; 10 per cent have no training beyond high school; 40 per cent have never attended a standard theological seminary; and 48 per cent fail to meet even the minimum standards for ordination. (With such an inadequately trained leader-

ship, is it any wonder, then, that we witness conditions as they now are in many of our Baptist churches?) It is all the more tragic when one learns that the churches are willing to call men of better preparation if such men were available. It is also startling to know that the Baptist seminaries are falling short of supplying the demands for pastoral leadership in the denomination by 62 per cent. The survey faces quite frankly the fact that the seminaries are not getting the best qualified and most capable students from our colleges and is correct in stating that the real problem of theological education is to raise the level of those entering our seminaries and then to see that they secure the adequate training they should have. Many readers will probably be surprised to learn that only five of the Baptist seminaries, all of them the older established institutions, are standard seminaries in that they are fully accredited by the American Association of Theological Schools.

The main emphasis of the survey is that the seminaries are not educating men professionally, that is, they are not developing "a body of graduates competent to engage in a profession, i.e., who possess a broad grasp of the basic sciences underlying the work and thought of the practitioner, a detailed knowledge of the facts related to some particular field of practice, an understanding of the principles which must be followed in successful practice, and at least so much skill in practice as to guarantee that they are likely to grow into competent members of the profession" (p. 214). The program of theological education is viewed in terms of the manner in which it approaches the above goals. There is in this and throughout the survey an emphasis on the functional approach. This is satisfactory provided "functional" is not limited too narrowly. Much of importance that goes into the preparation of a man as a minister is not apparent in the definition. The program leading to the degree of B.D. is also a graduate program. While most of our ministers need more of the professional, they also need in a mighty bad way more of the graduate liberal arts aspects of the curriculum. Witness the denominations where such is required in ministerial training and see the higher quality of the product!

To determine the program of studies for this professional training the job-analysis technique is used. While admittedly this has its strong points, it also overlooks many of the personal, social, and intellectual factors involved in the training of the minister. In their program of education our students need opportunities which will allow for the development of much more enrichment than is provided in training for a job. (How I hate that word! It seems more appropriate for plumbers than ministers!)

In a study which involves two sets of schools so very different the authors very wisely divided them in presenting data on several issues. It strikes this reviewer, however, as being decidedly unfair to call the older, well-established seminaries which require college preparation of their matriculants and which are accredited by the A. A. T. S., the "B" seminaries and the other schools "A." This latter rating is usually used to designate first-class institutions. The data dealing with the educational preparation of the faculty members are almost useless unless one knows where the degrees were earned. In Table 61, on the typical class hours taken by students, there is an error. Typical students at Crozer do take work in biblical languages. I also challenge the statement that in only one seminary, an "A" one at that, the amount of time spent on biblical languages "seems to approximate what it would require to become free in their use." It is not the number of hours that is important but the quality of the teaching.

All in all, however, the emphases are wholesome ones. Northern Baptists should be deeply concerned over many of the problems presented. Methods must

be devised for the recruitment of more capable students. The conclusions concerning the theological college and the length of the course of training are commendable. "When students and faculty merge into one institution the tendency is either to lower the graduate work to an undergraduate level or to transform the college into a theological school." Though much depends upon the selection of the students and the subjects taught, the effect of the shorter course, as shown by this study, "is to limit seriously the general outlook of students and their grasp of some of the basic elements of modern culture" (p. 159). What is needed is not a reduction but an increase in the amount of time spent in preparation for the ministry. Long overdue, also, is the statement: "The day is past when the seminary curriculum can be confused with the speaking of the Christian message. The seminary is not a church but a school" (p. 161). Standards of higher training have developed in other professional fields because the state and the people have demanded them. The quality of the ministerial student and of his training depends upon the joint action of all concerned—the denomination, local churches, colleges, and seminaries. We are indebted to the Board of Education for this survey. We hope that the data presented will not only concern Baptists but will lead them into constructive action to improve the quality of all of the elements that are combined in a good program of graduate professional theological education.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

Pascal: Genius in the Light of Scripture, by Emile Cailliet, Philadelphia, Westminster, ©1945, pp. 383, $3.75.

Blaise Pascal was the sort of universal genius who is many things to many men. The mathematician and physical scientist recognize in him one of the architects of modern science. The literary critic is interested in the influence of the *Pensées* and *Letters* on the development of modern French prose. But Pascal himself is not fully to be understood in terms of either of these categories. For the central focus of his life and the crowning and consuming interest of his mature years was religion, and it is from within a religious perspective that his genius has to be interpreted, if one wishes to penetrate beyond the surface facts.

Not many students of Pascal have grasped the significance of this clue to Pascal as firmly as Professor Cailliet, and the result is a study which is especially welcome not only to lovers of Pascal, but to anyone interested in the religious atmosphere and ideas of that rather sterile period of the seventeenth century which stands as the dreary aftermath of the religious ferment and creativity of the Reformation and Counter Reformation. The book is, I think, the most detailed exposition in English of Pascal's religious thought.

Professor Cailliet is obviously a devout Pascalian; for him, Pascal is indeed a fair Bayard, without fear or reproach. This lends an air of hero worship, of prolonged encomium to the book. This is not to suggest that Cailliet's scholarly craftsmanship is not careful and objective; the whole story of Pascal's life is set down with candor and fidelity. Nevertheless, there will be readers who find such unflagging enthusiasm a bit wearing and unimpressive.

One of the special merits of this study is the importance which Cailliet attaches to the influence of Pascal's family upon his character and career. The sturdy realism and independence of his father, the intense, deeply emotional piety of his sister Jacqueline, the quieter, more practical devotion of Gilberte (Madame Perier)—all are seen to be factors which stimulated and gave form to Blaise's deepening religious maturity. The long, confused, and tragic story of Jansenism and Port Royal is

told largely in terms of the Pascal family's connection with it. Naturally enough, the report of the conflict between the Port-royalists and the Roman hierarchy is one-sided: the polemical caricature of the Jesuits in Pascal's *Letters* is taken for sober truth, and the cause of Jansenism fully exonerated from all offense.

Pascal was, in his own fashion, an authentic Christian saint. Cailliet is especially skillful in carrying the reader somewhat within the mystery and power of a life laid hold upon by God's sovereign grace. The two most significant climactic "conversions" (the "Jansenist quickening" of 1646 and the mystical crisis of November 23, 1654) are described and put in context. And Pascal's deliberate theological excursions (in the *Pensées,* the *Letters,* and the unfinished "Vindication of Christianity") are interpreted so as to appear parts of a comprehensive and compelling faith.

A consideration of the internal evidence concerning the author of this book strongly suggests that Cailliet himself is a Calvinist and that he has read his documents through highly polished Calvinist spectacles. He is too careful a scholar to attempt a positive identification of Calvinism and Jansenism, and he admits that there was not a single real "protestant" among the Port-royalists. But he proceeds to interpret their cardinal ideas about God's sovereign grace by means of references to "the five points of Calvinism," the Westminster Confession, Charles Hodge's *Systematic Theology,* and the Calvinist *sola Scriptura.* The result might be misleading for the unwary. For there is no denominational patent on the doctrine of divine sovereignty and, in any case, Catholic context of Port Royal gives their doctrine a different theological cast and flavor from its counterpart in Calvinism. Pascal himself recognized this (*Oeuvres,* XI, p. 133). The probity and piety of the Roman Church gained no lustre in the savage repression of Port Royal. But one misses the point when it is implied that Pascal can be understood as a crypto-Calvinist who never quite got around to breaking with Rome. St. Augustine has had many spiritual progeny; what Cailliet takes for siblings are, in this case, second cousins once removed.

Nevertheless, Cailliet's portrait of Pascal deserves warm praise and thoughtful attention. Pascal is incomparably the greatest religious figure in the seventeenth century, and it is an interesting fact that the atmosphere of *contemporary* theological discussion is much more congenial to Pascal's genius than was the case two decades ago. Hence, this instructive and provocative interpretation of his religious experience has a timely relevance.

ALBERT C. OUTLER

The United States Moves across the Pacific, by Kenneth Scott Latourette, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. ix, 174, $2.

It is an interesting fact that in 1936 almost half of the Protestant missionaries in China, and two-thirds of those in Japan and Korea, were from the United States. On the part of American Roman Catholics, likewise, missionary endeavor has been directed mainly to the Far East. Such facts are symptomatic. They reflect an aspect of what Professor Latourette calls America's "westward moving frontier." The settlers of our country, we are reminded, have long been accustomed to let their dreams follow the sun. Only a few years after the great rush to California, Commodore Perry opened up Japan; and even earlier, in the wake of the British, our traders had entered China. Our secretaries of state took the lead in proclaiming the "open-door" policy for China. Our troops helped police China after the Boxer uprising of 1900—many years earlier than any of our troops appeared in Europe.

And it was no European incident but the attack on Pearl Harbor which brought us at once into the war. Now with the war over, the United States finds itself plainly involved, more than any other Western nation, in the life and problems of the Far East. The significance for our foreign policy of this historic involvement is the subject of Professor Latourette's remarks in the present volume.

Professor Latourette notes that America's westward drive to the East has been largely nonviolent and nonannexionist. In its long history it has been inspired, he believes, more by ideals of unselfish service than by any sinister plot of capitalists. Statistics support this view: the transpacific commerce of the United States has never been as much as one-seventh of our total foreign trade; and our investments in the Far East as reported in 1930 made up but 2.33 per cent of the total of investments abroad. Moreover, the Far East cannot be said to promise for generations to come an outlet for American goods equal to that of Europe or of Latin America and Canada. In large part, therefore, our concern in politics across the Pacific reflects our traditional distaste for involvement in the internal quarrels of western Europe and our desire to express the New World's idealism in undeveloped countries across the other sea. However, this traditional American policy in the Far East now faces the danger of being betrayed into a course of imperialistic adventure—unwittingly, as England was drawn into India, in connection with responsibilities for keeping the peace. To forestall this danger, our future action must be in connection with some form of international organization world-wide in scope and enrolling in its membership not only neutral nations but also eventually our former enemies.

At present there is much speculation as to the possibility of a clash between Russia and the United States in the Far East. Professor Latourette outlines the danger but argues that Russia's logical field of interest is in Europe rather than in Asia. Moreover, he believes that no communist-inspired revolution could hold permanently the allegiance either of the Chinese or of the Japanese: Chinese culture is family-centred and individualistic, shaped by the Confucian principle of government by example rather than by force; and Japanese culture, while autocratic, is characterized by an ingrained obedience to the aristocracy. Ancient habits of the people cannot be summarily overthrown.

These facts will also exercise their limitations on American policy. Our government cannot reëducate the Japanese to adopt Anglo-Saxon democracy; the attempt would merely call into being a dangerous underground movement in Japan. Instead, our occupation authorities must encourage the influential and moderate leaders among the Japanese to reconstruct their own country freed of militarist elements; and as soon as possible our forces should be withdrawn. China also cannot be unified by American pressure. She must work out a stable regime for herself. Change in China will come from the bottom up, just as in Japan it will come—because of that nation's different culture—from the top down. In each case the most the United States government can do will be to give opportunity for constructive forces to work within these countries; it cannot by propaganda call forth the spiritual and moral vitality necessary to their rehabilitation. There are some things government cannot do; and here private agencies of education and religion have their sphere.

ROY W. BATTENHOUSE

In Him Is Life, by Robert H. Beaven, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 188, $1.50.

In this book the son of the late Albert W. Beaven, whose genius for friendship is introduced as an illustration (pp. 118 f.), stands forth as a champion of "the

traditional concepts of Christian faith." To make them relevant to the modern mind he will use, his introduction tells us, "an analogy with human friendship." Near the end he writes: "We have run the gamut of the major topics treated by Christian theology. . . . We have discussed them from a particular point of view, namely, that provided by an analogy with our human experience of friendship and love."

His first chapter is on the Trinity. When, in a bull session at a fraternity house, a student suggested to him that the Trinity "doesn't matter," he did not inform the student that the Trinity had, at best, been a majority opinion among Christians, and that for centuries many Baptists had repudiated it. Instead, he pointed out that the girl with whom the student was in love had a threefold character. 1. "There's just something about her." This "element of mystery" is God the Father. 2. She comes out of her shell enough to reveal herself as "a fine dancer, a good sport, a passable cook, a fair student, a good talker." God the Son. 3. "Our account of our friends is likely to end as did the boy's in the fraternity house: 'This all sounds pretty foolish, 'cause she's a lot more. . . . You've got to know her. . . . Anyway, I'm in love.' We recognize more than existence, more than 'knowledge about.' We recognize spirit. Is it strange that what is necessary to describe our human friendships should find its way into the descriptions of our relationship to God? Would we not, rather, be compelled to formulate the Trinity if it were not already at hand?"

Does not that rhetorical question border upon the absurd? By no stretch of the imagination could anyone's analysis of human love yield three distinct persons in the loved one. And without three distinct persons there is no Trinity. So the "analogy" underlying the whole book is, at this crucial point, not an analogy. There is a "significant difference," as the logicians say. At best, the experience of human friendship or love is but a poor illustration of the experience that led to the formulation of the trinitarian dogma. And given only the facts used in the illustration, we could certainly never "be compelled to formulate the Trinity if it were not already at hand."

The three persons of the Trinity, or rather, Beaven's idiosyncratic interpretations of them, provide the subjects for his next three chapters. "The Relevance of God for Man" deals with the individual's and society's need for a transcendent God, "The Will of God for Man" deals with the need for each man to get rid of self-centredness and to relate himself to other men in creative love, and "The Life of God with Man" deals with man's need for fellowship with God. Chapter V, "The Life of Man with God," deals with salvation, which is said to consist in a new relationship with God. The final chapter, "The Living Fellowship of Man and God," is upon the church. The primary concern of the church is "to discover and make available that experience of God out of which true service flows."

The author reveals an unusual capacity for reflection. He has a dialectical mind; frequently his motif is thesis-antithesis-synthesis. He has a good style, an aptness in illustration, and has many penetrating and valuable things to say. Had he not begun as a defender of a particular dogma, had the first chapter been dropped and the rest modified accordingly, his book would have been less ingenious and might have approached brilliance. Since he is president of the Baptist Missionary Training School of Chicago, his attitude to missions, which is antiliberal or, as he would prefer it, antimodernistic, is noteworthy (pp. 186 f.).

ROWLAND GRAY-SMITH

The Way, the Truth and the Life, by Glenn Clark, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. vi, 179, $1.50.

Many books have been written as aids to the Christian life; many have sought to guide and nurture the prayer-experience of Christians. It is a commendable purpose to help people but one fraught with danger. It should be obvious that the most worthy approach is that of the light touch and the delicate gesture; but how few there be that use them! The preference seems to be for some form of strict discipline, rigid conformity, or ingenious procedure for the unveiling of a hitherto spiritual mystery; for the display of cleverness in interpretation.

Glenn Clark is interested in prayer, and the title of this volume means that "the way" is the Sermon on the Mount, "the truth" is in the parables of Jesus, and "the life" is the life of Jesus. The explanation of this formula is fantastic. It is presented by means of diagrammatic relationships (pp. 101 f.); by "parables arranged in dynamic symmetry, like the stereoscopic lens, through contemplation of which one could step into a new dimension of thought and action" (p. 69); and by such whimsical interpretations as that the reason why the last chapter of the First Gospel has three references to Galilee—first by an angel, then by Jesus, and finally by Matthew—as "the goal of the Apostles" is to be found in the fact that Galilee means "circuit" and "In this completed 'circuit' of the Love of God and man, the disciples were able to see the resurrected Jesus and to get his message, and nowhere else. No one in the past, present or future, who refused or refuses to enter this circuit, has been or will be able to see Jesus" (p. 160).

When one begins to force free material into the confining patterns of preconceived judgments, almost anything can happen. Thus, "Spiritual Truth is presented in Scripture in three forms: Proverbs, Psalms and Parables. Proverbs are prose, Psalms are poetry and Parables are drama. Proverbs give us Truth as a concept, Psalms as a picture, Parables convert Truth into a moving picture. Proverbs make their appeal to the intellect, Psalms to the imagination, Parables to the will" (p. 100).

Since "Jesus took great care to wrap the Truth about the Kingdom in symbology and parable," the incident recorded in John 13:2-10 becomes the teaching of Jesus that "the Truth in the head is not the final step." Therefore Peter's request to "wash his head also" would have qualified him only to understand the truth, and he must first be clean to walk upon the way—and so his feet must be washed (p. 113).

When Jesus wanted to give a demonstration of prayer, he "selected Peter, James and John, who represented Faith, Hope and Love, and left behind him Thomas, who represented doubt, and Judas, who represented selfishness. He led these three up into a high mountain. Hills in the Bible always refer to elevated states of consciousness; and when 'hill' is changed to 'mountain' and the adjective 'high' is added, we can infer that it refers to prayer at its very highest culmination" (p. 119). The power that was in this mountaintop experience must be wired into the homes in the valley. Jesus, accordingly, had to investigate the wiring of the distressed child's father: first, his intellectual wiring; and second, his spiritual wiring (p. 121).

The cry of Jesus on the cross, "My God, my God," is his ingenious use of "a secret code more unique (!) than even his parable code revealed" (p. 174).

As though all this were not quite enough, there is the quotation, with approval, of a perfect gem of esoteric drivel in the discovery that "the principles upon which the human voice depends for its effective development and control . . . are replete with a religious symbolism which derives its basic tendency from the horizontal and

vertical lines of the cross. Every vocal effort, every movement of the tongue, lips, larynx, pharynx, diaphragm and jaw, and even the alignment of the body itself, conforms to these two tendencies of horizontality and verticality" (p. 147). There follow a page and a half of the most extravagant nonsense one can imagine.

It may be suspected by this time that the reviewer is doubtful about there being any real value in this book. If one desires confirmation of such a suspicion, let it be found in the frank statement that *The Way, The Truth and The Life* is a dangerous menace to sane and sensible prayer. Its exegesis is wholly unsound, its characterization of the New Testament and Jesus is the most insidious temptation to return to the outmoded allegory and cryptography of earlier days, and as for being a help to our praying, that is admissible only if one wishes to reduce prayer to the use of a talismanic formula and to the doubtful practice of enjoying a personal secret that has waited all these centuries before being revealed to simple souls. The author has become fascinated by his own cleverness and, thereby, verily he has his reward.

The dignified simplicities of worship and prayer will always remain as the natural expressions of the sincere worshiper. They are their own bulwarks against captious critics, inept imitators, and clever experimenters. Yet they are all too frequently forced to endure, by association, the stigma that rightly falls upon the puerile and senile extravagances of those who really worship only ingenuity. Amiel was right: "Cleverness is serviceable for everything, sufficient for nothing."

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Science, Liberty, and Peace, by Aldous Huxley, New York, Fellowship Publications, [distributed by Harper], 1946, pp. 86, 50 cents.

This brilliantly written booklet outlines a problem which is based upon a doubtful premise and then offers a solution which has contradictory implications. It is a small epic of confusion.

The problem is this—what can be done to check the progressive decline of liberty which has accompanied the progressive centralization of power during the twentieth century? Dr. Huxley maintains that progressive applied science has been an important factor in bringing about the centralization of power. "On many fronts nature has been conquered; but, as Tolstoy foresaw, man and his liberties have sustained a succession of defeats." It seems to me that it would be difficult to convince a farmer that his liberty would be enhanced by his refusal to use agricultural machinery. Anyone may elect to do without a telephone, but in this abnegation not many people would experience a stimulating sense of freedom. Applied science in many departments of life has made us more dependent, but at the same time it has given us all kinds of new freedoms.

Dr. Huxley believes that scientific workers can help to solve this problem by directing their energies toward the development of decentralized production rather than mass production and toward the development of instruments of peace rather than instruments of war. The difficulty with this thesis would seem to be that almost anything that can be done to promote small-scale production can be adapted more advantageously to promote mass production, and there are few applications of science that cannot be used either for good or for ill.

The booklet is sponsored by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, perhaps because there is a favorable reference to *Satyagraha* or war without violence, but Dr. Huxley deplores the fact that modern concentrations of military power make it impracticable

for the masses to revolt with violence. "After a century of scientific and technological progress, no weapons available to the masses of the people can compete with those in the arsensals controlled by the ruling minority." There might be a difference of opinion on this point, but since Dr. Huxley abhors war, why should he not be grateful to science for making revolution impracticable?

Although he castigates nationalism, he urges national economic self-sufficiency and a minimum of international trade. "The material havoc wrought by applied science in the service of nationalism is such that it will take a generation to repair the damage." This may be granted (if you wish) but Dr. Huxley then calls for "regional self-sufficiency in food production" and "finding means for providing all countries, whatever their natural resources, with a sufficiency of power." "Recent history makes it abundantly clear that nations as at present constituted are quite unfit to have extensive commercial dealings with one another." Such ideas seem to me to be nationalistic in the extreme.

He considers the press to be a dangerous instrument of propaganda, but he quotes statistics to show that people do not believe what they read. He dislikes government controls, and yet he insists upon arrangements which depend upon such controls. He scorns the United Nations as a superconcentration of power, but he calls for international agreement among technologists. He believes liberty (whatever that may be) is more important than security, and yet he criticizes present economic systems because they do not give security.

It is remarkable that so much confusion could be condensed into such a small volume.

EUGENE AYRES

League of Nations and National Minorities, by P. de Azcárate, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, [distributed by Columbia University Press], 1945, pp. ix, 216, $2.

This concise and informative work is one of a series of historical and descriptive studies sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment as aids to postwar reconstruction. The author, formerly a professor of administrative law at the University of Granada and for fourteen years a civilian expert on the League of Nations staff, including a term as director of its Minorities Questions Section, manifests a high degree of objectivity and suggestive insight. Had all statesmen charged with international responsibility approached their task in similar spirit, the world's first serious attempt at international organization would have succeeded. This record accordingly becomes a valuable guide for diplomatic and administrative officers and also for unofficial moulders of public opinion concerned with the effective development of the United Nations. Christian ministers may well draw upon its facts and outlook for use in sermons and other public addresses.

Dr. de Azcárate examines the treatment of minorities in Europe and Asia Minor between the two world wars, especially such minorities as had been ruled by the old Russian, German, Austrian, and Turkish empires. He devotes most detailed study to policies and actions related to Upper Silesia, both as a type and as the field of his own distinctive service and competence, revealing the ways in which fundamental issues were occasionally bravely faced and at other times shelved or buried in red tape or in the passing of responsibility from one agency to another. He advocates careful study by disinterested, highly qualified experts. A constructive official report prepared by such specialists in 1929 and dealing with the protection of minorities comprises a fifty-page appendix.

In the author's view national minorities are determined less by race than by language and culture. Fundamentally illogical in concept and origin, they represent ponderous, highly self-conscious and inflammable danger zones. The treaties following World War I were more interested in the political than humanitarian aspects of the European minorities question. It was therefore easy for a minority in one state to become the football of a supposedly similar group making up the majority in some neighboring state. The German Republic thus encouraged unrest among German minorities in Poland, establishing a "fifth column" which Hitler extended. Although the original boundary between Czechoslovakia and Germany may have been unwisely drawn, the German minorities under Prague's jurisdiction were relatively quiescent until fanned into flame by the propaganda and prodding of the Third Reich in 1938.

Neither suppression nor change of minorities constitutes a satisfactory solution. Equal treatment before the law and in actuality supplies the ideal answer. Even a frontier absurdly drawn is tolerable if relations between the countries involved are cordial. The task, once boundaries have been fixed with reasonable justice, is to maintain good feelings on both sides through the use of the best techniques of world concern and international responsibility. Dr. de Azcárate assumed that at the end of World War II the boundaries of Europe would be readjusted according to national consciousness and fundamental good sense rather than power politics. Whether or not this ideal will be realized, he has given his generation and posterity a thoughtful, legal, and ethical analysis by which to evaluate the international conduct of the next few years.

EARL CRANSTON

Lay My Burden Down: A Folk History of Slavery, edited by B. A. Botkin, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1945, pp. xxi, 286, $3.50.

Lay My Burden Down is a testimony of ex-slaves, from a project proposed in 1934 by Lawrence D. Reddick to Harry L. Hopkins, director of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. It became in 1936 a project of the Works Progress Administration by white and Negro workers of the Federal Writers' Project in the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. The narratives that make up this book are taken from the large collection of life history and interview material gathered from more than two thousand ex-slaves.

Though many inaccuracies must occur because the ex-slaves relied on memory, one gets the feeling that the narratives are essentially true and that an adequate picture of what slavery was like is recorded here. Many things, well-known and things not generally known, are brought to the fore. By and large, these ex-slaves show no bitterness as they tell their stories. Though some of them express themselves as being undisturbed by the stigma of slavery, it is clear that a vast number of them show that they hated slavery and were happy to be free. Many slaves were good obedient servants and accepted their lot without obvious protest; others displayed signs of restlessness, running away to freedom and often fighting back when their masters beat them. One finds evidence that there were slaves who would fight back and be killed rather than endure abuse; a case or two of suicide rather than accept constant whipping; and a case where a slave boasted to his master, "I never had a whopping and you can't whop me." The master, being afraid to try to whip the slave, shot him dead on the spot.

The common knowledge of how loyal some slaves were to the families of their masters while the latter were off at war is vividly portrayed. The narratives also show that some masters were not harsh, while others made life almost unbearable for the slaves. A few instances of hanging of slaves occur, and cases where slaves killed overseers and occasionally a master.

By and large, the ex-slaves used the language of their masters and refer to Negroes as "niggers." Seldom do the ex-slaves use the word *Negro*. They accepted without protest the derogatory term *nigger* which was so characteristic of slave days and which is all too prevalent today.

The plight of many of the slaves is revealed in that they were turned loose without learning and without economic security. It is not surprising that many of them preferred to remain with their former masters and did. When one sees how little regard there was for life, for marriage, and how lightly even many of the masters regarded the so-called marriages, it is amazing how rapidly real marriage and wholesome family life developed among the Negro people. Slavery did not contribute to good family life and encouraged loose living among the slaves and immorality among the masters.

That the life of the slave was cheap and that they were considered subhuman is seen not only by the way most of the slaves were treated but also by the way they were buried. One ex-slave says: "If a slave die, Massa made the rest of us tie a rope around he feet and drag him off. Never buried one, it was too much trouble." Another ex-slave says: "When a nigger died, they let his folks come out the fields to see him afore he died. They buried him the same day, take a big plank and bust it with a ax in the middle 'nough to bend it back, and put the dead nigger in betwixt it. They'd cart them down to the graveyard on the place and not bury them deep 'nough that buzzards wouldn't come circling round. Niggers mourns now, but in them days they wasn't no time for mourning."

Though the book gets monotonous at times, it is interesting reading and the public is indebted to the Federal Project Writers and to Mr. Botkin for giving the world this insight into slavery and its horrors from those who experienced it and know it best. The testimonies show that in the main Negroes hated slavery and were not happy in it as many people would have us believe.

BENJAMIN E. MAYS

BOOK NOTICES

The Faith of a Protestant, by W. Burnet Easton, Jr., Macmillan, 1946, pp. xi, 76, $1.50.

This is a useful, plain, and nontechnical book which undertakes to set forth exactly what its title describes. It aims to do this in a positive way. At the same time, it combines modern views with those traditionally associated with Protestantism. The purpose of this is obviously to commend Protestantism to the reader. But it is not so certain that this effect will follow. It is a quite modern idea that Jesus' baptism was a "profound experience," and that his dialogue with the disciples near Cæsarea Philippi was another profound experience. Moreover, the use of the crying baby as an illustration of original sin, popular as it is at the present day, is perfect nonsense. The baby is not trying to "impose his will upon the universe." Instead, he is simply endeavoring to survive. His first cries are necessary if he is to breathe properly. His cries for food are the only way in which his hunger can be satisfied, that is, the only way he can obtain food. It is a curious and antiquated view of childhood which turns babies into small-sized adults and treats them as if they were motivated by the passions of maturity. A crying adult may be trying to "impose his will upon the universe," but it is a singularly unsympathetic view of childhood which views a baby's cries in this way. On the other hand, the chapter on the resurrection is capital and points out the proper approach to that subject. Protestantism, which is fundamentally a faith, not a system of dogma, starts with I Corinthians 15, not with the last chapter of Mark, for its doctrine of the resurrection. It is a question whether the chapter on the church will satisfy many readers. Of course, Jesus did not "found" a church. On the other hand, the ministry, for most Protestants, is not so purely functional and adventitious a development of Christianity as is here represented. This book is "the faith of *a* Protestant," not a systematic or historical exposition of *the* Protestant Faith. The proofreading could have been better: p. 23, "Westminister"; p. 63, "twittered"—or did she, really?

FREDERICK C. GRANT

The Religion of Russia, by Robert Pierce Casey, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. viii, 198, $2.

The author of this small book undertook an ambitious project: nothing less than the story of Russian Christianity from its beginnings after Vladimir's reign to our day. The remarkable thing about it is that he has succeeded quite well in his project. The story is a mere sketch, particularly that prior to Peter the Great; there are, necessarily, many omissions. But what it includes rests on competent knowledge of the whole field which is evident throughout. One feels that the author's knowledge of the subject is like an iceberg: only a small part of it is in sight; the bulk is below the surface. Beside the feat of telling the story of the Russian church succinctly, the author managed, in the short space at his disposal, to insert a surprising amount of germane (and sometimes not germane) material which is not often found even in ponderous tomes devoted to the same subject. Most of it is freshly minted bullion from the mines of widely dispersed source materials. Thus he finds room for a sample of antireligious propaganda taken from an actual Konsomol amateur play, which certainly adds zest to the narrative. There are also extensive quotations from

The Truth about Religion in Russia, a collection of important official documents published by the patriarchate in 1943. The author also draws illustrative excerpts from recent Russian literature; among other sources he employs modern folklore of the non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he includes a fairly extensive treatment of the early attempts of the representatives of the Oxford Movement to establish fraternal ecclesiastical relations with the Russian church. Just one inaccuracy needs to be pointed out: in dealing with Tikhon, the author asserts that the patriarch "abdicated" his office in 1922 (p. 107). This is not so. Patriarch Tikhon merely entrusted the chancery to the group of the "Living Church" clergy, at the time he himself was arrested.

MATTHEW SPINKA

Jesus, the Man of Prayer, by John Henry Strong, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1945, pp. ix, 166, $1.35.

Such a book, based upon the prayer life of Jesus and written in a warmly devotional vein, does not easily lend itself to an objective appraisal. The reviewer can only comment on its timeliness, outline its contents, and speak of its excellencies. *Jesus, the Man of Prayer* has a life-situational approach designed to meet the needs of specific persons. One group consists of those who have been religiously reared but are spiritually adrift and therefore "isolationist to all higher control." Another group are those secularists who because of the world's tragedy are turning away from materialism in search of something more satisfying. Prayer is the answer to man's deepest hunger and to our Specialist and Exemplar we must turn. The Master never told us to understand prayer, for that would have left us a problem rather than a duty; our Lord simply admonished men to pray, confident of the results. The opening chapter in this slender volume reveals the crises Jesus met and mastered through prayer, crises common to all. The remaining chapters consist of expositions of the kinds of prayer Christ employed at certain crisis times, and their significance for us. For example, at his baptism Jesus made a prayer of consecration, which we also must do to bring our lives into line with God's purpose for us. So life's demands call for the prayer of dependence; the needs of others, for the prayer of intercession; benefits bestowed, for the prayer of thanksgiving. In the sixth chapter there is a thoughtful consideration of the prayer of submission when suffering and death may be faced in some Gethsemane. The final chapter on the prayer of communion is a glowing defense of mysticism. The few typographical errors have been corrected by the author in a supplementary *errata* card. The numerous scripture references are clearly indicated in the index. The book is lovingly dedicated to the author's father, Augustus Hopkins Strong, of revered memory. Illustrations from the lives of evangelists and missionaries, personal experiences and touching anecdotes about children—these illumine and enforce the lessons taught. The book is a faithful portrayal of Jesus as a man of prayer by one whose own personal testimony is a sincere and eloquent call to prayer. "Book knowledge is hollow, ghostly knowledge" in comparison with the higher wisdom available for those who pray "in the fellowship of Christ, by the power of the Spirit, for the glory of God." This philosophy of the author will prove conclusive for many troubled souls who confront the needs and problems of this tragic age.

VAUGHAN DABNEY

Deep River, by Howard Thurman, Oakland (Cal.), Eucalyptus Press, 1945, pp. 40, $2.

We have here an introduction and four essays or meditations—to use the author's designation—based upon and furnishing an interpretation of the Negro spirituals, the whole being fused by a quality of inspiration somewhat unusual in works having a scholastic imprint—or am I biased? To be sure, there is a thesis, namely, "that the texts of the Spirituals reveal the contribution which the songs themselves made to the minds and spirits of the people who first sang them. The melody and rhythm, meaningful though they are, tend to deal with the external effect of the songs upon the hearer." In the exposition of this thesis Mr. Thurman, utilizing the texts of the spirituals, discusses first their source, or rather sources, since there are three of major importance: the Bible, the world of nature, and the personal experience which was the common lot of the people. There then follows a textual analysis from the standpoint of the Negro, which for insight and sensitivity quite transcends the realm of scholarship. It is, furthermore, of a type not to be discovered by even the most diligent research in, for example, the music encyclopædias. One need not be a specialist to realize how apposite this background becomes in interpreting the *total* spiritual. The musical reader, particularly, is provided with information which—*multum in parvo*—is out of all proportion to the bulk of Mr. Thurman's slender volume. The thought of the foregoing sentence is, however, mine and not the author's. For Mr. Thurman is not, primarily, concerned with information as such. His objective is to provide something that will shield the modern reader from the spiritual torment which is so characteristic of our age. And in furtherance of this aim he has written in the last meditation (entitled "Deep River") as fine an example of philosophic religious reflection as it has been my good fortune to encounter. It would be ungracious not to commend Mills College for the format of this product of its press. After some five years of wartime restrictions it comes as a relief to read once more a book the quality of whose paper and style of printing are a pleasure to the eye.

WALTER HELFER

The Incarnation of the Word of God by St. Athanasius, translated by A Religious of C.S.M.V. S.Th., New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. 96, $1.50.

This is a very useful little book, and we need more like it. One of the weaknesses of today is the almost universal ignorance of the classics. The pointed word of C. S. Lewis, who has written an altogether charming introduction to this little volume, should be pondered:

> This mistaken preference for the modern books and this shyness of the old ones is nowhere more rampant than in theology. Wherever you find a little study circle of Christian laity you can be almost certain that they are studying not St. Luke or St. Augustine or Thomas Aquinas or Hooker or Butler, but M. Berdyaev or M. Maritain or M. Niebuhr or Miss Sayers or even myself.

Nor when he continues: "Now this seems to me topsy-turvy," does he go too far. To know the classics of the past is not to dwell in the past, although it is popular today so to excuse our ignorance. One of the real difficulties to this knowledge lies in the fact that for many the doors are locked because, on the one hand, we do not believe in wasting our time learning dead languages, and, on the other, adequate and readable translations are so few. This excellent translation of one of Athanasius' earliest writings, long before the bogey of Arius rose before his eyes, is a modest step toward making available for our day the heritage of the past. It is an excellent

and readable version intended for the general reader. A brief "life of Athanasius" is prefixed by the translator. It is to be hoped that insofar as this volume is a trial balloon—to see if modern readers can interest themselves in day before yesterday—it will have a successful flight and will lead to many more like it.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

Lincoln and the Land of the Sangamon, by Louis Obed Renne, Boston, Chapman and Grimes, ©1945, pp. 140, $2.50.

To one who, in his boyhood, has fished for sunfish in the Frankford Creek—and sometimes caught them—and drowsily listened the while to the buzzing of dragonflies and thought he was very near to heaven, the Sangamon is not so terribly important even though Lincoln lived there. In fact, to those of us who think of Lincoln as a cosmic figure, local loves and local shrines are not exactly of eternal value. And yet, we walk reverently and understandingly with Dr. Renne (for surely he must be one of us preachers) as he takes us into the land of his boyhood and touches again the chords of memory that will ever sound richly for us all. Dr. Renne tells us of the places where Lincoln lived before he belonged to the ages; of what old folks, some of them Dr. Renne's uncles and aunts, remembered about Lincoln. We do not know these old folks, but their stories seem in keeping with the Lincoln whom America loves to remember. We are, however, acquainted with William Henry Herndon, Esq., Lincoln's onetime law partner and imaginative biographer. And we are not altogether willing to accept as factual everything the redoubtable Billy tells us. Dr. Renne likes the Lincoln that Edgar Lee Masters and Dr. Barton and even Carl Sandburg love to paint. He quotes the Anne Rutledge poem—a sweet bit of verse, dear to those who love the sad Lincoln whose life was so cruelly blasted by a frustrated early love. How our sentimentalists have reveled in this bit of Americana! As if you, Mr. Hard-Boiled Preacher (and there are a few of us museum pieces still around!), have wandered through life downcast, saddened, lonely, and even embittered because you did not marry the first lovely girl with whom you played "spin the plate"! About the middle of the book, Dr. Renne leaves the Sangamon and takes us to Washington, giving us a brief résumé of the life and administration of Lincoln the President. The volume belongs to the realm of sentimental Lincolniana, it is true. But it is refreshing and human. It is a joy always to clasp hands in our muckraking and factual age ("factual" means here "a little dirty" combined with an adeptness in making the worse appear the better reason)—it is always a joy to clasp hands with Victorian enthusiasm and faith.

ALEXANDER MACKIE

Bible for the Liberal, edited by Dagobert D. Runes, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1946, pp. xii, 368, $3.50.

Frankly I am not favorably impressed by this book. It appears to me to evidence a distinctly arrogant and supercilious attitude—the air is fine up here, how is it down there? The title itself is in questionable taste. Who is this "liberal"? The preface states: "Liberals of our time hardly ever read the Bible. I made wide inquiries among them; some of them just shrugged their shoulders, others had derisive words for the 'ramblings of ancient Hebrews.' A few made patronizing remarks about the 'some good that is in the Testaments.'" Haughty disdain like this, for what one is ignorant of is scarcely an attitude that warrants the term

"liberal." And the preface itself, with its list of "Authors of the Biblical Writings," scarcely warrants the confidence that the editor is himself profoundly learned in the literature he jauntily excerpts. Moses, Job, David, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jesus (son of Sirach), Jesus the Christ, Saul—these are the "authors" of the several sections printed. In certain circles it is customary to talk airily about "Jeshu ben Joseph." To me it seems no indication of either scholarship or a liberal approach, but simply a vulgar evidence of skin-deep and sneering erudition. And to toss in references to the "Thoraic-Messiah" is also easy but not tremendously impressive. It is not surprising, however, in an editor who refers to the selections he has excerpted as being "presented in the original King James version" and who passes on the interesting information about Ecclesiasticus (which he prints in its entirety) that "parts of the original Hebrew manuscript were discovered at the beginning of the 20th century in an ancient synagogue in Egypt." Nor is it anything except shoddy, third-hand, pseudoscholarship that leads a man to style the excerpts which he makes from the Gospel of Matthew "From the Gospel of Levi." The only other selection from the New Testament is I Corinthians 13, which is styled: "A Letter by Saul." The actual contents of the book, stripped of their jaunty titles are: fifteen pages from the Pentateuch, Job, sixteen Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, one page of Isaiah, Lamentations, twenty pages of the Wisdom of Solomon, Ecclesiasticus, excerpts from Matthew, and I Corinthians 13. Why a well-known churchman—I withhold his name through obedience to the Golden Rule—should write of the book (the publishers include the mimeographed letter): "'A Bible for the Liberal' constitutes a valuable study in comparative Religion, in simple form, and should be used in both Christian and Jewish schools of Theology," I will not presume to guess.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Inner Victory: Two Hundred Sermons, by Charles E. Park, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1946, pp. 203, $1.75.

Any one of these two hundred sermons can easily be read aloud in less than two minutes, but it could not be forgotten in many times two minutes. One thinks about the choice of texts; few are the old, familiar ones, and even these reveal new facets by the reflection upon them of the author's insight. The titles are arresting, not because they are bizarre but because they speak directly to our interest and subtly to our imagination. The sermons themselves are chaste revelations of those deep truths, beautifully expressed, that convince us of our better selves and confirm us in our faith in a universal self that is the source of our ideals and the inexhaustible resource of power for their realization. It is a sheer delight to find thought so happily wedded to feeling that religion becomes invested with a genuine dignity. Oh, that more sermons followed this pattern!

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Tibetan Voices, by Robert B. Ekvall, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. 63, $1.50.

This is an interesting reprinted collection of fourteen dramatic monologues in free verse, written by one who has lived many years in Tibet. Deep insights into Oriental character and the impact of Christianity on it are revealed in the poems. The illustrations by Miss Jean Hammond add to the effectiveness of the characterizations and the attractiveness of the volume.

CHARLES E. BATTEN

Manufacture of Christianity, by Thomas Albert, Philadelphia, Dorrance, ©1946, pp. 177, $1.75.

Rarely have I read a more tasteless and worthless book than this silly little piece of trash. The thesis (if so dignified a word is legitimate) is that the Gospel of Matthew is simply a distorted and perverted version of the Gospel of Luke, from which Matthew "stole almost all of his book's material." Mark is not a common source, but a late writing, "copied alternately from Matthew and Luke, switching from one to the other about a dozen times." The demonstration of this brilliant and original thesis lies in having Matthew, a scribe and rabbi in Alexandria, tell (in the first person) how he had deliberately "plagiarized Luke," "cleverly distorting everything to make it agree with his own personal prejudices, his own bigoted opinions, his own racial views and his own ecclesiastical interests." If you omit the adverb "cleverly," you have a fair description of Mr. Albert's own volume. Why any publisher, especially in these days of shortage of paper, would be willing to give his impress to such twaddle is distinctly the most interesting query raised by the book.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

The Nature and Purpose of the Gospels, by R. V. G. Tasker, New York, Harper, ©1944, pp. x, 137, $1.50.

This is a series of seven lectures (with two appendices) intended for a semi-popular audience—"teachers, clergy, and others interested in Christian Education." The style is easy and direct, and the material is presented in an interesting manner. In addition to chapters on each of the gospels there is one devoted to the "gospel behind the gospels" and two to the kingdom of God. Two brief appendices discuss the extracanonical gospels and the importance of the study of New Testament Greek. While the volume evidences thorough familiarity with all the details of gospel analysis, the author has sought, and successfully, to make it intelligible and interesting to those who are not themselves experts. In his treatment of the gospels he frankly recognizes that all gospel material is influenced by what he calls "Christian doctrine," and that the earlier attempts, common twenty-five years ago, to approach the gospels by first separating out the material which seemed to the modern critic "ethically sound" and the sort of thing which he would himself want to maintain, and then to say, "Here is what Jesus was and taught; the rest is simply accretions due to his disciples' failure to understand him," are quite unjustified and misleading. This emphasis is sound and skillfully done. At the same time he tends to minimize what he calls the "intense second adventism" which has been ascribed to the early disciples and Jesus. Here I am less certain that he is justified. As a result he finds the unique quality of the gospels to be due to the fact that they are "records of certain deeds and sayings significant because they are the deeds of God Himself in the human life and death of the one man considered their Lord and Master." The volume combines a keen discernment and critical faculty which provide a vivid and, to my mind, essentially true picture of the nature of the gospels—although at times I would have phrased myself quite differently—with a strong emphasis upon the present much touted crisis theology: the sinfulness of man, his need for outside help, and the centrality of the atonement. This combination will probably appeal to many readers; I find much in the latter emphasis on very doubtful ground.

MORTON S. ENSLIN

BOOKS RECEIVED

**Foundations for Reconstruction,* by Elton Trueblood, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. 109, $1.

**The Christian Future,* by Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. xii, 248, $2.50.

**The Christian Pattern,* by Hugh Stevenson Tigner, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. vii, 80, $1.50.

**The Apocryphal Literature,* by Charles Cutler Torrey, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945, pp. x, 151, $3.

Our Hearts Are Restless, by Gilbert Kilpack, Wallingford (Pa.), Pendle Hill Pamphlet 32, n.d., pp. 37, 25 cents.

A pamphlet for devotional reading.

**The Devotional Life of Christian Leaders,* by Clarence W. Cranford, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1946, pp. 71, no price.

**Discerning the Signs of the Times,* by Reinhold Niebuhr, New York, Scribner, 1946, pp. x, 194, $2.50.

**The Peace That Is Left,* by Emile Cammaerts, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. x, 150, $2.

**Christian Leadership in a World Society,* edited by Justin Wroe Nixon and Winthrop Still Hudson, Rochester (N. Y.), Colgate-Rochester Divinity School, 1945, pp. 273, $2.

**The Fallow Land,* by Constancio C. Vigil, translated by Lawrence Smith, Boston, Bruce Humphries, n.d., pp. 207, $2.50.

**Faith and Reason,* by Nels F. S. Ferré, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xii, 251, $2.50.

**Conversations with an Unrepentant Liberal,* by Julius Seelye Bixler, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1946, pp. x, 113, $2.

**Christianity Rightly So Called,* by Samuel G. Craig, Philadelphia, Presbyterian and Reformed, 1946, pp. viii, 270, $2.

Now to Live, by Ralph W. Sockman, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1946, pp. 214, $2.

Twenty-five sermons "chosen from those meeting two tests: large audience response, and value unaffected by passing headlines of the hour."

**New Testament Life and Literature,* by Donald W. Riddle and Harold H. Hutson, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, ©1946, pp. 263, $3.

**The Catholic Apostolic Church,* by P. E. Shaw, New York, King's Crown, 1946, pp. 264, $3.25.

**Best Sermons: 1946 Edition,* edited by G. Paul Butler, New York, Harper, ©1946, pp. xx, 324, $2.75.

**Religion in America,* by Willard L. Sperry, New York, Macmillan, 1946, pp. xi, 318, $2.50.

**We Have This Ministry,* edited by John Oliver Nelson, New York, Association Press, ©1946, pp. xi, 93, $1.50.

**Genesis: a Devotional Commentary,* by W. H. Griffith Thomas, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1946, pp. 507, $3.50.

**The Mishnah: Berakoth, Peah, Demai,* edited by Jacob David Herzog, New York, Bloch, ©1945.

* To be reviewed.